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1Introduction
In 1912 a lawsuit was waged over a woman’s right to own and bequeath property 
on her own accord. The woman, who was now dead, had remarried in her wid-
owhood with a three-year-old son. To her new marriage she brought 200 wŏn, 
with which she purchased nine parcels (majigi) of rice paddy. It was this land she 
bequeathed to her two sons: four parcels to the son from her previous marriage 
and the rest to the son of her second marriage. The plaintiff, who seems to have 
been a creditor of the second son, sued the first son, demanding that he hand over 
his parcels. He denied the first son’s claim to the land, arguing that the widow did 
not have the right to leave property to her son from a previous marriage: “Accord-
ing to Korean custom, it is a certain fact that a wife does not have any legal capac-
ity; she cannot meddle at all with matters of property while the husband is living 
and must absolutely submit herself to the husband.”1
Many aspects of this case are surprising to the modern reader. The life choices 
of this deceased woman defy contemporary notions about what was possible for a 
common Korean woman at the turn of the twentieth century. She chose to remarry 
instead of remaining single in chaste widowhood, and she was able to bring her 
son into her second marriage. She also exercised a significant degree of property 
rights, buying land with her own money and gifting it on her own accord. The 
Japanese judges of the High Court of Colonial Korea (Chōsen kōtō hōin), against 
the expectations of modern readers accustomed to assumptions about the abject 
status of women in premodern Korea and their even worse status under Japanese 
colonial rule, surprisingly defended the property rights of the woman. The judges’ 
statement read, “There is no law or Korean custom that bans a woman with a 
living husband from buying property with her money and bequeathing it to her 
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children.” Comments that were most severely damaging to women’s property 
rights came not from the colonial judges but from the Korean plaintiff, with his 
confident claim that “Korean custom” categorically denied any property rights to 
women and prescribed “absolute submission” of wives to husbands.
This 1912 case exposes a gap between what we have come to believe about 
women’s legal status under Japanese colonial rule and how women were dealt with 
in practice. In the following pages I explore the transformation of women’s legal 
rights in the creation of the small patriarchal family that emerged out of Japanese 
imposition of the household system during the Japanese colonial period. This 
transformation is visible to us in records of women’s active participation in civil 
lawsuits.
THE DEBATE OVER HOJUJE  AB OLITION
Many of the assumptions about women under Japanese colonial rule that have 
become conventional knowledge in South Korea were created in the late 1990s, 
finding wide currency in the heated public debate to abolish the household-head 
system (hojuje) installed by the Japanese, beginning with the implementation of 
their version of the household-registration system (K: hojŏk; J: koseki) in 1909.2 The 
debate in South Korea that culminated in the 2003 National Assembly decision to 
abolish the old registry system homed in on the colonial origin of that system, 
which had been obfuscated during the postwar years in South Korea. Formulated 
in the Japanese metropole, the household system was disseminated throughout 
Japan’s colonies as the administrative foundation of the Japanese Empire and its 
family-state ideology. It met diverging fates in different territories as the empire 
was dismembered after Japan’s defeat in World War II: it was abolished in the 
Japanese homeland under U.S. occupation as a culprit in wartime mobilization 
and dismantled in North Korea as a vestige of feudalism, but it was embraced in 
South Korea as “Korean tradition,” against strong opposition from women’s groups 
for its discriminatory orientation.3
The debate that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s framed the house-
hold-head system anew, as not simply an issue of gender discrimination but 
also an issue of colonial legacy. The colonial origin of the registry came as a sur-
prise to many Koreans, and this new angle of discourse provoked an explosive 
response during the time of heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea in 
the 2000s.4 Pundits began pitting the registry’s colonial legacy squarely against the 
claim to “tradition” that was the core of the argument of the system’s proponents. 
“Many think that hojuje is our Confucian tradition,” one critic pointed out, “but 
in fact it was a product of Japanese “spiritual invasion [sasang ch’im’nyak]. ”5 The 
sex-discrimination aspect of the registry, they argued, also was a colonial imposi-
tion rather than Korean tradition. Revisionist histories of family culture in the 
Chosŏn dynasty and scholarship on the family-state ideology of wartime Japan 
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added academic support to the argument that misogynistic family culture was not 
Korean tradition but a product of Japanese colonial rule.
After the abolition of the household-head system, the old registry was replaced 
with a new registry (kajok kwan’gye tŭngnokpu) in 2008 that was based on the 
individual but still fell short of solving all problems. One issue highlighted in the 
public debate over the old registry was the suffering that it imposed on the fast-
growing number of nonnormative families in ever-changing Korean society. The 
tribulations of divorced mothers, in particular, struck a chord in Korean society: 
under the old system, a divorced mother, even if she had full custody of her child, 
could not exercise full parental rights because of the restrictions of the registry, 
with its basis in patrilineal principles that never severed the parental rights of the 
father. For any official business such as school registration, a mother had to  produce 
the family register of her child’s birth father, where the child was  registered as 
his child. Similar problems continued even after the old registries were abolished, 
since the residential registry (chumin tŭngnokpu) continued to register  family 
members under their relationship to the “head of the household” (sedaeju). As 
residential registries are routinely required for all official business, from school 
registrations to job applications, nonnormative families have been particularly 
concerned with the exposure of their private family lives through these registries. 
“I remarried so that I could give my children a proper family, but my children are 
stigmatized on the registry as ‘coresident [tong’gŏ’in],’ as if they are not part of 
the family,” lamented one woman in a 2015 article about the new family-relations 
registry.6
The continued struggles of families in South Korea with the idiosyncratic fea-
tures of the family registry aptly illustrate the long legacy of a household system 
that even abolishment could not undo. Although the new system aimed to over-
haul the patriarchal hierarchy and the patrilineal principles of the old system, it 
could not shake fully free of some of the major features of the old family registry: 
the privileging of familial relationships in defining one’s personal identity and the 
primacy of the patriarchal nuclear family unit as the underlying organizing (albeit 
now hidden) principle of official registration.
Even more significant for contemporary Korea than the Japanese imposition of 
a household-registry system was the larger realm of practice of which that system 
was a part, for it is there that the enduring legacy of Japanese colonial rule truly 
lies. The Japanese made the small patriarchal family the official administrative unit 
in Korea and the basis of their family-law regime. The Japanese imposed a new 
boundary around the household and exercised exclusive power in administering 
the newly defined family unit. This, rather than the strengthening of patriarchal 
power, was the significant innovation in the Japanese colonial household system. 
That Korea was strongly patriarchal before the onset of colonialism is no secret. 
As we have seen earlier and as will be repeatedly evident, it was Korean men who 
pushed to strengthen patriarchal customs when the colonial household system 
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threatened to weaken their position by dissolving the traditional lineage system, 
or the traditional patrilineal descent group.7 A quantitative gauge of patriarchal 
power therefore would be the wrong means to assess change in the family system 
in this period: the impact of the Japanese household system becomes pronounced 
only when we look at it as a contest between two family systems that were both 
patriarchal.
This contest between two patriarchal family systems produced particular gen-
der dynamics in the colonial legal system. Koreans were not passive receptors of 
these colonial family policies. Korean men, as noted, actively pushed back against 
the colonial household system. Nor were Korean women passive victims of the 
colonial legal policies; they actively participated in the colonial legal system in an 
effort to claim their rights and to protect those rights through official channels. 
Furthermore, to expand their rights in Korea, they at times pushed to expand the 
application of Japanese laws to Korea. The colonial state, in turn, eagerly mobilized 
women’s—and other reform-minded Koreans’—desire for legal integration to pro-
mote the colonial goal of assimilation.
FAMILY L AW AND JAPANESE ASSIMIL ATION POLICY
The reason why colonial family laws were accepted as tradition in post-1945 South 
Korea was that the Japanese legal system fundamentally relied on Korean customs 
to adjudicate family matters between Koreans. While most of the Japanese Civil 
Code was transposed through the Civil Ordinances in Korea (chōsen minjirei, 
1912), a small but significant exception was the rules governing family matters. To 
the family affairs of Koreans and cases between Koreans the courts applied “Korean 
custom” (chōsen kanshū), a noncodified and loosely defined set of family customs 
produced through surveys of customs and inquiries conducted by the Office of 
the Governor General (also known as the Government General [Sōtokufu]).8 The 
Japanese, in other words, operated a hybrid legal system in Korea, where a single 
legal system applied different laws depending on the litigants involved: Japanese 
litigants were subject to Japanese laws, and Koreans to Korean customs. This pro-
cess, intended to lead to the ultimate goal of a legally integrated Japanese Empire, 
was premised on the concept that the various legal spheres would be integrated 
as the “level of the peoples” (mindo) was raised.9 Following this logic, the exemp-
tions to the Japanese Civil Code were incrementally diminished over the period 
of colonial rule. The exception for family matters, which followed precedents in 
European colonies, seems to have been devised to serve other objectives as well. 
For one, relying on Korean customary laws was useful for maintaining stability in 
the colony as well as for appeasing the local elite, to whom continuity (however 
deceptive and fleeting) was appealing.
Applying different laws to different nationals in Korea required maintaining 
a division between those who belonged to the Japanese metropole, that is, were 
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citizens of Japan, and Koreans, who were colonial subjects. This was one of the key 
roles of the household registers.10 The household-registry system, thus, was more 
than just an administrative system of identity registry; it also was a system for 
the verification of national belonging within the expanding empire and, thereby, a 
critical part of the colonial legal system.11 The “original place of registry” (honseki) 
in the registry functioned as a de facto marker of nationality, as moving the hon-
seki was not allowed until the end of Japanese rule—despite demands for change 
as practical needs mounted for both Koreans and Japanese.12
The organization of civil laws through the utilization of family customs also, 
significantly, helped the colonial government manage the tension created by its 
goal of assimilation (dōka) and the continuing reality of discrimination. This ten-
sion was most intensely felt by the Japanese on the colonial ground.13 Following 
the example of European empires, the Japanese presented their colonial rule as 
designed to “civilize” the colonized population. At the same time, according to 
the Japanese ideology of assimilation, the gap between the colonizers and the 
colonized was to be bridged by imperial benevolence, as subjects in the colony 
received the same benevolent rule as those in the metropole. The maintenance 
of separate legal spheres in Korea therefore served a dual purpose. On the one 
hand, it preserved the myth of colonial difference, which posited that the colony 
was backward and needed to emulate the progressive metropole that was always 
ahead. On the other hand, the distance between the family laws of the colony and 
the metropole furnished reasons for the project of assimilation with its premise 
of the potential for the colony to be integrated with the metropole, thereby real-
izing the ideal of integration in the Japanese Empire at large.
This tension between the need for separation and the ideal of integration often 
was palpable in the course of colonial administration, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing disagreement between two Japanese colonial officials in Korea. Both Oda 
Mikijirō and Tateishi Shūichi were engaged in legal preparations for a reform of 
Civil Ordinances in advance of the 1918 Common Law (Kyōtsūhō) and the 1922 
Household-Registration Law (Kosekihō).14 Oda sought to include as many of the 
local family customs as possible, while Tateishi pushed to extend the Japanese 
Civil Code to Korean family matters:
One day, Mr. Oda asked me, “Do you know why the British Empire was so successful 
in its colonial policy? It was because it respected the natives’ customs and mores. In 
order to retain Korea as an eternal colony, we should respect their customs and retain 
their mores as they exist today.” To that, I replied, “If we are content to keep Korea 
as an eternal colony, I agree. But I don’t think Korea should be left a mere colony; I 
think that it should be ‘made into Japan [naichika]’ as soon as possible.”15
Tateishi’s position aptly illustrates the logic behind Japanese assimilation policies: 
extending Japanese family law to Korea was equivalent to making Koreans become 
Japanese, thereby making Korea an inseparable part of Japan. In contrast, if 
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colonized Korea were to retain its own family customs, it would remain a Japanese 
“colony,” an entity separate from the Japanese family state.
Since the separation of legal spheres in civil matters was predicated on the dif-
ferences in family customs between Korea and Japan, attempts at reform of these 
family customs naturally had implications for the colony’s status within the empire 
vis-à-vis the metropole. The process of legal assimilation was to be realized through 
a gradual expansion of the matters to which the Japanese Civil Code applied and 
a concomitant shrinking of exemptions where Korean customs applied. The first 
of these assimilatory reforms was a series of reforms in 1921–22, when numer-
ous family-law matters, such as the legal age of marriage, divorce, parental rights 
and sponsorship, and regulations on family councils (shinzokukai) became subject 
to the Japanese Civil Code. The second occurred in 1939 (implemented in 1940), 
when adoption and family names were made subject to the Japanese Civil Code, a 
reform widely known for the Name-Change Policy (Sōshi Kaimei).
The process of incrementally expanding the application of Japanese legal codes 
to replace Korean customs is a process that I call legal assimilation. Specifically, 
legal assimilation meant incrementally extending Japanese legal codes in a care-
fully orchestrated process, whereby local customs were manipulated to slowly 
accommodate the laws from the metropole. I thus am expanding the definition of 
assimilation from the more conventional usage that refers to a unilateral erasure 
of the colonized’s culture by the colonizer, encapsulated in terms such as “national 
annihilation policy” (minjok malsal chŏng’ch’aek), which has been treated as syn-
onymous with “assimilation policy” (K: tonghwa chŏngch’aek; J: dōka seisaku).16 
This more strident definition of assimilation dominated the earliest scholarship 
on colonial family laws, wherein these laws were understood to be a product of 
Japanese “distortion” of Korean family customs.17 By my definition assimilation 
was a process whereby the systems of colonized territories were integrated into 
the larger system of the empire. Although the system of the metropole became 
the template for such accommodations, the process did not result in a unilateral 
erasure of one culture by another; the end result, rather, was a restructuring of 
the metropole as well as the colonies. Much recent scholarship on the Japanese 
Empire in fact redefines assimilation in a similar fashion: Takashi Fujitani’s recent 
work has reconsidered the “forced assimilation policy” as a radical process of 
inclusion of the colonial populations, which meant a fundamental reshaping of 
the Japanese Empire as a whole.18 Janet Poole also has depicted the later wartime 
period as involving a radical reimagining by Korean intellectuals of the Japanese 
Empire as a whole, including a redefinition of the relationship between Korea and 
the Japanese metropole.19
Structural integration of the colonial legal sphere into that of the metropole 
through civil- and customary-law reforms led to the structural transformation 
of Korean families themselves, as the structure of society changed from lineage-
based to one based on small families. This, I argue, was the most enduring effect of 
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colonial assimilation efforts on the Korean family. Through legal assimilation and 
the implementation of the Japanese family system, traditional lineage groups in 
Korea that privileged kinship ties lost legal recognition in favor of the household, 
the new unit of family. In the traditional lineage system, defined by kinship ties, 
the rights of each lineage member varied relationally. Degrees of kinship ties as 
well as their pertinent rights followed traditional lineage laws (chongpŏp) rather 
than the status laws defined by the new colonial state.20 In contrast, the colonial 
state emphasized the boundary of the family and clearly distinguished the family 
members inside of the household from those outside. With the household system, 
the colonial state tried to redefine the relationship between the family and the 
state, by claiming the exclusive right to define family boundaries and personal 
status.21
The scholarship on colonial family laws has in fact moved in the direction of 
acknowledging the local accommodations made by the colonial institution in the 
process of producing the customary laws. Hong Yang-hŭi has argued that rather 
than a straightforward distortion of Korean customs, the customary laws were 
derived through a more complex mechanism whereby the Japanese family system 
(ie-seido) was transplanted (isik) in Korea in the name of “Korean custom.”22 In the 
process the Japanese actively utilized existing Confucian family culture to accom-
modate the patriarchal Japanese family system. Yi Sŭng-il, on the other hand, has 
further emphasized the fluid interaction of the colonial legal system and prac-
tices on the ground, arguing that the shifting customary laws in Korea reflected 
not just the unilateral expansion of Japanese laws but also the changing practices 
among Koreans.23 Most recently, Marie Seong-Hak Kim has argued that, unlike the 
European counterparts that the Japanese customary laws were modeled after, the 
customary laws in colonial Korea (and Japan) were “bureaucratically invented” in 
the legal system. The invention process was directed by individual judges’ prag-
matic decisions to “accommodate evolving practices” rather than a premeditated 
colonial policy to distort and control.24 Building on this trend to emphasize the 
power of the colonial society in shaping colonial laws, I show how the Koreans 
who litigated at the colonial courts understood and utilized the laws. As a result, 
rather than focusing on the colonial legalists, I concentrate more on the evolving 
legal consciousness of the colonized Koreans, which left a lasting legacy in the 
postcolonial years in family law.
Considering the Japanese colonizers’ efforts to utilize Korean customs requires, 
of course, understanding the sources of those customary laws in the Chosŏn 
dynasty, but I also consider the transition from the Chosŏn dynasty to Japanese 
colonial rule as a significant enough break to warrant a serious investigation of 
the colonial legal system on its own. The Japanese colonial legal system not only 
left a significant legacy, the full extent of which is yet to be fully explored, but 
also provided a unique space where continuing patterns of familial conflict played 
out.25 Unlike Chŏng Kŭng-sik, who has challenged the colonial distortion thesis 
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by pointing to existing precedents of patrilineal succession practices before the 
colonial period, I agree with Yang and Hong that the colonial legal system had a 
significant and lasting role in rigidifying the existing patriarchal biases from “cul-
tural norms” into “legal norms.”26 Emphasizing the break, however, does not mean 
that I read this transition as a quantifiable trajectory toward modernity or a gain 
or loss of women’s rights, as some have implied.27 Rather, my focus is to see how 
women’s rights were redefined from one patriarchal system to another.
The civil disputes that are the central source for this book are a direct product of 
the reconfiguration of the family and the redistribution of family property under 
Japanese colonial rule. As the lineage system was weakened, exclusive property 
rights of the household head were strengthened in its stead. This in turn strength-
ened the property rights of certain women in opposition to the rights of lineage 
elders, leading to a heightened number of civil disputes. The gendered conflicts 
over family property were byproducts of colonial legal policy.
CUSTOMARY L AWS AND TR ADITION
Scholars of colonial law in other areas of the world, interrogating the ways in 
which the colonial propaganda of legal modernization intersected with local cus-
toms, also similarly highlight the particular articulation of the modern and the 
traditional in colonial legal regimes. In some cases, the colonized people embraced 
certain customs deemed backward by the colonial state as a tactic of resistance; 
in other cases, colonized people seemingly usurped modern measures to bolster 
traditional existing power relations. As Martin Chanock has elucidated, battles 
over customary laws in colonial courts often masked an underlying struggle over 
socioeconomic issues recently reconfigured by colonial economic conditions.28 
Tamara Lynn Loos, in her examination of the Siamese case, notes how the enforce-
ment of monogamy at the turn of the twentieth century inspired some individu-
als to embrace polygyny, not only as part of their tradition but also as a critical 
component of an alternative modernity.29 Mytheli Sreenivas, in her examination 
of colonial India, examines how the argument for expanding women’s property 
rights was hijacked by men who wanted to expand their own rights as heads of 
nuclear families.30 Within the Japanese Empire, Chen Chao-ju has examined how 
the Taiwanese marriage custom of simpua (little daughter-in-law) was subject to 
multiple reconceptualizations under Japanese colonial legal discourse.31 These 
studies illuminate the deeper socioeconomic context of legal struggles fought over 
old customs—often hidden behind the rhetoric of modernity.
For the case of Korea, I propose that assimilation, rather than being perceived 
as a cultural assault of the colonizer on the colonized, was to a significant degree 
disseminated and accepted as the universal direction of progress. The particular 
family laws imported in the process, in other words, were perceived not only 
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as Japanese customs but as laws of the empire with a universal value: the Civil 
Code of Japan became the Civil Code of the Japanese Empire. Whether or not it 
indeed really promoted universal values in the colony is beside the point. What 
is important is that to Koreans, the universal values written into the Japanese 
Civil Code, albeit limited, were as much as they could achieve in terms of legal 
progress under Japanese colonial rule. From this perspective I seek to show how 
assimilation could be desirable for some colonized people, as assimilation often 
meant the dissemination of progressive legal rights in the colony. The colonial 
legal system was an important arena in which the colonized people’s desire 
for civilization and the colonial state’s desire for assimilation met. These legal 
changes, I argue, unfolded not necessarily through coercion but through  affective 
mobilization of Koreans, who responded to reforms with proactive consent 
 motivated by a yearning for progress. The colonial legal system became a forum 
for Korean women to pursue their desires for an ideal family: from a widow’s 
desire to have her rights strengthened to a daughter’s desire to have a share in 
inheritance to a New Woman’s desire for a love marriage.32 Through adjudication 
of these mundane familial conflicts, the colonial state intimately impacted the 
family life of colonized Koreans. In other words, separate legal spheres maintained 
in the Korean colony ended up producing a strong desire among some sectors of 
Koreans for legal assimilation.
Instead of political rights such as suffrage that were denied to the colony, wom-
en’s demands for rights often were articulated within the framework provided by 
efforts for legal assimilation. It was thus that the desires of some Koreans provided 
a useful and effective basis for the Japanese colonial state to mobilize its impe-
rial subjects to implement the colonial household system. Yet legal assimilation 
and its mechanisms also were identified with modernization and progress. After 
the liberation in 1945, the processes of modernization—formerly directed toward 
assimilation—quickly shed their colonial origins to form the basic foundation of 
family law in Korea.
Much previous scholarship has focused on detecting whether Japanese colonial 
laws were accurate or distorted representations of Korean customs, begging the 
question of how to define Korean customs when in fact there was not a uniform set 
of customs across local and class boundaries before the colonial use of customary 
laws. I argue that there was no pure form of Korean customs to be rescued from 
alleged colonial distortions and, instead, read the laws and the legal discourse as 
dynamically changing throughout the colonial period, serving as sites where the 
evolution of the mutual understanding and identities of Koreans and Japanese are 
recorded. The resulting customary laws had the power to influence not only how 
Japanese understood Koreans but also how Koreans understood themselves. The 
legal definition of Korean customs was not necessarily a true reflection of the cus-
toms in practice, but it still had the power to affect their practice.
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WOMEN IN THE C OLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM
The colonial legal archive contains numerous examples of proactive and ingenious 
uses of the legal system by Korean women. Through examination of women’s 
roles in domestic disputes in the colonial courts, I highlight the complex gen-
der dynamics manifest under the colonial regime. Contrary to what their dou-
bly victimized position under Korean patriarchal Confucian culture and Japanese 
patriarchal modernity would lead us to believe, Korean women under Japanese 
colonial rule actively participated in the colonial legal system to claim and defend 
their rights. The majority of the cases that directly involved hammering out the 
specifics of Korean customary laws had women involved as litigants: among the 
156 cases collected in the Chōsen kōtō hōin hanketsuroku (Records of verdicts in 
the High Court of Colonial Korea), which directly concerned Korean family cus-
toms, 93 had women as the litigating party. Cases with female litigants concerned 
a wide range of issues, from marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance to dis-
putes over property transactions. The dominant presence of women in these civil 
cases challenges us to think about women’s position in the legal system during the 
colonial period. These records show not only how active colonized Korean women 
were in the colonial courts but also how women’s legal rights were central in the 
civil disputes that concerned Korean family customs.
The high visibility of women in the colonial courts does not necessarily prove 
that women enjoyed a high level of legal rights. What it does prove—beyond the 
fact that they had sufficient rights to bring lawsuits to court—is that women’s legal 
rights were heatedly contested in the colonial courts. This also suggests that many 
women found the colonial courts to be their main recourse. The evidence chal-
lenges the dominant notion about Korean women under colonial rule: that they 
were helpless and passive victims.33 Their prominence in colonial civil courts had 
more to do with the changing dynamics of gender relations under the new colonial 
legal regime than with preexisting “evil customs” of misogyny among Koreans or 
the patriarchal nature of the Japanese legal system. If anything, the heightened 
visibility of women at the courts represented a certain strengthening of particular 
legal rights for women. While the household system under the Japanese strength-
ened the rights of the household head, it did so even where the household head was 
a woman. The colonial legal system also provided official backing for certain rights 
that had previously been relegated to private and customary handling, presum-
ably to the detriment of certain women. Such women and their volatile position 
reminds us of the widows of British India and the rite of sati. Gayatri Spivak, in her 
examination of these sacrificial, or rather sacrificed widows, suggests that more 
widows may have burned on the pyre in Bengal because widows in that region 
had inheritance rights.34 The familial anxiety wrought by a changing colonial legal 
regime is hidden in the imperialist and colonial reading of the sacrificed women, 
who are made illegible by both the imperialists, who read them only as victims of 
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customs, and the male Indian nationalists, who read them as admirable and will-
ing practitioners of Indian tradition. The widows in the Korean colonial civil case 
records are subject to a similar fate: they are constantly viewed as helpless victims 
of backward Korean customs (to be saved by the modern Japanese laws) or victims 
of the colonial laws that deprived of them of the rights they allegedly enjoyed in 
the precolonial era. Korean women in the colonial civil courts thus also need to be 
examined as subjects on an “ideological battleground” of interpretation.
The civil disputes that I analyze in Rules of the House often show how gen-
dered conflict over family property unfolded at odds with the Japanese colonial 
laws, a perspective previous scholarship privileging the Korea-Japan dichotomy 
has downplayed. Often Korean men and their patriarchal interests, rather than 
Japanese laws, were the opponents of Korean women’s struggle to have their cus-
tomary rights acknowledged. Challenging previous scholarship that emphasized 
patriarchal biases of the Japanese colonial laws over the existing patriarchal biases 
of Korean customs, what I present in Rules of the House makes clear that the issues 
of women’s rights were in a complex, and often complicit, relationship with the 
colonial power. Colonial law, armed with the state’s power as well as the discourse 
of civilization, effectively wedged itself between colonized men and women: often-
times colonial law benefited Korean women’s rights in unexpected ways, and 
Korean men struck back strongly for patriarchal interests.
The antagonistic relationship between Korean men and women is prominent 
in close readings of the litigants’ arguments. Rather than following the decisions 
and the judges’ explanations for making those decisions, on which previous schol-
arship has predominantly focused, I consider the litigants and the arguments 
they presented in court. Through close readings of their arguments, I expose the 
patriarchal biases of the male litigants, as well as the legal world of the female 
litigants who tried to disrupt such patriarchal jurisprudence. Through the variety 
of arguments—and the world views that informed them—that created and recre-
ated notions about Korean customs and Korean women’s place in them, I show 
that colonized Koreans were active participants in the discursive production of 
colonial knowledge about Koreans and their family customs. The case records 
are part of the colonial archive along with other forms of information, such as 
customs-survey reports, newspaper and journal articles on Korean customs and 
mores, and novels that deal with Korean family matters. Korean litigants—in addi-
tion to the Japanese or the Korean collaborators powerful enough to control the 
customs-survey process—also were among the producers who shaped the con-
tours of the colonial perception of Korean family customs. In this sense, I agree 
with the notion that “colonial texts are not ‘reflections’ of colonial relations but are 
‘constructive’ of them, and . . . therefore require us to attend to the ‘configurations’ 
of the archive itself.”35
In Rules of the House I also seek to break new ground in the study of women and 
gender in Korean history by illuminating an underrepresented group of women in 
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the field of women’s history. In doing so I hope not merely to expand our under-
standing of a new group of women but also to suggest a more radical view of 
how modernity impacted colonial Korean society. With a few exceptions, previ-
ous studies of women in colonial Korea have focused predominantly on either the 
educated and privileged class of New Women or the working-class “factory girls.”36 
This artificial separation of certain groups of women from others has resulted in 
discussions of the impact of modernity as a contained phenomenon within a cer-
tain stratum of society or strictly within the cultural realm. The court cases that 
I examine here reveal that previously underrepresented groups of women, such 
as widows and concubines, in fact can be found at the forefront of colonial legal 
transformations, participating in the modern legal system side by side with the 
more typical New Women and thus also at the forefront of the experience of colo-
nial modernity.
OVERVIEW OF THE B O OK
The following chapters trace the trajectory of the household system as it was estab-
lished in Korea under Japanese colonial rule. The account necessarily begins by 
considering the traditional customs on which that system was based, in particular 
the lineage system that emerged during the late Chosŏn dynasty. The story that 
then follows is of the process by which the lineage system was replaced by the 
colonial household system and the different legal issues that contributed to that 
system’s articulation.
In chapter 1 I examine how the late Chosŏn emergence of the patriarchal family 
system in the form of the lineage system reconfigured women’s inheritance rights. 
In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, as families abandoned partible 
inheritance in favor of primogeniture, daughters’ inheritance rights were replaced 
by those of mothers, and the rights and status of widows without heirs became 
increasingly precarious.
Chapter 2 brings us to the beginning of colonial rule and examines widows’ 
lawsuits over inheritance rights against in-law family members in the colonial 
courts. Contrary to the conventional notion that Korean women lost many legal 
rights under the colonial legal system, widows’ rights were largely protected in the 
colonial civil courts. This was a coincidental result of the colonial legal system: 
as the Japanese were trying to implement the new family unit of the household, 
the widows who embodied its boundary received legal protection. The customary 
rights of widows to inherit the family headship worked hand in hand with the 
colonial household system and functioned to weaken the ties of the traditional 
lineage system. Under the colonial legal system, widows gained official backing for 
their customary rights against the abusive extortion efforts of their in-law family 
members. The victory of widows was not without its limitations, since the inheri-
tance rights recognized for widows proved only temporary.
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Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the 1920s and 1930s, when various reform discourses 
on family law emerged and fiercely contended with one another. Popularly referred 
to as the Cultural Rule (Bunka Seiji) period and widely seen as a period of relaxed 
colonial policies, this period was also a time of incomplete assimilation, flanked 
on either side by the two major assimilatory reforms in the Civil Ordinances in 
1921–22 and in 1939. The era saw intense contention between two contradictory 
forces: the need for separation and the desire for assimilation. In chapter 3 I exam-
ine the reform discourses over inheritance rights that emerged in the 1920s and 
the 1930s “age of progress,” as the colonial state’s goal of dissolving the lineage 
and clarifying the boundary of the household was advanced through manipulating 
discourses that equated assimilation with progress. The debate over inheritance 
reforms focused around expanding women’s rights through granting daughters 
the right to inherit. Couching this in the language of progress, the Government 
General tried to implement son-in-law adoption in Korea, a measure that drew 
widely divided responses from the colonized Koreans. While many Korean women 
enthusiastically supported the measure, the backlash from the conservative elite 
was significant enough to cause postponement of the measure until 1940. When 
son-in-law adoption eventually was implemented in 1940, it was with a significant 
compromise with the principles of Korean lineage and, as a result, denied daugh-
ters the right to become female household heads independently of husbands. The 
compromise with the Korean lineage laws continued into the postcolonial period, 
marginalizing daughters in inheritance and failing to check the power of house-
hold heads.
In chapter 4 I examine reform discourses about the conjugal relationship in 
the 1920s and 1930s and show how the universal ideal of conjugal love, which was 
gaining increasing popularity at the time, converged with the colonial state’s goal 
of legal assimilation. Through a wide range of divorce and inheritance cases that 
hinged on the definition of a conjugal relationship, I show that the legal defini-
tion of a female spouse in this period came to be defined increasingly by affective 
companionship. While some wives demanded expanded rights to divorce when 
their marriages did not fulfill the ideal of affective marriage, some concubines 
demanded inheritance rights on the ground that they had fulfilled the role of an 
affective spouse. Making affective companionship a primary and necessary defi-
nition of a female spouse ended up stripping both wives and concubines of their 
rights to economic independence and incorporated the conjugal relationship into 
the colonial household system. The ideal of affective marriage, therefore, eventu-
ally served the assimilation of the Korean family into the Japanese family system.
Chapter 5 examines the reform discourse in the 1940s following the Civil-
Ordinances Reform of 1939 (implemented in 1940) and the persistence of its influ-
ence in postcolonial reforms. The new Civil Ordinances, notorious particularly 
for the Name-Change Policy, aimed at completing the assimilation of Koreans 
to Japanese under wartime exigencies yet ended up maintaining and fossilizing 
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what had been deemed unique features of Korean family customs, spawning a 
continuing production of scholarly discussion of Korean family customs and how 
to reform them. These discourses left an important legacy, which was to natural-
ize the direction of assimilatory reforms as a rational and progressive solution 
to the inevitable worldwide trend toward family dissolution. Despite strong anti- 
Japanese sentiments in the immediate wake of liberation, legacies of the discourses 
on the 1940s reforms exerted a strong influence on the new Civil Code of South 
Korea in 1960. Hiding behind the facade of recapturing Korean tradition, much of 
the direction of colonial-era reforms toward strengthening the patriarchal small 
family and instating son-in-law adoption as a way to expand daughters’ inheri-
tance rights made its way into the new Civil Code.
I close the book with a conclusion, where I summarize my key points and con-
sider the ramifications of the long life of the household system in South Korea 
until the recent abolition of the household-head system (hojuje) in 2005.
A NOTE ON SOURCES
Rules of the House makes use of a wide range of primary sources written in Japanese 
and Korean. The largest number of primary sources are drawn from the collection 
of civil cases in Chōsen kōtō hōin hanketsuroku. These cases provide a privileged 
window not only into everyday life struggles over family matters during the colo-
nial period but also into the active participation of colonized Korean women in 
the colonial courts. The thirty-volume collection has records of around 2,000 civil 
cases, 156 cases among which are categorized under “Korean Civil Ordinances,” 
indicating that they dealt with Korean family matters to be adjudicated accord-
ing to Korean family customs and not the Japanese Civil Code. The number of 
these cases may not seem high, and they certainly were a very limited portion of 
all family-related cases decided in the local and appellate courts, but these cases 
had influential power in the colonial legal system. Unlike local and appellate court 
cases, some of which received media attention in sensational newspaper articles, 
reports of these cases were distributed through official routes, monthly through 
the Shihō Kyōkai Zasshi (Journal of the Judicial Association), as well as in other 
government notices and circulars. The cases concerning the Civil Ordinances 
were especially important because Korean customary laws were uncodified and 
the High Court’s decisions functioned as important precedents. The court system 
in the Korean colony was a direct import of the metropolitan counterpart, con-
sisting of tertiary court levels, the local courts, the appellate courts, and the High 
Court (Chōsen Kōtō Hōin). Judges were drawn from among both Japanese and 
Koreans, with Koreans being assigned mostly to the local court–level and civil 
cases. There were about 250 Korean judges and 50 Korean prosecutors during the 
Japanese colonial period.37 Korean judges were allowed to rule on cases only in 
which both plaintiff and defendant were Korean and were excluded from the High 
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Court bench, indicating the importance that the Japanese Government General 
placed on the decisions of the High Court and their potential impact.38 Indeed, the 
only cases cited as precedents and related reference in High Court decisions were 
previous decisions of the High Court of Korea and the Supreme Court of Japan 
(Daishin’in).
In addition to the High Court records, Rules of the House makes use of a variety 
of related material, including journals, newspapers, and novels, written in both 
Japanese and Korean. The legal journal Shihō Kyōkai Zasshi was published by the 
Judicial Association (1921–45), the official organization for colonial judicial offi-
cials and specialists, including judges, prosecutors, and lawyers; it published, for 
their reference, official notices, administrative inquiries, all legal decisions from 
the Chōsen High Court, and academic essays on various legal matters. The asso-
ciation also had the right to issue formal agreements (ketsu’i) on inquiries from the 
courts on matters of Korean customs: their official agreements were acknowledged 
as customary laws.39 The picture that emerges from these sources is much messier 
than the collected statements of judges on civil-case decisions would lead us to 
believe.
Korean-language newspapers and journals of the time also reflect high pub-
lic interest in legal matters. Newspapers carried copious accounts of legal events, 
ranging from dry reports on pending legal reforms, in both Korea and the Japanese 
metropole, to sensational reportage on civil disputes over matters such as divorce, 
concubinage, and parental rights. Novels also provide a valuable source of insight 
into popular understanding. These novels, commonly serialized in Korean-
language newspapers, are a repository of the common-sense legal knowledge that 
was easily available to the reading public and show what their authors imagined, at 
least, to be the popular level of legal knowledge at the time.
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Widows on the Margins of the Family
In 1898 a man submitted an appeal to the Ministry of Legal Affairs (Pŏppu), deny-
ing an accusation of widow rape against his son. The plaintiff, Chŏng Tong-il, had 
paid a hundred coins to a man so that his son could marry the man’s widowed 
daughter-in-law. Soon after the wedding the widow’s natal family severely rep-
rimanded the father-in-law for the marriage and demanded the widow’s return. 
Back in her natal home, the widow was rebuked for having defiled her chastity; 
“unable to bear the shame,” she eventually committed suicide. The widow’s family, 
in turn, sued the plaintiff ’s son for “raping the widow,” and he was imprisoned. In 
his letter of appeal, Chŏng pleaded that his son was innocent and should not be 
charged with rape when the widow had come willingly to the wedding site.1
This case raises many questions about the situation of women, widows in partic-
ular, at a point in 1890s Korea when change was imminent, but the consequences of 
centuries of social, economic, and ideological developments still prevailed. Widow 
chastity was an important moral virtue for elite women in the Chosŏn dynasty 
from early on.2 By the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, with the increased competi-
tion between elite families, widow chastity became a “public indicator of the moral 
level” of the family.3 In the increasing competition for official recognition, widows 
were pushed to perform more drastic acts, usually suicide, to prove their virtue.4 In 
her study of a widow suicide case from the early nineteenth century, Jungwon Kim 
has argued that widows’ virtue became a “highly vulnerable asset” for the family as 
well as the women themselves in the period; to protect the honor of herself and the 
family, a widow would commit suicide at the slightest slander against her chastity.5
Widow chastity, or the prescription that widows remain unmarried, was abol-
ished, formally at least, in 1894 as part of the Kabo Reforms of 1894–96 undertaken 
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in the Chosŏn court by the pro-Japanese cabinet.6 Under the strengthened influ-
ence of the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War, former pro-Japanese reformers 
of the Kapsin Coup in 1884 were brought back into the cabinet from exile in Japan 
and were able to implement many of the reforms that they had failed to implement 
before. In addition to various measures to reform Korea in the model of Meiji 
Japan, many institutional reforms were implemented to at once modernize Korea 
and optimally prepare Korea to be a Japanese protectorate.7 The reforms that were 
undertaken during this period therefore are a good indicator of which Korean 
customs were considered backward as well as an impediment to Japanese control. 
Social institutions that were considered the basis of yangban elite power, therefore, 
were targeted for reform.8 The abolition of the ban on widow remarriage was 
one of these, together with the abolition of early marriage, the discrimination of 
 offspring of concubines (sŏja), and slavery.9 Women’s status by then had become 
a “yardstick for the civility of an entire country” in Korea as well.10 Mistreatment 
of widows, or women in general, was considered a marker of backwardness, and 
a particularly Asian backwardness at that. Customs like the ban on remarriage 
of widows, for example, often were criticized in the same terms as the notorious 
practice of sati in India; the news of its abolition by the British was well known 
around Asia, including in Korea.11
Another key goal of the Kabo Reforms was to establish and expand new insti-
tutions. The appeal letter introduced at the opening of the chapter is part of a 
collection of letters addressed to the Ministry of Legal Affairs, a judicial institu-
tion created by the reforms that served as a kind of appellate court. The head of 
the Ministry of Legal Affairs received letters requesting revocation of decisions 
handed down in the local courts administered by local magistrates.12 In 1894 the 
Korean court had established the Ministry of Legal Affairs as the sole admin-
istrative apparatus for legal matters. Judicial matters were to be handled by the 
Provisional Court of the Department of Justice (Pŏppu amun kwonsŏl chaep’anso).
Despite the Kabo Reforms, however, the practices surrounding widow chastity 
persisted, and the collection of appeal letters addressed to the Ministry of Legal 
Affairs contains a set of cases filed under the category of “widow rape” (kŏpkwa). 
“Rape” was a serious crime according to Taejŏn hoet’ong (1865), the Chosŏn legal 
codes, and a perpetrator could receive punishment of up to a sentence of death.13 
The fact that people understood widow rape to be a uniquely punishable offense 
seems to suggest that, even after the Kabo Reforms, widow chastity still was 
regarded as a prized act of morality. In fact, the details of the 1898 case reveal a 
wide spectrum of attitudes toward widow chastity: while the natal family seems 
to have been so attached to the ideal of chastity that they drove their daughter to 
suicide, the father-in-law seems to have considered it a mundane matter to sell his 
daughter-in-law in marriage for profit.
The case reveals much about what was considered normative, acceptable, and 
transgressive. We can detect, for example, that the widow remained with her 
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husband’s family and that it was not considered particularly criminal for the hus-
band’s family to arrange her remarriage and even collect a dowry in the process. 
But we also can detect that marrying off a widowed daughter-in-law was not con-
sidered an honorable act and that it could earn criticism from the widow’s natal 
family. The widow’s natal family seems to have had the recourse of claiming her 
back. We also can see that the virtue of widow chastity was still a viable ethical 
norm and that families thought that their reputation relied significantly on proper 
adherence to virtue by the women of the family. It also is clear that an accusation 
of rape could be far more than a matter of sexual offense.
Most of the cases concerning widows mentioned in the appeal letters to the 
Ministry of Legal Affairs involved attempts or actual incidents of rape or abduc-
tion, both of which were considered serious crimes in the Chosŏn dynasty. Accused 
men often pleaded their innocence by saying they had entered into sexual relations 
with a widow with her consent or sometimes even with the assistance of a match-
maker. These men often rebutted the charges of rape with accusations that the in-
laws were trying to sell off their widowed relative to another bidder. While these 
cases are filed under “widow rape,” upon closer examination they often are not at 
all about the moral prescription of female chastity against immoral outbursts of 
male desire. In many instances the sexual offense came under official scrutiny only 
because of the violence of widow suicides, which often grew out of what was essen-
tially an economic conflict. Those accused of raping a widow often were men who 
had gotten on the wrong side of the in-laws by providing an insufficient amount 
of money for the widow. In one of the cases, a daughter-in-law was threatened 
with rape by her brother-in-law when she refused to obtain money from her natal 
family.14 A survey of the cases involving widows among the appeal letters show 
that behind the issue of rape or remarriage there existed a common and deeper 
problem: the tension over family property between the widow and her in-laws.15
Although the case is filed under “widow rape,” we are unlikely ever to find out 
whether this widow was indeed married off against her will, or if she was a willing 
bride protesting against the familial censure against a new marriage. The same 
goes for other widows who appear in the collection of letters to the Ministry of 
Legal Affairs, mostly as corpses. These dead widows remind us of Bhuvaneswari’s 
suicide in Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?”16 As in the case of Spivak’s 
dead woman, our dead widow likewise could be viewed in widely different subjec-
tivities: a defiled widow, a willing (and perhaps not so chaste) bride, and even an 
abject victim of the brutal prescriptions of Confucianism. Yet, just like the early 
nineteenth-century widow in Jungwon Kim’s study, this widow seems to have 
killed herself in protest. Whatever the real story was, suicide seems to have been 
used by the widow as what Kim calls a “premeditated strategy” to express her anger 
and protect her honor.17 In a world where Confucian ethics, which idolized widow 
chastity, still had great currency, some chaste widows found suicide their only and 
last recourse to expose the truth of the violence to which they were subject.18
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Still, it was not so much the Confucian prescription of widow chastity to which 
widows fell victim but their marginalized position in a virilocal marriage system. 
They were victims of a land-based property regime that largely deprived women 
of access to property ownership. In Dowry Murder Veena Talwar Oldenburg shows 
that the practice of dowry murder in India, where a woman could be murdered for 
insufficient dowry, was a product of British imperialism, which had transformed 
the Indian economy to favor men over women, both in the labor market as well as 
in property ownership.19 In the process dowry was redefined from movable prop-
erty voluntarily given to women in marriage by natal families for provision and as 
a mark of status to “groom price,” where the bride’s family paid the groom’s fam-
ily to compensate for the (perceived) inferior economic (earning) power of the 
bride. In short, dowry murder was not a cultural problem but an economic one. 
Oldenburg’s case inspires us to rethink the argument that Korean women were vic-
timized by Confucianism (or by the culture-as-culprit thesis, in Oldenburg’s term) 
in a whole new way. In other words, women’s marginalization in the family was not 
from cultural or ideological transformation per se (“Confucianization”) but rather 
from the socioeconomic transformation of family that reconfigured property rela-
tions and concentrated land property in the hands of sons (and later in the hands 
of the eldest son) as the lineage system matured.20
The case thus illustrates the precarious position of widows at the end of the 
Chosŏn period. In their marginal place in the family, many widows seem to have 
been perceived as burdens, and even threats, to family viability. Accordingly, they 
were subject to extortion, threats of expulsion from the family, or pressure to 
remarry (or sold in marriage in exchange for monetary compensation). Whatever 
the specifics of individual cases, these dead widows seem to have been pushed to 
the limits of their existence by numerous converging desires: the widow’s desire to 
protect her honor, the natal family’s desire to maintain the widow’s chastity, and 
the marital family’s desire to decrease the financial burden of keeping the widow.
By the late nineteenth century, where we encounter the corpse of the raped 
widow, the Korean family system and ideology had effectively pushed widows to 
the margins, where they had to negotiate between the impossible ideal of widow 
chastity and the realities of their position in the marital family. What does the case 
of these dead widows tell us about the state of widows’ and women’s position in 
the family at the end of the Chosŏn dynasty? What is the process through which 
widows became so marginalized in the family system? In the following I examine 
the reconfiguration of family practices in marriage customs, living arrangements, 
ancestral rites succession, and property inheritance in the seventeenth century that 
increasingly marginalized women’s claim to family property. I also show that, in 
addition to this slow transformation of inheritance practices, the patrilineal prin-
ciple that became the official principle of family arrangement of the court from the 
beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty made women’s, and especially widows’, right to 
family property a precarious one, susceptible to continuous challenges. Revealing 
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sources for our purposes lie in accounts of litigation, where economic conflicts 
dating from the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty were exposed and resolved. The 
fault line increasingly came to be between married-in women (who were wid-
owed) and those linked through agnatic ties.
THE EMERGENCE OF PATRILINEAL FAMILY 
PR ACTICES
Confucian ideology was highly prescriptive when it came to matters of family, and 
it was instrumental in transforming family practices in the Chosŏn dynasty, when 
it became the official ideology of the court. According to Confucian teachings, a 
proper family should be organized on strict hierarchical principles, where the wife 
was always to submit to the husband’s guidance. A woman was taught to adhere 
to the “Three Followings [Samjong Jido],” which meant that she should follow 
her father when young, her husband upon marrying, and her son in widowhood. 
Marriage was to be strictly virilocal: a woman married into a man’s family, signify-
ing a wife’s submission to a husband’s ways. The wife had significant restrictions in 
legal rights as well. She was expected to submit her rights over property to her hus-
band while married, and she had no right to divorce her husband; the husband, on 
the other hand, could divorce the wife on seven legitimate grounds (ch’ilgŏ ji ak), 
which included jealousy and failure to produce children.21 In inheritance families 
were to exercise primogeniture: the firstborn son inherited the right and obliga-
tion to perform the ancestor rites and with that the right to inherit the dominant 
portion of the family property.
It was another couple of centuries after the initial round of reforms by the 
court before the lineage system became fully fledged as a result of steps initiated 
by the elite.22 Scholars largely agree that this happened sometime around the mid-
seventeenth century after the Imjin War (also known as the Hideyoshi Invasions, 
1592–98). It was then that lineages became larger and began enforcing lineage-
securing practices such as virilocal marriage, primogeniture in inheritance of the 
ritual heirship, and the exclusion of daughters and privileging of firstborn sons in 
property inheritance. As early as the mid-sixteenth century, some families began 
abandoning partible inheritance and setting aside property to compensate for 
ancestral rites that were becoming increasingly elaborate. At the same time, fami-
lies began allotting more inheritance to the sons (and later, the eldest sons), who 
began to take on more responsibility in carrying out rites.23 As the ideal of con-
ducting ancestral rites for four generations of ancestors spread among the ruling 
class of yangban, agnatic kin who congregated to perform the rites became more 
organized, with stronger leadership and systematic lineal succession. Lineage 
groups thus formed were designated the “small lineage” (sojong), as opposed to 
the “large lineage” (taejong), which referred to all descendants sharing a common 
lineage seat (pon’gwan), the purported geographic site of the lineage’s origin.24
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These changes came about slowly across families but, by the eighteenth century, 
were normative expectations for elite yangban families. In the late eighteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries, the conspicuous practice of Confucian rites spread even 
to the lower levels of the middle-status class (chung’in) and to wealthy merchants.25 
This affected family makeup and dynamics, strengthening the powers of patri-
lineal heirs against other elders. Chŏng Chi-yŏng (Jung Ji Young), for example, 
detects a declining number of women household heads in household registers, 
even among commoners, in the eighteenth century.26 The status of household head 
increasingly came to be passed on directly to sons rather than to widowed wives, 
reflecting a shift in ritual inheritance and the accompanying public recognition 
and status given to the ritual heir.27
VARIATIONS IN FAMILY PR ACTICE
Evidence suggests that even after the principle of virilocal marriage became estab-
lished as the norm, modified forms of uxorilocal marriage customs, a remnant from 
the preceding Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392), continued for centuries. In the Koryŏ 
dynasty the wedding took place in the bride’s house, where the bride continued to 
live after the wedding, while the groom had a variety of options: he could live with 
the bride in her natal home, return to his home and visit the bride occasionally, or the 
couple could move away from both homes to set up a separate residence, typically 
to follow his posts.28 As marriage was utilized to form ties of alliance and patron-
age, upper-class men commonly married multiple women and rotated among their 
respective houses.29 Despite continued efforts by the Chosŏn court to reform mar-
riage customs to implement ch’inyŏng (C: qinying), the wedding rites at the groom’s 
house, such change initially was resisted by the yangban elite families. King Sejong 
(r. 1418–50), for instance, conducted all the royal weddings in ch’inyŏng-style to be 
an example to his court officials, but to no avail.30 By the sixteenth century, what is 
called a “half-virilocal marriage” (pan-ch’inyŏng) was practiced widely among the 
yangban elite. A half-virilocal marriage entailed a wedding ceremony at the bride’s 
house, after which the couple would move to the groom’s house. As time went on 
and the custom of virilocal marriage spread, women increasingly moved into their 
husband’s families’ home, but it was not rare for them to postpone the departure 
until they were comfortably settled into the marital relationship with a number of 
children. Many couples chose to extend the period in the bride’s house for quite 
a long time, one year on average but sometimes longer.31 Although the time the 
couple lived in the bride’s family was gradually shortened, a nineteenth-century 
record still shows a bride joining the groom’s family six months after the wedding. 
The record includes no sign that this practice was unusual; therefore, it would be 
safe to assume that this delayed move was perfectly acceptable.32
While uxorilocal marriage was still in practice, daughters had equal rights to 
inheritance as well as an equal share of the obligation to support natal parents 
22    chapter 1
in old age and also the responsibility of carrying out ancestral rites.33 Even when 
a daughter was expected to marry out of the house, it was not uncommon for 
part of the household property to be inherited by her to then be passed on to her 
descendants. Records indicate that yangban-class women had rights over separate 
property that they inherited from natal households and passed on; records show 
men reporting among the property they inherited property that originated with a 
maternal grandmother.34
VIRILO CAL MARRIAGE AND THE REC ONFIGUR ATION 
OF FAMILY PROPERT Y
Virilocal marriage significantly impacted a woman’s position in the family: while 
she lost standing in her natal family, she gained a new standing in her marital 
family. Upon moving to her husband’s house, the bride lost all the familiar sur-
roundings and support that she had grown up with. Prescriptive literature for 
women aimed to suppress women’s emotional attachment to their natal parents, 
while asking that they transfer their feeling of filial piety to their parents-in-law.35 
Popular didactic stories of women sacrificing themselves for natal parents from 
the Koryŏ dynasty disappear in the Chosŏn dynasty. Instead, women gained a new 
strong and stable status in the marital family as mother of the future heir, as well 
as mistress of the inner quarters and overseer of the preparation of ancestral rites, 
the significance of which grew steadily in the late Chosŏn period. By the mid-
seventeenth century, as laws of lineal succession were followed by more yangban 
families, wives’ status in the family was strengthened in comparison to that of 
daughters.
Even with their newly gained status in the marital house, wives’ rights paled in 
comparison to the increasing rights of sons. As agnatic principles became more 
pronounced under the lineage system, the patrilineal line from father to children 
(increasingly sons rather than daughters) became emphasized, and legal rights 
over family property also began to reflect this change. Beginning in the sixteenth 
century, adoptees, who used to be chosen from outside of the lineage, increas-
ingly were chosen exclusively among agnatic kin.36 Also, an increasing number 
of sons inherited directly from their deceased fathers rather than waiting until 
their widowed mothers passed away. In other words, wives slowly lost rights to 
directly inherit from their husbands. Such a move was first initiated by the Chosŏn 
court itself: as early as 1411 the court began to let sons directly inherit from their 
deceased fathers, bypassing widowed mothers.37
Daughters’ rights accordingly were diminished. As the virilocal marriage cus-
tom spread, daughters were excluded from ancestor-rites succession, which tradi-
tionally was a shared responsibility of all children. Often the performance of rites 
rotated among the houses of sons and daughters. Such a sharing of obligations 
supported the practice of partible inheritance, which included daughters.38 But as 
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daughters began marrying out and living farther away from the natal household, 
ancestral rites increasingly became the obligation of sons and then increasingly 
that of the eldest son.39 As ancestral rites became more formalized and onerous, 
inheritance increasingly came to be considered a compensation for their economic 
burden. As virilocal marriage practices made sharing the obligation to carry out 
ancestral rites more difficult, more and more families began to excuse sons-in-
law from ancestral rites duties, and sons-in-law, in turn, excused themselves from 
inheriting from a wife’s natal family, yielding their share to her siblings, who would 
carry out the rites.40 From the mid-sixteenth century, families began to replace 
daughters’ inheritance in immovable property with dowries of movable property.
C ONFLICT S OVER WID OW RIGHT S
The principle of virilocal marriage affected widows as well. As the virilocal prin-
ciple was strengthened, virilocal residence came to be expected even in widow-
hood. Although widows seem to have commonly returned to their natal families 
or remarried during the Koryŏ dynasty, widows in the Chosŏn dynasty were 
expected to remain in the marital family, never to remarry. The notorious ban 
on widow remarriage—meant only for upper-class women—was promulgated as 
a rule in 1485, when sons of remarried widows were banned from sitting for the 
civil examinations.41 Widows therefore were forced to keep their chastity for the 
sake of their sons’ future prospects and to maintain the status of themselves and 
their marital families. To encourage widow chastity and to assist the livelihood of 
chaste widows, the court allowed a chaste widow to retain part of her husband’s 
rank land as susinjŏn (land to preserve chastity), but that practice was abolished as 
early as 1466; this was an indication, not of the diminished importance of widow 
chastity, but rather of a strengthened expectation of it, as it indicates that the court 
expected the marital family to support the widow.42
On the other hand, such a strong obligation to remain chaste also resulted in 
stronger rights for widows despite Confucian agnatic principles. Traditionally, 
since the Koryŏ dynasty, widows had rights to own and manage their husbands’ 
property until the ritual heir had matured enough to assume the duties.43 Widows 
also, in the meantime, had ritual rights and the obligation to carry out ancestral 
rites. The same logic applied when a widow had no sons and an heir had to be 
adopted. Such a widow still enjoyed usufructuary rights over her husband’s estate 
and had the prerogative to select an heir.44 As a ch’ongbu (eldest daughter-in-law), 
a widow could move into the lineage’s main house and take over possession of the 
land and slaves set aside for the support of ancestral rites. In terms of ritual succes-
sion, ch’ongbu had precedence over a husband’s nephews.
While remaining customs of uxorilocal marriage practices enabled women to 
enjoy certain rights that they lost in the late Chosŏn period, there is not a neat 
storyline by which women’s standing in the family consistently diminished from 
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Koryŏ to late Chosŏn. The trend toward virilocal marriage and lineage formation 
formally and forcefully initiated at the outset of the Chosŏn dynasty meant increas-
ing tension over women’s property rights. Legal records show that women were 
subject to challenges to their property rights from marital relatives all throughout 
the Chosŏn dynasty, albeit with differing degrees of intensity.
Although legal records mainly represent (often extreme) violations of norms, 
and thus are not the optimal source for deducing norms, they nonetheless pro-
vide a rich source of information about what was considered ideal, “normal,” and 
transgressive. Records of lawsuits or criminal investigations provide us with a van-
tage point on how family norms were practiced in everyday life. These records, 
far more than the ideals laid out in the prescriptive literature, tell us about the 
actual rules for customs that people adhered to, just as sources like diaries provide 
glimpses into customs-as-practices rather than customs-as-ideals. Actual family 
practices are useful not only to see how things were different in reality from pre-
scriptions but also in showing the boundaries of what was considered acceptable, 
if not ideal. Similar contrasts between ideal and practice also are employed by legal 
anthropologists in distinguishing between law-as-text and law in everyday life.45
Even though many records remain about legal disputes that were civil in nature, 
the Chosŏn dynasty legal system, in accordance with the legal culture of China, 
did not have civil laws separate from penal codes.46 Not only was there no separa-
tion of civil matters from penal matters, but there were no codes written for civil 
matters, except for procedural laws for such disputes. Also, most of today’s civil 
matters were in general considered outside of the judicial concern of the state. 
Legal administration of the state was focused on adjudicating criminal matters, 
and therefore only penal codes were compiled.47
This is not to say that civil conflicts were ignored by the state. As economic 
relationships became more complex in the late Chosŏn dynasty, legal codes had 
to accommodate a growing number of conflicts between private parties of a civil 
nature when those parties appealed for official adjudication. Sok-taejŏn, a legal 
code compiled in 1746 to complement the original codes of Kyŏngguk taejŏn, 
included eleven new categories of codes, among which were “Listening to Disputes 
[Ch’ŏngri: Procedural laws]” and “Land Registers [munki],” to address the growing 
number of civil litigations. Since family order was deemed a critical foundation 
of the Confucian world order, some family matters that may seem private to the 
modern reader were very much at the center of state interest. Failure to marry off a 
daughter by the age of thirty, for example, was deemed criminal and was a subject 
of direct state intervention.48 Yet the focus of adjudication in civil disputes was not 
delineation of rights but conflict resolution, even though validation of rights was 
what happened in the end and what the litigators sought.49
Confucian ideology influenced what sort of cases came to court as well as how 
they were adjudicated. Civil lawsuits were discouraged under Confucian legal cul-
ture. Lawsuits with monetary objectives were perceived as indications of selfish 
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intentions and symptomatic of disharmonious relationships. The ideal of the 
Confucian state, therefore, was to have no lawsuits (musong). Even in criminal 
matters ritual propriety played an important role in adjudication. In noncrimi-
nal matters lodging lawsuits against one’s elders or superiors was discouraged and 
could warrant the death penalty regardless of who was at fault. One of the major 
concerns of the state was breaches of propriety. For example, when a grandson 
became entangled in a lawsuit for selling a family property without the permis-
sion of his grandmother, he lost the case not because he was not the legitimate 
owner but because he had breached propriety by bringing a lawsuit against his 
elder. The majority of civil cases concentrated on issues considered acceptable in 
terms of maintaining Confucian social order: disputes over property boundaries 
and cultivation rights, slaves (especially those who had run away), and gravesites. 
In such a legal culture, where it was considered inappropriate for family members 
to lodge lawsuits against one another, it was rare for familial conflict over property 
to appear in official legal records. Indeed, one result in some cases was for both the 
plaintiff and the accused to be penalized for disrupting harmony.50
Despite such limitations, a number of records remain where widows came 
forward to accuse their in-laws of taking away property that they had inherited 
from their late husbands. In some cases, widows even sued their natal families 
for property.51 These cases show several implicit concepts about family-property 
ownership in the Chosŏn dynasty. One was the principle of “separate family, sepa-
rate property” (pun’ga pyŏl’jae), by which lineage elders had limited rights over 
the property of family members living in separate households.52 Another was that 
women, especially as heads of their own households, had certain rights to prop-
erty. Women also had rights over separate property that they inherited from their 
natal families and also independent ownership over property and wages that they 
earned. Despite the Confucian sense of propriety that encouraged submission to 
elders in all things, such concepts of property ownership remained strong and 
provided bases for property litigations throughout the Chosŏn dynasty.
Married-in women who were not mothers of heirs (i.e., sons) posed a unique 
threat to the agnatic lineage system. Cho Ŭn traces how even as early as the fif-
teenth century, the Chosŏn court tried to limit women’s place in the family inheri-
tance regime to their status as mothers; a widow, for example, no longer directly 
inherited from her husband if she had children who could inherit on her behalf.53 
This meant that a new concept of property ownership emerged in the Chosŏn 
dynasty, whereby property ownership became collectively held by the patrilineal 
kin group, access to which depended on one’s membership in that kin group and 
was stratified depending on one’s standing within it. Membership was restricted to 
agnatic kin, and one’s standing followed the agnatic principles that defined one’s 
share of obligation in the performance of ancestral rites. Widows without children, 
therefore, posed a unique challenge in the inheritance regime, especially because 
they were expected to remain in the marital family. Since they lacked children who 
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could inherit in their stead, they had to be given some inheritance rights, albeit 
provisional, to ensure the flow of property to the next generation to an adopted 
heir; yet, as they were denied lineage membership, they were forever outsiders. 
Changes in widows’ property rights, therefore, serve as a barometer of the transi-
tion in property ownership from being individually based to being collectively 
based in the agnatic lineage.54
As patrilineal principles grew stronger in the Chosŏn dynasty, a widow’s posi-
tion in the family became an ever more volatile one: she was not quite a member 
of the agnatic kin group, but she held significant ritual and property rights as the 
key figure protecting the patrilineal line.55 It was thus that widow rights, that is, 
ch’ongbu-gwŏn, became a common source of conflict between women and marital 
family members. Families struggled to restrict widows’ property rights to keep 
control over family property within the hands of agnatic kin. In 1466 chastity land, 
the rank land of a late husband that a widow was allowed to keep to support her 
during widowhood, was abolished.56 A widow was now expected to be supported 
by her sons or her husband’s family. Exercises of property rights that would have 
been unremarkable in the Koryŏ dynasty were considered preposterous in the 
newly evolving lineage system: a widow selling family property under her manage-
ment would cause great alarm to her husband’s brothers. In some cases, younger 
brothers-in-law resented the widow and deprived her of inheritance or even 
expelled her from the house. In 1488 a dispute broke out in the royal family when a 
younger brother usurped the ritual heirship of his elder brother’s widow. Although 
the court reprimanded the younger brother for harming propriety by expelling his 
sister-in-law, it also took his side and acknowledged him as the legitimate ritual 
heir. The court concluded that customary widow rights were too strong and con-
tradicted patrilineal principles, eventually declaring that the widow should not be 
allowed to succeed to ritual heirship unless her husband had already succeeded as 
the ritual heir.57 In 1554 an official restriction also was placed on whom a widow 
could adopt as her husband’s heir: adopted heirs had to be chosen strictly from 
among agnatic kin. A widow thus could not adopt from her natal family and the 
previous exception for adopting toddlers from outside of a family was banned. 
Often, especially when she had only daughters, a widow would postpone adopting 
an heir, creating tension with her in-laws, whose main interest was in securing an 
heir for the family line.
Cases of widows who died without children serve to reveal in stark relief the 
emerging concept of kasan, or family property, in late Chosŏn. Family property 
was not new, for it had been a source of controversy even earlier in the Chosŏn 
dynasty. Records of a series of litigations over such properties remain from the 
sixteenth century. These cases show that, as the concept of family property spread, 
even property of married-in women came to be folded into the collective prop-
erty of the marital lineage. In 1560 two families, Choe and Son, went head-to-
head over a piece of property that had been inherited from a Choe daughter who 
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had married into the Son family. Her property, which had been inherited by her 
adopted daughter from her natal family (another Choe), had passed to her son-
in-law and was about to be inherited by a nonrelation (the son-in-law’s second 
wife and son). In sending one of its daughters as an adoptive daughter to the Son 
family, the Choe’s had attempted to maintain control over the property given in 
marriage, but the plan fell apart when the adoptive daughter also died without 
leaving children. When the Son family attempted to pass the property that was 
originally from the Choe family to one of the descendants of the Sons, technically 
cutting all traces of Choe ties to the property, the Choes went to court but were 
able to reclaim only half of the property; the rest was divided among all Son prog-
eny, including those unrelated to the Choes.58 In 1583 a lawsuit was lodged from the 
opposite direction, from a marital family against the natal family of a dead woman. 
This dispute over an inherited slave broke out between the Yi and Kim families. 
When a Kim daughter died without children, her natal father retrieved the fam-
ily slave given to her in marriage and gifted him to one of his other children. In 
response to this, the dead daughter’s adopted son brought suit against the Kim 
family, citing his rights to inheritance as the ritual heir.59 In both of these cases, the 
woman’s family lost control of the property granted to a daughter in marriage, as it 
had become increasingly difficult to retrieve such property when a daughter died 
without children. This was a sharp departure from Koryŏ dynasty conventions.
In the Koryŏ dynasty, when a woman died, her property was enjoyed by her 
spouse until his remarriage or death, upon which point the property was returned 
to the woman’s natal family. This custom was observed until the early Chosŏn 
dynasty, when, in King Sejong’s reign, debates flared over whether a widower had 
an obligation to return property when he remarried. Eventually, it was decided that 
when the widower died, one-third of the property (from the deceased wife’s family) 
was to be given to the ritual heir born of the second wife (who presumably would 
continue to observe ancestral rites for the deceased first wife), and two-thirds of 
the property was to be returned to the natal family. A woman, however, could 
keep her husband’s property only when she maintained chastity. By 1548 the court 
ordered that in cases where a child born of a second wife bore the obligation to 
continue the ancestral rites, he or she could inherit all of the first wife’s property.60
By the late seventeenth century, inheritance rights of the ritual heir were further 
strengthened. A case from 1696 between the widow Yu and the adopted ritual heir 
shows how much a widow’s rights over family property had diminished. When the 
widow Yu tried to pass on part of the family property to her five daughters, citing 
her deceased husband’s verbal testament on his deathbed, the ritual heir sued her, 
citing his rights as the ritual heir.61 The widow eventually won the lawsuit, but such 
resistance on the part of the ritual heir to partible inheritance and to inheritance 
by daughters, as well as the extent of the ritual heir’s exclusive rights to inherit fam-
ily property, is a stark contrast with the practice of bilateral and partible inheri-
tance common during the sixteenth century.
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As property given in marriage was increasingly difficult to retrieve, it is easy to 
understand why daughters were given an increasingly smaller share of property 
that had any lasting value, such as land or slaves. Land inheritance to married-out 
daughters seems to have begun diminishing sometime in the sixteenth century, a 
trend more pronounced during the late seventeenth century. Slaves, especially wet 
nurses, continued to be provided to daughters of wealthy families, but they were 
given without formal papers, presumably so that they could easily be retrieved 
when need be. This also made disputes more difficult for the natal families when 
conflict did break out, because they lacked documentary evidence.62 By the late 
seventeenth century, when virilocal marriage and agnatic principles had become 
more established, married-in women brought with them dowry that was valuable 
but not worth much more than what they could themselves consume.
By the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, then, a family-property regime had devel-
oped that pushed women to the margins of the family in terms of rights of access to 
family property. As daughters, they were largely excluded from family inheritance, 
except for some movable valuables received as dowry. As married-in women, they 
lost direct inheritance rights to their husband’s rank land or other forms of prop-
erty. As widows, they had indirect rights over family property as the mother of the 
ritual heir, but without sons they were in a precarious position: expected to remain 
chaste (unmarried) and stay in the marital house, yet unable to own property in 
their own name. As the eldest daughter-in-law (ch’ongbu), a woman had provi-
sional rights over family property, but she had to turn over her rights as soon as a 
ritual heir was secured.
C ONCLUSION
I have outlined the long process through which patrilineal principles were 
entrenched in family practices, especially customs that governed marriage and 
inheritance. While virilocal marriage and agnatic inheritance increasingly mar-
ginalized women’s rights to family property, it also maintained widow rights, 
which led to inevitable contradictions. While widows were indispensable in ensur-
ing the stable succession of heirs and property along patrilineal lines, the fact that 
these women married into the family from outside, as nonagnatic members, posed 
a threat to the desire and principle to limit access to family property to agnatic 
kin. As we have seen, widow rights had an inherently ambivalent relationship with 
patrilineal family principles and were a source of familial conflicts from the begin-
ning of the Chosŏn dynasty.
The ambivalent and controversial nature of widow rights were what lay behind 
the dead widow bodies from the 1890s that we encountered at the beginning of 
this chapter. Yet it would be incorrect to see these women as helpless victims of 
strident Confucian prescriptions for widow chastity. More accurately, I would 
argue, they were active agents using suicide as the strongest and loudest legal voice 
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available to them to advocate for their innocence, and as such were successors to 
the widows who appear in legal cases of the Chosŏn dynasty. Forceful female liti-
gants again emerge in legal records in the Japanese colonial period, which began 
just a few years later. The pattern of familial conflict over widows during the colo-
nial period, moreover, was similar to that from the Chosŏn dynasty. The continu-
ity of such patterns dispels the popular perception that colonial rule dramatically 
changed (for better or for worse) Korean families and the lives of women. What 
was changed was merely the legal venue that widows used to claim and defend 
their rights.
What is significant, these cases show, is how similar family conflicts were 
treated differently under the two different legal systems. While the widows in the 
nineteenth century were invariantly depicted as victims of moral crimes or expe-
rienced loss of propriety, the widows from colonial courts presented themselves 
as bearers of certain rights for which they demanded recognition. Also, while the 
power of widows’ positions, shown in the nineteenth-century letters, was contin-
gent on their moral authority (that is, the chastity or propriety that they derived 
from being reputable members of their families), the rights of widows in the colo-
nial period cases were independent of any moral qualities. Rather than reflecting 
any drastic change in consciousness (in what was, after all, a short ten-year span), 
these changes reflected the different cultures of judicial process within which wid-
ows operated.
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Widowed Household Heads and the 
New Boundary of the Family
With the beginning of Japanese colonial rule, many things about women and 
their position in the family were transformed. At the base of the legal structure 
implemented in the colonies and the status of women within it was the family 
system that had developed in Japan in the Meiji era. Ordained in the Meiji Civil 
Code (1898), the formal framework of the Japanese family system (ie-seido), or the 
household system, embodied the Japanese political ideology of the family state, 
which literally, figuratively, and ideologically captured the Japanese citizenry into 
one large big national family under the paternal authority of the emperor. It is this 
family system that the Japanese tried to transplant in colonial Korea through the 
colonial legal system and the household registry.
The impact of the colonial transformation of the traditional family system was 
complex for the colonized, especially for some of the women and widows who 
occupied a marginal position in society and found new opportunities in the vola-
tile legal environment that colonial rule engendered. The Japanese family system 
had a transformative effect in Korea, as it did in Japan, specifically by creating an 
official boundary around the unit of household, which weakened the traditional 
lineage system. The new administrative unit of the household restructured fam-
ily relations; each household was an administrative unit as well as a legal unit, 
firmly placed under the administrative authority of the household head. These 
were made manageable and legible to the state through the household registry 
(koseki). The operation of the modern colonial legal system systematized adju-
dication processes, cutting the operative power of the cultural and customary 
authority of family elders and significantly boosting certain women’s standing in 
legal struggles against family elders. Widows, whose position in the family had 
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long been threatened, found an official and systematized route to have their pleas 
addressed.
In this chapter I examine the impact of the colonial household system through 
records of civil cases that involve widows and their customary rights. Rather 
than resort to suicide to express their resentment, as did those widows from the 
late nineteenth century we encountered in the previous chapter, widows under 
Japanese colonial rule proactively utilized the colonial legal system to claim their 
customary rights over property and often won. Yet these victories had their limi-
tations. Since strengthened widow rights were an accouterment of strengthened 
household-head rights, widows’ rights still were vulnerable once a male heir was 
secured through adoption. A widow’s house headship remained temporary, as a 
later case we examine at the end of the chapter illustrates through one widow’s 
vain attempt to make her tenure as household head permanent.
JAPANESE FAMILY POLICIES AND THE C OLONIAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM
The Ordinances on Civil Matters (Chōsen Minjirei) promulgated in 1912 extended 
the Japanese Civil Code in its entirety in Korea, with the important exceptions 
of family and inheritance matters, which were designated to be ruled according 
to Korean custom.1 Family customs thus were meant to play a prominent role in 
the colonial civil-law regime. An immediate problem, however, was that Korea 
lacked any codified set of customary laws. Following the tradition of Chinese legal 
culture, Korea had long left most civil matters to be dealt with privately, handled 
by local magistrates only when they were considered harmful to public order.2 
Without a tradition of private law, there also was no history of customary law 
formation.3 To fill this gap, the Japanese conducted customs surveys to collect 
material to determine Korean customs in practice. The result, published later in 
1912 as Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho (Customs-survey report), was used in the colonial 
courts as a reference on Korean customs in conjunction with additional surveys 
and inquiries, though these by no means were sufficient to cover all matters that 
came to the colonial civil courts. In addition, the discrepancy between the civil-
law regime in precolonial Korea and the Japanese Civil Code meant that there was 
bound to be some adjustment, if not outright distortion, of customs in the process 
of their becoming customary law.
For leadership in the colonies, the operation of a customary law regime served 
some important political objectives. As with Taiwan, the governor general of 
Korea answered directly to the emperor, bypassing the Japanese Diet. Establishing 
colonies as separate legal spheres ensured political ease of control and enabled a 
flexibility that facilitated the transition to colonial rule. The Japanese authorities 
were concerned that applying foreign laws to private affairs, such as family mat-
ters, might cause too much disruption to local society. As a latecomer to empire 
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building, the Japanese were positioned to take cues from other colonizers, such 
as the British, German, and the French, who applied local customs in matters of 
family and religion.4
That keeping Korea as a separate legal sphere was the main objective of the 
customary laws is proven by the fact that locating the Korean difference in family 
matters was not always part of the plan. The choice to do so was derived from a 
long and rather haphazard process. Japanese influence on Korean legal matters 
began with protectorate rule in 1905, even before Korea was formally annexed 
to Japan in 1910. Rescinding the unequal treaties and thus severing the Western 
countries’ ties to Korea was crucial to Japan’s monopolization of Korea—a fact of 
which the Japanese resident general, Itō Hirobumi, was acutely aware.5 Itō rec-
ognized a pressing need for a proper system of civil law in what he saw as a still 
chaotic legal system in Korea. As the first step toward legal reform, Itō formed 
a system of legal advisers. Judges and lawyers from Japan were invited to local 
regions in Korea to “advise and assist” the Korean administrator-judges in legal 
matters. Korea’s 1895 efforts to modernize the judicial system during the Kabo 
Reforms by implementing new judicial procedures had fallen far short of what 
had been achieved in the Japanese legal system.6 Civil cases and criminal cases 
remained undivided, and local administrators doubled as judges. Without any 
legal or administrative authority, however, the Japanese legal advisers had limited 
means of directly implementing reforms of the local courts.
For the reform of the framework within which these courts operated, Itō, with 
a background in law and having himself been a significant contributor to the writ-
ing of the Japanese Constitution, envisioned a civil law for Korea separate from the 
Japanese Civil Code. To write such civil law, Itō included among the legal advisers 
he invited to Korea Ume Kenjirō (1860–1910), a prominent civil-law scholar who 
had participated in the writing of Japan’s Civil Code.7 In Japan Ume had been a 
member of the Enactment Faction (Dankō-ha) and had supported a Civil Code 
based on universal principles rather than Japanese customs. Yet in Korea he sup-
ported a Civil Code more agreeable to local customs. What is notable is that, 
unlike the customary law regime enacted later in 1912, Ume’s plan was to produce 
separate laws for commercial matters in Korea based on its customs but extend 
Japanese family laws to Korean family matters. Accordingly, Ume’s customs sur-
veys concentrated on customs concerning land, such as ownership, transactions, 
land tenure, and tenancy.
The sudden shift of Japan’s Korea policy in 1909, following a whirlwind of 
events, turned the legal policy on civil laws in Korea on its head. In 1907 King 
Kojong’s attempt to publicize his discontentment with Japanese control failed at 
the Hague Convention. In the aftermath of this incident, the Japanese forced King 
Kojong’s abdication and assumed control over legal and diplomatic matters in 
Korea. Following the assassination of Itō Hirobumi by An Chung-gŭn, a Korean 
nationalist, the Consignment of Judicial Power in November 1909 nullified the 
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need to write new civil laws for Korea. Japan discarded its plan to keep Korea as a 
protectorate and signed the Annexation Treaty in 1910 to formally colonize Korea.8 
Ume’s original plan came to naught, and, shortly after, in August 1910, Ume him-
self died from typhoid fever.
Despite the tumult of the times, legal reforms after 1910 were carried out 
with smooth continuity under the supervision, in part, of the same legal experts 
already on the ground since 1906. They were joined by many legal specialists 
newly recruited after 1910 with attractive pay and benefits.9 Shifting away from 
Ume’s original plan, the overall direction of reform was toward legal assimilation, 
whereby the new modern Japanese laws and legal system would be implemented 
almost wholesale in Korea. Korean exception became confined to the area of fam-
ily matters, thereby giving family customs a more prominent role in defining the 
Korean difference.
Legal reform in Korea was later remembered by its implementers as a smooth 
and optimistic march toward progress. One judge, Yamaguchi Sadamasa, remi-
nisced in 1940 about how ecstatic he had been over the transfer of legal matters in 
1909: his decision to come to Korea, which was an ambitious career gamble for a 
young legalist, had finally paid off. The happy sentiment was shared by many, and 
the Japanese legalists celebrated the occasion with various festivities. At the old 
site of Kyŏnghŭi Palace they held a sports meet (daiundōkai) and a costume ball, 
where they dressed up as British and German officers and European ladies; they 
also marched in a costume parade.10 The Government General installed a modern 
court system modeled on Japan’s own in 1909, even with similar court names, and 
began implementing divisions between judicial and administrative duties as well 
as between penal and civil matters.
The colonial civil-court system, formalized in 1912, had three levels, consisting 
of eight local courts, three appellate courts (fukushin hōin), and a High Court (kōtō 
hō’in). Litigating parties commonly had legal representatives or lawyers, either 
Korean or Japanese, although even at the highest level of the High Court some 
cases were litigated by the plaintiffs or defendants themselves.11 Lawsuits were quite 
expensive; one had to pay the lawsuit filing fee of 3.50 wŏn. If one hired a scribe, 
which seems to have been the common practice, one paid an additional 5.00–6.00 
wŏn, bringing the total to around 10.00 wŏn. Considering that an average female 
factory worker’s monthly earnings were around 12.00 wŏn, filing a lawsuit must 
not have been undertaken lightly.12 The filing fee, moreover, was only part of the 
challenge. A scene in Kim Tong-in’s short story “Yakan jaŭi sŭlp’ŭm” (Sadness of 
the weak, 1919) provides a sense, albeit fictional, of the economic realities of a 
lawsuit for a person of modest income. In this story a young female student is 
impregnated by her employer and sues him for compensation. As an orphan from 
a poor, rural family, putting herself through school by working as a live-in tutor in 
an affluent household, she can afford a lawsuit only because she receives an unex-
pected severance payment from the employer’s wife. Her limited monetary power, 
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however, inhibits her from hiring a lawyer, which proves to be a critical disadvan-
tage against the defendant, who hires a very eloquent professional.13
INVENTED CUSTOMS
Much ink has been spilled about how accurate or distorting the survey process was 
for Korean family customs. This process was very much influenced by the Japanese-
introduced household system in addition to the logic of customary lawmaking. 
Countering the conventional understanding that the survey distorted, or “misin-
terpreted,” Korean custom, scholar Yi Sŭng-il more recently has argued that the 
changes in customary law merely reflected the natural change of customs themselves 
under colonial rule.14 Marie Seong-hak Kim has argued that the colonial survey pro-
cess of customary laws was inadvertently a process of the “invention of tradition.” 
Owing to their invented nature, Kim notes, the customary laws of colonial Korea 
lacked the critical component of customary laws in European cases: communal con-
sensus. Since customary laws were produced through judicial processes in a very 
short period compared to the long historical processes through which European 
customary laws were created, Koreans themselves ironically were marginalized in 
the creation process of the very customs that they supposedly embraced. It was not 
surprising that Korean litigants commonly claimed that the Korean customs cited 
as the basis on which the colonial courts adjudicated were inauthentic. What was 
happening was that Korean custom (Chōsen kanshū) was not exactly what Koreans 
were practicing customarily, but rather a set of customs artificially created by the 
colonial judicial system through a process of replies (kaitō) and bulletins (tsūchō).15
In fact, the way that surveys were designed made a certain distortion unavoid-
able. Customs that the Koreans observed were not customary laws per se, and the 
very process of systemizing them into customary laws entailed codifying prac-
tices that previously lacked uniformity and communal agreement. Yet the surveys 
assumed that there already were uniform customs among Koreans, though this 
was far from the truth.16
That the surveys used as key sources textual material such as old legal codes 
from the Chosŏn dynasty and China contributed to the confusion.17 Using textual 
sources in customs surveys meant the risk of equating law-as-text with custom-
as-practice. Especially in the premodern Korean context, where legal codes often 
functioned as ideals rather than norms, it was problematic to consider these as 
sources for customary laws. Codes on civil matters from premodern Chinese tra-
ditions reflected more the reality of the ideal than the reality of practice—should 
rather than is—and thus probably were not an optimal source for customary laws, 
indigenous as they may have been. Using written records as sources for customary 
law meant that customs that were being weakened could be revived. This might 
explain why some Koreans seemed exasperated by the customs that the Japanese 
colonial court decided to acknowledge, such as widow rights. Since the Japanese 
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relied on old Chosŏn legal code books as a source, widow rights may well have 
been a dying practice, upheld on paper because of the moral purpose (e.g., widow 
chastity) it was serving. That also would explain why some of the customs listed 
on the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho seem contradictory to one another: some customs 
were text-derived, and others may have been derived from practice.
In the process of compiling the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho, local variations were 
erased. Korean customs were not nationally homogeneous. In institutionalizing a 
set of customary practices known as Korean customs, some customary practices 
inevitably had to be excluded and ignored. If certain customs were found to be in 
conflict with the overall framework of colonial law, they were not incorporated 
into the colonial legal system even if they fit a broad definition of national customs. 
For instance, even though concubinage was a widespread practice, customs related 
to concubines were not acknowledged as part of the customary law.18 Instead, con-
cubines were banned from household registries in 1915.19 It thus was the practice 
of the colonial court not only to pick and choose among diverse customs but also 
to exclude those Korean customs that did not fit into the colonial legal scheme, 
replacing them with alternatives that usually were comparable to articles from the 
Japanese Civil Code. The end product was a nationalized version of customs that 
was new and alien to many Koreans.
Biases built into the survey process contributed to the problem of confusion. 
Local interviewees, for example, were drawn from the ranks of local notables, pre-
sumably with a penchant for customs that benefited them more than others (the 
younger generation, the poor, and women). In one customs survey, for example, all 
interviewees were men between forty and seventy years of age. They also seemed 
to have status: reports duly noted their occupations, most of which, such as “for-
mer head of township” or “member of Confucian student organization [chang’ŭi]” 
seemed honorary, but probably held a certain currency of local power.20
But beyond the design or method of the surveys, it was also the framework that 
proved problematic. The customs surveys operated on the assumption that the 
household system was already in practice, although the surveys were conducted 
before the household system was firmly established; this pushed the customs-
survey process in the assimilatory direction. The survey questionnaires reveal 
that the household (ie) that formed the basis of status in the Japanese Civil Code 
was assumed to be in practice in Korea. While survey results detected that there 
was a complex and varying definition of the boundary of the family in Korea, 
questions such as “Is there a house that a son must enter?” simply assumed that 
households existed in Korea and differences existed only in procedural matters. 
Yet later reports drawn from local surveys conducted occasionally to supplement 
the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho show that a continuing discrepancy existed in the 
legal framework of the household and the actual lived realities of family life. A 
1919 report, which was conducted to determine the applicability of inkyo (retire-
ment of the household head) in Korea, showed that Koreans preferred terms like 
36    chapter 2
chŏn’ga and kajang rather than inkyo or koshu, showing that the Korean sense of a 
ka and its head was different from the Japanese sense of a household and its head 
(koshu).21 Given the built-in biases of the customs-survey process itself, accurately 
surveying customs in practice was a flawed project from the beginning. In other 
words, the boundary of the household that often played a definitive role in decid-
ing family matters was a Japanese legal concept imposed not only on legal matters 
but also, from the beginning, on the process of surveying local customs.22
WID OWS C ONTEST THE HOUSEHOLD
Throughout the colonial period, there were 72 High Court cases that involved 
widows as litigants, most of which concerned widows’ property rights. This was 
around 3 percent of all civil cases (2003 in total), but 30 percent of all cases con-
cerning family matters and 40 percent of the 156 cases categorized under “Korean 
Civil Ordinances” (Chōsen Minjirei), the colonial civil laws that concerned Korean 
customs. Although this number may not seem high, these were just the cases that 
made it to the highest level of courts and thus a fraction of all the cases adjudi-
cated in the local courts. The High Court cases are significant, moreover, because 
these decisions had wide-ranging impact as precedents.23 They were disseminated 
through official notices to the local courts and, after the Judicial Association was 
established, to all legal professionals through their monthly journal, Shihō Kyōkai 
Zasshi (Judicial Association journal).24
Widows’ lawsuits uniquely illuminate the impact of the Japanese legal system 
on Korean families. Widows who were household heads literally embodied the 
boundary between the new colonial household and the lineage and thus often 
found themselves in a crossfire between the interests of the lineage and the inter-
ests of the colonial state. The new household regime, combined with clarified 
legal rights under the modern colonial legal system, meant that Korean women, 
especially widows, found themselves unexpected beneficiaries in the colonial legal 
system. Although such gains were not gains for all women, or for women’s rights 
in particular, they demonstrate that the workings of colonial laws had a complex 
influence on women’s status and legal rights under the colonial legal system: at the 
very least, the new colonial legal system breached the old system just enough so 
that some women were able to utilize it to their gain in unexpected ways.25
In January 1917, for example, two civil cases reached the High Court of Colonial 
Korea, one over the management rights of a piece of land and another over the 
ownership of harvest from that land. The land had been owned by a man who 
died in 1914, leaving behind a young wife and an infant son, who also died shortly 
after. The cases involved the widow, named Yi Se-sŏn, and the older brother of 
the deceased, Ko Sŭng-hwan. When Yi’s husband passed away, Ko took charge of 
her husband’s land and refused to give her any harvest from that land, prompt-
ing her to sue him. Yi argued that she had the customary right to retain her late 
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husband’s property and manage it until she found a suitable adoptee to inherit the 
household. Ko, on the other hand, argued that in the event a woman was widowed 
without an heir, it was “Korean custom to have a close (male) relative in the lineage 
[J: monchū; K: munjung] manage the property,” as women were dependents and 
had no rights over property, according to Korean custom. Yi won both cases in 
both the local and appellate courts, but Ko took the case to the High Court.26
Rather than demonstrating a sudden amnesia about what existing customary 
rights were for widows, this case, and many other cases over widow rights in the early 
years of the Japanese colonial period, more likely represented a continuity of conflicts 
and disagreements over widow rights. As we have already seen in chapter 1, widows’ 
positions in marital families were increasingly threatened during the late Chosŏn 
dynasty, as the property regime came to favor land property, and daughters were 
excluded from inheriting land. By the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, widows, it seems, 
were victimized by contradictory standards: they were expected to remain single yet 
were subject to being sold in remarriage—sometimes against their will. The colonial 
civil courts merely provided a new venue in which these conflicts were enacted.
This case is notable because it shows how conflicts that were not new in themselves 
played out differently in the colonial legal system. First of all, the widow Yi pursued 
her own lawsuit. In a very similar case from 1906, before the onset of Japanese colo-
nial rule, a widow’s brother-in-law appealed on her behalf against a cousin-in-law 
who had taken the land title (chŏndap munkwŏn) previously owned by her late hus-
band.27 The cousin-in-law had persuaded the widow to entrust the household’s land 
title to him. Land titles, during the Chosŏn dynasty, were a critical proof of owner-
ship.28 Since the widow’s son was still young and the document needed safekeeping, 
the widow had agreed. Seven years later, when her cousin-in-law had not given her 
any of the harvest, the widow realized that she had been deceived and appealed to 
her brother-in-law for help. It is significant that the widow from 1906 did not directly 
put forth the lawsuit herself, unlike the widow Yi, who did.29
A more striking difference in the colonial legal system, perhaps, was how mat-
ters of widow rights became the subject of official legal attention, and civil lawsuits 
such as these became opportunities for the colonial legal system to clarify custom-
ary rights. The High Court sided with the widow Yi in the 1917 case. It refuted 
the brother-in-law’s claim that Koreans categorically denied property rights to 
women. As a widow and now the household head of her family, Yi, the judges 
stated, had the right to inherit her late husband’s property and manage it until she 
adopted an heir. Such decisions would later be used as precedents in rulings when 
similar cases emerged.
Widow rights themselves were not an invention of the colonial legal system. As 
explained in chapter 1, widows had special customary rights in Korea before the colo-
nial period. An eldest daughter-in-law (ch’ongbu) of the family had a special ritual 
standing, and, in cases where the family head died without an heir, the daughter-
in-law was eligible to continue the ancestral rites and adopt an heir to continue the 
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family line. To suppress the remarriage of widows, the Chosŏn court allowed widows 
to keep their husband’s rank land as “chastity land” (susinjŏn). Yet these rights were 
continuously challenged at court, for they clashed with the principle of patrilineality, 
as the trend toward exclusive agnatic inheritance grew stronger after the seventeenth 
century. An inheritance regime that flowed through bilateral lines gave way to an 
inheritance regime that gave rights exclusively to agnatic kin. A long tradition of par-
tible inheritance also gave way to primogeniture, further marginalizing daughters’ 
inheritance rights in the family. Widow rights seem to have been uneven and weak-
ening, especially among commoners, by the late nineteenth century.
There are several likely reasons why widow rights were acknowledged under the 
colonial legal system as legitimate Korean customs. First of all, widow rights served 
a practical purpose in the legal system by filling an important gap necessitated 
by the colonial household system. In the household system, where the household 
head had an important legal capacity, succession needed to happen immediately 
after the household head’s death. Therefore, there always needed to be a desig-
nated heir in any given household. In the absence of daughters’ inheritance rights, 
having a widow as the backup heir was a necessary provision for households that 
lacked sons as heirs. Yet the strong tradition of agnatic inheritance in the Korean 
family system, centuries old at this point, dictated that family property had to pass 
into the hands of agnatic kin and denied widows permanent inheritance rights. 
The administrative need for a backup heir, yet the customary resistance to giving 
widows full inheritance rights, produced colonial widow rights that were neither 
full inheritance rights nor an outright lack of rights.
Parts of the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho do give credence to the argument of the 
brother-in-law who denied independent property rights for women. Item 5, “Are 
There Restrictions in the Wife’s Legal Capacity?,” notes, “In Korea, the wife must 
be absolutely obedient to the husband . . . and in all legal transactions (contracts, 
lawsuits, and other important legal actions) must receive permission from the hus-
band.” Item 132, “What Kind of Rights Does the Husband Have over the Wife?,” 
notes again that the husband’s power over the wife is mightily large and that the 
“wife must always receive permission from the husband in all legal matters.”30
Yet widows and their rights and status were another matter. Descriptions 
from the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho show the ambivalent and vague nature of 
widow rights. Item 164, “What Happens When There Is No Legally Assumed or 
Designated Heir to the Household Head?,” clearly states that the widow of the 
household head had the right to choose the heir when the household head died 
without one: “When the household head dies without an heir to conduct ancestral 
rites, an heir needs to be chosen, which amounts to nothing less than the action 
of adopting a son after the death of the adoptive father. The person to decide the 
adoption is the wife [that is, the widow]. If there is no wife, then this responsibility 
falls on the mother [of the deceased household head]. If neither of these persons is 
alive, then the lineage association is to decide the adoption.”
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Yet custom was more equivocal about the inheritance of property. Item, 168, 
“Who Can Become the Property Heir?,” states,
When the household head [koshu] (except for a female household head) dies, the 
heir to the property is the same as the heir to the ancestral rites, others who can 
perform the ancestral rites, or the deceased’s brother. A daughter cannot become an 
heir to property. The heir has to be someone within the house; someone [living or 
registered] in another house [take ni oru mono] cannot become a property heir. . . . 
When there is no son, [one can] either have the wife accept [ukuru] the portion of 
inheritance or choose an adoptee and have him accept the adoptive father’s portion 
of inheritance, but the custom is inconsistent on this point. . . . If the deceased family 
member does not have a son and if the deceased is the eldest son, the inheritance is 
passed on [shōkei] to his father. If he is a younger son, the property is passed on to his 
wife. If the [deceased] family member is not married or is a daughter, the inheritance 
is passed on to the father.31
In other words, according to the Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho, when there was no suit-
able heir, the widow could “receive” property. But the description itself was con-
flicted: the widow could receive property, but, as a woman, she could not become 
heir to property. Because the purpose of these descriptions was to clearly designate 
heirs, it established the widow as the last resort for passing on the family property 
when there was no heir but made sure that she had only temporary rights over 
the property until an heir was chosen. The Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho also states 
elsewhere, “People do not acknowledge retirement of a household head in Korea, 
but when a widow household head has adopted an heir for the deceased male 
household head, the adoptee, of course, becomes the household head, and the 
widow who had been the household head [retires and she] and her family mem-
bers become his family members.”32
Since the Japanese also wanted to maintain the household as the only legal 
unit of family, widows were critical to keeping the property within the household 
and preventing the property from being subsumed into the main house, thereby 
obliterating the particular household. The problem was that there was no legally 
defined tenure of a widow in the household-head position. Widow rights were 
acknowledged, but the contours of their rights were not clearly delineated. This 
ambiguity not only subjected widows to vulnerability but was bound to cause 
problems and, indeed, became a source of contention as well.
THE C OLONIAL REGIME REC ONFIGURES THE 
HOUSEHOLD
Widow cases show that more than Korean customs, it was the new household 
framework that determined the outcome of lawsuits. The colonial household sys-
tem implemented through household registration thus deeply affected family life 
in colonial Korea. The civil-registration system was introduced in 1909, and the 
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Civil-Registration Law (Minsekihō) required all Koreans to register by household 
units under the name of the household head (J: koshu; K: hoju). Also noted in the 
registers were the address of the family and the names and dates of status changes 
of all family members, such as births, deaths, marriages, divorces, adoptions, and 
recognition of (the paternity of) children born out of wed-lock.33
To be sure, family registration itself was not new in Korean history; it was the 
legal function of it that was new to Koreans. Records of registering king’s subjects 
in household units date as far back as the Three Kingdoms period. The Koryŏ and 
Chosŏn courts also required subjects to register with the state. The purpose of the 
Chosŏn dynasty family registers was to clarify personal status for the yangban elite 
and to levy corvée and head taxes on commoners.34 The unit of the family regis-
tered was the unit of coresidency, including family members but also any relatives, 
slaves, or hired hands that shared the residence. The term, head of the household 
(hoju), also was in use since the Chosŏn dynasty, but the role of the household 
head was entirely different from that recognized by the colonial registry: in the 
Chosŏn dynasty the household head was simply a representative of the family 
responsible for paying the household tax to the state authorities.35 Rather than a 
position of authority, the household head performed an administrative function. 
Therefore, taking on the duties of the household head in the place of an ailing 
father or an aging mother could even be considered an act of filial piety.36 Surveys 
from as late as the 1920s show that Koreans had a concept of chŏn’ga (passing 
on the family), meaning passing on the position of hoju, or kajang, to a younger 
family member when the older hoju had grown too old to properly perform the 
administrative role.37 The Kwangmu Registry, a reformed household registry put 
in place shortly before the onset of Japanese rule between 1896 and 1907, as part of 
Kojong’s efforts at strengthening the court administration, did not change much 
in these regards. The objective of reflecting the lived reality of the family was 
strengthened: the focus was on accurate depictions of who lived within the fam-
ily, regardless of their relations.38 In short, although previous forms of household 
registries existed in Korea, their function was an administrative identification of 
the household composition, with the household head serving merely to represent 
the family.
The Japanese-installed household registry differed from previous Korean ver-
sions in some significant respects. First, it imposed a particular family structure 
rather than accurately reflecting existing coresidence patterns, as the Kwangmu 
Registry, for example, had aimed to do.39 In the Japanese-installed system, 
the household head and family members were registered, while other unre-
lated  coresidents—such as servants, who had been registered in the Kwangmu 
Registry—were excluded. Patriarchal principles and primogeniture also were 
imposed for inheritance of the position of the household head. Unlike in the pre-
vious Kwangmu Registry, the ability of an eldest son to divide his household from 
the parents’ household was restricted; as a result, within the first few years of the 
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Household-Registration Law’s promulgation, families were restructured to fol-
low the newly normative structure of the patrilineal stem family.40 The household 
registry recorded the personal status of all residents in a household unit under 
the administrative authority of the household head, whose position was inherited 
according to principles of primogeniture and patrilineal succession. The house-
hold head held both legal and economic power, with the authority to approve all 
status changes of family members, such as marriages, divorces, and the registra-
tion of births, as well as the right of an individual to claim a larger portion of 
family property in inheritance. Validation of family status changes that used to be 
in the realm of the family and the community were now moved to the realm of 
government administration. Through the Japanese-installed household registry, 
the relationship between the state and society was reconfigured, and the Japanese 
colonial apparatus inserted itself into the private space of the family.41
Figure 1. A page of a household register with a wife and 
a concubine. From Ariga, “Kosekini kansuru jikō.”
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In addition, the registry officially transformed the definition and boundary 
of the family. The household that was registered was not a simple reflection of 
the actual coresident family. It privileged the definition of family that centered 
around consanguinity, that is, relations by blood organized around the principle 
of patriarchal hierarchy. The collection of household registers from 1913, gath-
ered presumably in preparation for the 1918 Common Law (Kyōtsūhō) and the 
1922 Household-Registration Law (Kosekihō), shows that there was a significant 
gap between the proper household that the colonial state was trying to enforce 
and the actual lived realities of Korean families.42 Among the registers collected 
for their peculiarities were those of households with both a wife and a concubine, 
households with tsureko (children from a wife’s previous marriage), households 
headed by a widow living with a daughter and a son-in-law, and households of 
Figure 2. A page of a household register with a concu-
bine and a daughter she brought in. From Ariga, “Kosekini 
kansuru jikō.”
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monks, a group of unrelated people who yet shared one residence and economy.43 
These were all groups of people coresiding in one household, reported by those 
people themselves as a household, that nonetheless were considered by the colo-
nial state unfit to be considered as proper households. Clearly, the household in 
the registry was meant to be more than just a reflection of the lived reality: it was 
an abstract legal concept imposed on the lived reality. In fact, this concept of a 
household unit was the first instance of the extension of metropolitan family law 
into Korea, even before Korea was formally colonized.44
It was the new boundary of the family that most critically determined the out-
come of many of the cases that involved widow rights. In the previously mentioned 
case from 1917, the brother-in-law, Ko, lost the case because his claim to be a family 
member of the widow was denied by the judges. According to the appellate court 
Figure 3. A page of a household register with a widowed 
household head and her daughter and son-in-law. From 
Ariga, “Kosekini kansuru jikō.”
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judge, Yi Se-sŏn, the widow, was the only family member left to inherit the prop-
erty until a suitable heir was found. To this, Ko adamantly protested, “According to 
Korean custom, brothers are one body and are of one family regardless of whether 
they live together. It is also without question that the brother’s wife is one family.” 
To this, the High Court judge noted, “Once a household is divided, the household 
head of the divided house and his family members are not family members of the 
main house. . . . Therefore, it was right for the original decision to not acknowledge 
that defendant [Yi Se-sŏn] is plaintiff ’s [Ko’s] family.”45
The judge was subtly but surely changing the definition of family from kin-
ship to the legal unit of registration. The new household implemented through 
the colonial registration system thus clashed with the traditional family system 
in Korea, which had placed a strong value on consanguinal ties. The principle 
of the Ordinances on Civil Matters that decreed family issues in Korea were to 
be dealt with according to Korean customs did not stop the colonial state from 
imposing this new boundary of the family in Korea. This and similar decisions 
articulated a new boundary of the family: one defined by the Civil-Registration 
Law, whereby the boundary of the family was circumscribed to correspond to the 
boundary of the household. All informal family ties were deemed legally irrel-
evant. In the process widow rights, perhaps unbeknownst to the litigants them-
selves, were strengthened as the claims of in-law relatives were curtailed along the 
household boundary.
The case of Yi Se-sŏn, therefore, shows how widows benefited inadvertently as 
the placeholders of the boundary between the household and the lineage. In this, 
d. 
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Yi Se-s n ng-
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d. 
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Figure 4. A diagram of the Yi Se-sŏn case.
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as in all the cases where widows’ property rights were upheld, what was really 
being confirmed was the legal boundary of the household. Upholding a widow’s 
right to inherit the household property directly enforced the boundary of the 
household. Traditional rights of the widow in this way found new support from 
the colonial regime. The protection of a widow’s right to her deceased husband’s 
property may have been one of the most striking ways in which the Koreans 
learned about the everyday consequences of the household system. In the previ-
ously mentioned case, the appellate court stated, “Even though the plaintiff argues 
that there were customary rights for a household head to manage the property for a 
widow when her husband dies without an heir, the husband in question died after 
he had divided his household from the plaintiff ’s household, and therefore the 
plaintiff has no such rights to claim.46
With the establishment of the new boundary, the legal rights of relatives out-
side of the household boundary also were denied. Customarily legitimate but 
informal family titles were suppressed in favor of the new legal terms dictated by 
the household-registration system. To Ko’s claim of rights as a “lineage relative,” 
the colonial court responded with another term, “household head,” the legally 
recognized position in the household with prerogatives over family property. In 
other words, the colonial court was denying legal recognition to property claims 
based on lineage ties rather than household membership. The widow’s right to 
inherit her dead husband’s property and the brother’s failure to extend his power 
over that property protected the boundary of the household. The competing defi-
nitions of family boundary offered by Ko and the colonial court not only reveal a 
wide disjuncture between the colonial law and the local customs of the colonized 
but also show that these differences were constantly (and sometimes covertly) 
negotiated to facilitate the colonial system. Even though family matters were to 
be ruled by Korean customs, certain Korean customs were discarded, ignored, or 
drastically modified to fit the Japanese legal framework and Japanese objectives.
To stress the new boundary around the household, judges on the High Court 
sought help from a different customary concept: “separate register, separate prop-
erty” (J: besseki yizai; K: pyŏlchŏk yijae). Originally, this was merely a term that 
designated a separated house, very similar to the Japanese legal concept of bunke 
(divided house) or bunseki (separated registry). In legal documents from the 
Koryŏ and Chosŏn dynasties the concept pyŏlchŏk yijae was used to discourage 
separating a register and dividing a house when the parents were alive.47 Yet the 
term in the High Court was used to mean something different and prescriptive: 
if they had a separate register, their property was also separate. Cases that drew 
on this principle followed exactly the same logic as the Yi Se-sŏn case and show 
that the colonial court was consistent in its effort to enforce this new legal bound-
ary of the family. As early as 1911, the judges stated that, according to the Korean 
custom of “separate register, separate property,” a relative outside of the household 
could not inherit the household property. This case also involved a male relative of 
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the husband’s family protesting the widow’s inheritance of her deceased husband’s 
property.48
In another case that also cited this principle—the 1913 case of Chŏng In-su ver-
sus Yi Tong-sik— the court ruled that Chŏng could not inherit from his grandfa-
ther’s concubine, Madam Chu (Chu-jo’i), because she was registered in a separate 
household register from his. Her property instead was passed on to Yi, her nephew, 
whom she had designated as her heir.49 This decision also curtailed an existing 
family tie, that between a mother and a child, prescriptively imposed between a 
father’s spouses and his offspring. Chŏng In-su based his claim to inheritance on 
his perceived, or culturally prescribed obligation, to support Mme. Chu in her old 
age, reflecting traditional family sentiments. To this claim the High Court judge 
replied that he was not a family member of the widowed concubine. In fact, under 
colonial law Chŏng no longer had the obligation to care for his grandfather’s con-
cubine. Under the new law, which encouraged monogamy, adding concubines to 
the household registers was banned, and the familial relationship of the concubine 
with her husband and his proper wife’s children was officially severed. As such, 
this new legal condition gave concubines like Mme. Chu the opportunity to free 
themselves from the husband’s family, allowing them to become heads of their 
own household. They were then free to bequeath their property to whomever they 
designated, someone they could trust to honor their souls with annual ancestral 
rites. For Mme. Chu, that was not Chŏng In-su, her “grandson.”
HOUSEHOLD AND PROPERT Y OWNERSHIP
Redrawing the family boundaries had a larger implication than just reorganiz-
ing the family system. It also meant drastically restructuring property relations 
within Korean society, shifting land from communal ownership to ownership by 
individual heads of households. When the colonial land surveys compelled land-
owners to register their land with the colonial administration, it enforced the 
concept of individual ownership that denied customary rights such as surface or 
tenancy rights, causing great confusion and distress to tenants who had enjoyed 
long hereditary rights of tenancy and cultivation over the land.50 Because this new 
colonial definition of property ownership meant that there was only one owner 
per parcel, many families were thrown into chaos by the need to delineate the 
prerogatives of the lineage heir. Once the heir of the core family was declared to be 
the land’s sole owner, traditional restraints on his ownership (especially in terms of 
selling or mortgaging the land) also became ineffective. As is shown in the follow-
ing cases, the family patriarch became no longer able to claim rights to property 
owned by members of his family who lived outside of his household, even if the 
traditional norms had prescribed otherwise.
One of the areas where the new colonial property ownership wreaked particu-
larly serious havoc was that of ritual estates (wit’o), agricultural lands set aside by 
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the lineage to fund ancestral rites, the managerial rights to which were granted to 
the heir of the main family. While the colonial government nominally continued 
to acknowledge the communal ownership of such land by the lineage, this  principle 
sat awkwardly within the overall structure of individual ownership that precluded 
any restrictions by customary rights of communal ownership.
This conflict was visible in the following cases from the 1910s concerning burial 
sites as well. Burial-site cases were categorized separately among Korean custom-
related cases in the High Court decisions. The perception was that burial sites 
had a special customary status that marked them as different from other landed 
properties. Indeed, the litigants involved in burial-site cases did cite a special set 
of customs that constrained the general concept of property ownership under the 
colonial legal system. There were customary distances between grave sites that 
needed to be observed, which varied according to the buried person’s status, both 
social and familial. Problems arose when the owner of a burial site did not own 
all the extra space that custom designated as the necessary space to be left empty. 
When another person who owned within this extra space buried his own relative 
in it, a conflict would break out with the owner of the first burial site, who would 
protest that the second person was violating his customary rights. At heart, this 
was a conflict between customary rights and personal ownership. Invariably, the 
colonial court ruled in favor of the latter. If the owner of the first burial site did not 
own all the customary land around the burial site, he could not protest another 
person’s use of this land.51
In 1911 the High Court heard a particularly messy case concerning a grave 
site.52 This case between two family members shows how traditional familial 
propriety or customary rights had lost ground to the claims of individual own-
ership instituted by the new colonial regime. More pointedly, it shows how the 
new focus on exclusive ownership functioned to curtail the customary claims 
of lineage that had spanned family boundaries. Within the framework of exclu-
sive ownership of property, the customary rights of the core lineage family over 
other families based on ritualistic grounds were no longer sanctioned. This case 
involved the plaintiff—a second nephew of the accused—burying his father on 
land that the accused claimed as his. The accused went to the police, claiming 
that there was an “unidentified body” in his land. Failing to find the person who 
had buried the body, the police exhumed it. The plaintiff was suing to have the 
body reburied at the site. As it turned out, the burial site was part of a larger patch 
of land that the plaintiff ’s great-grandfather had given to his younger brother, 
the accused’s grandfather. While agreeing that the land was given to the ancestor 
of the accused, the plaintiff argued that the burial site itself was a “shamanistic 
ground [ŭmsaji]” and therefore excluded from the gift. Arguing that the injunc-
tion that had forbidden anyone from owning this shamanistic ground was now 
lifted, he stated that it should be returned to its rightful heir—himself—as he was 
the great-grandson of the original owner. The accused, meanwhile, denied any 
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such customary restrictions on the land. One can assume that before the insti-
tutionalization of registered ownership, customary propriety binding these two 
relatives would have prevented the accused from exhuming the body of a second 
cousin buried on his land. After all, the deceased second cousin of the core fam-
ily would have had a ritualistically higher position. Stating that there were no 
such customary restrictions based on the plot’s being a “shamanistic ground,” the 
colonial court upheld the accused’s right of ownership. Since the accused had the 
right to decide whom to bury in his land and since he had done all he could to 
find the person who had buried the unidentified body, his decision to exhume 
was deemed entirely justified.
Owing to similar complications, further cases concerning communal owner-
ship were presented in front of the courts in 1915 and 1916, including two cases 
of lineage members who had sold their communal land without the consent of 
other lineage members.53 In both cases the lineage members had registered the 
communal land under their names as individual property and conducted the sales 
with proper seals and documents. Although the High Court acknowledged the 
communal nature of both pieces of land, there was little that the court could do to 
prevent these individuals from claiming the communal lands as their own beyond 
rebuking the individuals for foregoing the customary process of consulting the 
other members of the lineage before the sale.
The new land-registry system, launched after the land surveys that the Japanese 
colonial state conducted between 1910 and 1918, also strengthened household-
head rights over property, curtailing any kinship ties or cultural convention that 
attempted to override such rights. In the sense that both systems strengthened 
household-head rights, the property cases over ancestral burial grounds were 
similar to widow cases like that of Yi Se-sŏn. Putting widow cases in the context 
of such other cases thus challenges us to evaluate widows’ victories in inheritance 
cases within a larger picture. The victories of widows, it seems, did not particu-
larly mean that the colonial courts were extending women’s property rights per 
se. Rather, the colonial court was showing a consistent and marked preference for 
upholding the new household boundary and protecting the colonial household 
against the extended reaches of the lineage. As with the aforementioned land-
ownership cases, the women triumphed in court only because the denial of their 
claims would have meant a threat to the boundary of the household unit.
The new household unit, therefore, had dual functions: limiting the authority of 
the patriarch over the extended kinship and defining a new boundary around the 
household that was enforced by and legible to the colonial state. In other words, 
although it preserved a certain collectivity of the family unit, the Japanese colonial 
state did so by significantly disrupting the existing collective unit of the lineage. 
Although both family systems strongly espoused patriarchy, there were crucial dif-
ferences in their definitions, especially in terms of family boundaries, giving rise 
to strong conflicts between the two systems. Therefore, the critical impact of the 
Widowed Household Heads, New Boundary    49
Japanese Civil Code in colonial Korea was not that it strengthened or weakened 
the patriarchal ideology but that it enabled the colonial state to define the bound-
ary of the family on its own terms. In this way Japanese colonial family law forged 
a new relationship between Korean families and the colonial state as the state tried 
to get rid of the competing object of loyalty, the lineage. With the new family law, 
lineage power was weakened, making the resultant colonial household much more 
directly accountable to the state.
Interestingly, this imposition of the household boundary on informal reaches 
of kinship also existed in Japan, even before the Meiji Civil Code was promulgated. 
One 1878 case from Japan suggests that the household had a similar effect of cur-
tailing larger kinship ties. This case, which occasioned a Japanese Supreme Court 
(Daishin’in) decision on July 27, 1878, involved a civil suit between Arabe Ryūji 
and his father, Arabe Heizaemon, over the issue of household inheritance.54 In 
1858 Ryūji separated his household registry (koseki wo waketa) as an older son; in 
1878 Heizaemon retired as the household head and passed the household on to his 
younger son, Heijū. A year later, however, Heijū passed away without a son, leaving 
the family scrambling to find an heir. When Heizaemon passed on the inheritance 
of the household to Kama, his daughter and Heijū’s sister, Ryūji objected, saying 
that his son, Koji, was the rightful heir. Ryūji argued that only sons could be house-
hold heads; daughters could be made heirs only when there were no suitable sons. 
The Supreme Court, however, backed Heizaemon, ruling that Ryūji, as a member 
of another household, had no right to meddle in the Heijū household’s business of 
deciding an heir—neither could Ryūji send Koji, his proper son (chakushi) and an 
eligible heir to his own household, to another household.
The case touched on many issues of central concern within the contemporary 
debate in Japan over family law (e.g., issues of daughter inheritances, household 
boundaries, and divisions of a household). While the principle of inheritance was 
formulated to support the prerogatives of the household head, its enforcement in 
practice did not necessarily result in the strengthening of the collectivity principle. 
Instead, by strengthening the enforcement of the household boundary (i.e., when 
the boundary of such a family violated the boundary of the household), it could 
have the opposite effect. This was partly related to the state’s desire to prevent the 
hasty division of households by families to avoid military conscription. But the 
most striking aspect of this particular case was the state’s desire to implement its 
own version of the family boundary, as recorded in the household registers, rather 
than acknowledge the nebulous ties of kinship claimed by the litigants. In this way, 
even as the Meiji state was struggling to reconcile various visions of the Civil Code, 
it ensured that old informal and private ties of kinship would be regulated by the 
administrative boundary of the family that matched the official household register 
legible to the state. Thus, the boundary of the family came long before the principle 
of household collectivity or the authority of the household head, which became 
increasingly important after the promulgation of the Meiji Civil Code in 1898.
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The implementation of the household system strengthened the household 
boundary against claims of kinship authority from outside of the household. In 
many lawsuits widows could take advantage of the strengthened boundary of the 
household and inherit family property (ownership or management) over in-laws. 
Such decisions were not inspired by the need to expand widows’ rights at large, 
let alone women’s rights. The following section analyzes civil lawsuits in which 
widows were involved to show that many of the widows’ victories were a double-
edged sword: as these decisions strengthened household-head rights they weak-
ened widow rights because widow rights, as well as the rights of all the household 
members, were subsumed by the strengthened rights of the household head.
With the strengthening of the individual rights of the household head, widows 
became more vulnerable to the actions of the male heir. It became almost impos-
sible, for one thing, to cancel an adoption, because that would mean disinheriting 
a household head. Also, personal influence over the adopted son, which used to 
be culturally acceptable, became defunct under the colonial legal system. A case 
in 1912 illustrated the precarious status of a widow under the colonial household 
system. On May 28, 1912, a lawsuit erupted over a property sale that a widow had 
made.55 The plaintiff, Pak Chi-yang, was the adopted heir of the household and 
claimed that the property that had been sold was his. The accused, Choe Chong-u, 
claimed that he had obtained the property from the widow of the household, 
Madam Chu. Choe argued that although Pak had been adopted as the heir, the 
widow later disinherited (ri’en) him, so he had no rights to the inheritance. In the 
first trial, Choe won. The local court acknowledged the fact that Madam Chu had 
disinherited Pak and that he therefore had no rights to said property. In his appeal 
Pak argued that, according to Korean custom, once he had become the household 
head, the elders of the household could not disinherit him. The inheritance thus 
was legitimate according to Korean custom, and the decision of the local court was 
mistaken. Moreover, he added, “Madam Chu was merely a concubine [hwach’ŏp—
literally, flower concubine, i.e., a young concubine of an older man], and did not 
have the authority of a household elder to disinherit the adopted heir.” The High 
Court accepted Pak’s argument. It ignored the accusation that Madam Chu was a 
concubine—she was probably a wife of remarriage—but conceded that even if she 
were a proper household elder, she had no rights to disinherit Pak once he had 
succeeded to the household headship.
This case demonstrated how the High Court specifically tried to strengthen 
household-head rights through stabilizing the household-head position. The deci-
sion contradicted the court’s own decision on a different case in the same year. 
In 1912 the High Court permitted a family to disinherit an adoptee who had suc-
ceeded to the household headship on the grounds that the adoptee was chosen 
from the wrong generation of agnatic kin, violating Korean customary laws of 
adoption.56 Although the Korean custom of somok stipulated that the adoptee 
had to be from one generation below the inheritor, the family chose an adoptee 
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from the same generation. The High Court stated that the ban on disinheriting 
an adopted heir once he had succeeded as household head was not an established 
custom at the time. Also, to acknowledge an exclusive right for the household head 
over which even the household elder had no influence was definitely a transforma-
tion of Korean custom. The court acknowledged not only that the household head 
shared his ownership with no one but also that he had full legal authority over the 
household property without having to answer to any other authority in the fam-
ily. This, one could say, was a covert assimilation of Korean inheritance custom to 
Japanese custom. And, as a result, the property rights of the household head were 
strengthened. More important, widows and other elders of the household were 
further constrained from exercising power over the household property. Unlike 
her Chosŏn dynasty counterparts, who exercised moral authority over the house-
hold head, whether he was her descendent or adopted, the widow of the colonial 
period had no such recourse; she was cut off from the household property once 
she selected the heir and passed the household-head position on to him. In other 
words, even though the widow’s right to designate an heir was a powerful one, once 
the heir was chosen, she had no power over the heir or the household property.
Not all widows were resigned to this disadvantageous position. In October 31, 
1933, the Chōsen High Court delivered a decision on a lawsuit that a widow had 
brought against the family council that arranged an adoption for her.57 The widow 
argued that she did not acknowledge the adoption and therefore it was invalid. The 
family council’s side argued that it had to act only because the widow was negli-
gent about arranging an adoption. The widow claimed that her deceased husband 
left her a testament telling her specifically not to adopt; she was merely respecting 
her husband’s death wish. The head of the family council argued that, according 
to Korean custom, it was the widow’s obligation to adopt a male heir to carry 
on the ancestral rites, and the husband’s testament prohibiting the adoption, 
WidowFamily council 
Adoptee
Figure 5. A diagram of the 1933 case, where the widow refused to 
adopt an heir.
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therefore, was invalid. The widow then pointed out that the adopted heir desig-
nated by the family council was a frivolous spender who was bound to ruin her 
family business. If the family business were ruined and the family turned out into 
the streets, how would the ancestral rites be continued? This was precisely why 
her husband left the will, she emphasized, warning her not to adopt an heir. Did 
a widow in Korea have the choice not to adopt an heir? Benign as it sounded, 
the widow’s query revealed the critical ambiguity in customary widow rights in 
colonial Korea: the widow household headship was supposed to be temporary, but 
there was no explicit rule regarding its duration.
Claiming that she was obeying her husband’s testament, what the widow was 
really doing was utilizing a loophole in the legal system to claim permanent own-
ership of her husband’s estate. In the end, the widow won the case and was able 
to dissolve the unwanted adoption, though she was not given permanent rights 
over the estate. The court merely concluded that the widow’s refusal to accept the 
heir in accord with her husband’s testament could not be interpreted as a “willful 
refusal to adopt.” The High Court dodged the demand to pass a clear decision on 
the matter, but the case revealed the heart of the problem with customary widow 
rights. The lineage’s interest (represented by the family council) and the widow’s 
interest were put into deadlock by the temporary nature and the obscure bound-
ary of widow rights. The legal limbo that the colonial court chose is understand-
able, because the colonial court itself was put in a quandary. Widow rights were 
something to be phased out (as its conceptual basis was in the lineage system), 
but without daughter’s rights to the household headship, abolishing widow rights 
could only strengthen traditional lineage power.
C ONCLUSION
I have examined how the new unit of the family installed through the household 
registers functioned to strengthen customary widow rights. Contrary to what con-
ventional understanding would suggest, and also contrary to the experience of 
some widows subject to utter mistreatment because of an absolute lack of power, 
many widows were successful in having their customary rights acknowledged in 
the colonial court system. These widows actively fought and won against their in-
law relatives who claimed in the colonial courts that Korean custom denied any 
inheritance rights to women. The colonial court system and the customary laws 
created through this system, in fact, benefited the widows subject to diminishing 
rights under strengthening patrilineal lineages on the eve of Japanese colonial rule.
Yet I argue also that strengthened widow rights were accompanied by strength-
ened household-head rights. Even though the 1912 Ordinances on Civil Matters 
seemed to acknowledge Korean custom in family matters, this acknowledgment 
happened only in the context of the household system that had been implemented 
in 1909. The household system already significantly redefined the family boundary 
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and affected how Korean family custom was interpreted and applied in the colo-
nial courts. As a result, widows who could become and remain household heads 
benefited, but those widows who passed the household-head position to adop-
tees too soon sometimes felt mistreated. The strengthened household-head rights 
meant that the traditional authority of mothers who could challenge household-
head rights was denied. Once the heir assumed the household-head position, 
there was no one in the house who could disinherit him. The problem with widow 
rights was mostly from their poorly defined nature. A widow’s right to ascend to 
household headship was only temporary, good only until she designated an heir to 
whom to pass on the position and the household property. Much contention thus 
arose because when this adoption needed to occur was not clearly defined. Indeed, 
the frequency of cases concerning widow rights seems to attest to the unstable 
nature of widow rights in the context of a modern property regime where clear 
property relations were key. Eventually, the colonial state tried to solve this prob-
lem by replacing widow inheritance with daughter inheritance, the issue to which 
we turn in the following chapter.
54
3
Arguing for Daughters’ Inheritance 
Rights
On December 7, 1939, the Tonga Ilbo reported on a sensational lawsuit between 
a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law filed at the Pusan Local Court. The dis-
pute was over an estate involving a large sum (200,000 wŏn) left by the recently 
deceased Yi Kwang-uk. Following Yi’s death, his daughter-in-law, Pak Rae-gyŏng, 
a “chaste widow since young,” as it was noted, had arranged a posthumous adop-
tion for her deceased husband to inherit the large estate and carry on the family 
line. Yi’s widow, Kim Su-rae, had mortgaged part of the estate to store away some 
cash, while filing suit against Pak for arranging an adoption without her approval. 
She argued that it was her right as the widow to arrange an adoption. In a short 
interview quoted at the end of the article, readers were treated to the opinions of 
the two widows: Kim asserted that her husband never had any intention to arrange 
an adoption and, since they had a daughter, she would rather adopt a son-in-law; 
Pak stated that it was her right as the daughter-in-law of the family to arrange an 
adoption, and Kim’s refusal to adopt an heir was a scheme to take over the estate, 
which violated the law as well as Korean custom.1
Given the age of the widow Kim, which was forty-two, much younger than the 
deceased husband (eighty) and even younger than her daughter-in-law, who was 
forty-four, we can easily assume that she was a second wife. Although the daughter- 
in-law, Pak, was right about her customary right to adopt an heir for her husband, 
the fact that she was unable to do so for so many years until Yi died tells us that 
Kim perhaps was right about the deceased husband’s unwillingness regarding such 
an adoption. What is also intriguing is Kim’s statement that she would rather adopt 
a son-in-law as an heir. At this point in 1939, son-in-law adoption, a Japanese cus-
tom, was not yet an option for Koreans. The Civil-Ordinances Reform, which 
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enabled son-in-law adoption, had been barely promulgated in November 1939, to 
be implemented in February 1940.2 Yet the article does not explicitly question the 
viability of this option. It shows that by the late 1930s the anticipation that son-in-
law adoption would be imminently available in Korea was so widespread that it 
was natural for the widow to consider it a viable possibility. At the same time, the 
tone of the article aptly captures the image of the widow in the late 1930s. Noting 
that widows were enthralled by lawsuits over dividing property, “even before all 
the funeral processions were over,” it depicted the widows as greedy and litigious.
REFORM DISC OURSES UNDER CULTUR AL RULE
What should we make of the derogatory image of widows that emerged in the 
public media of the 1920s and 1930s? I would argue that it derived from discourses 
for expanding women’s rights that developed in ways that championed daugh-
ter’s rights over widows’ rights. As daughters’ inheritance rights emerged as a 
progressive cause for reforming family law in the 1920s and 1930s, among both 
the Japanese and some reform-minded Koreans, the inheritance rights of other 
women, such as widows, and different routes to expand women’s rights over prop-
erty were suppressed.
The 1920s were a period of reform in colonial Korea. As the new “Cultural Rule” 
proposed in the aftermath of the March First Movement ushered in less restrictive 
colonial policies, Koreans were allowed a larger public space in the form of a pub-
lic press. This venue was embraced by cultural nationalists as a forum for advocat-
ing reforms, in the belief that such reforms (or reconstruction, as Yi Kwang-su 
would have it), were necessary for a stronger nation.3 As the 1920s progressed, 
Korean-language newspapers played a central role in disseminating ideas about 
national reforms and enlightenment.4 Matters of family customs, such as concubi-
nage, early marriage, and widow chastity, were key targets for reform. At the same 
time, new ideas about women and family, such as women’s rights, romantic love, 
and sexuality were entering Korea and competed with reform ideas laid out by the 
nationalists and the colonial state.
The new Cultural Rule was part of a larger shift in principles of colonial man-
agement under the cabinet of Japanese prime minister Hara Kei. The shockwave 
of the March First Movement, coupled with the new diplomatic climate under 
the Washington Treaty System, pushed the Japanese metropole to propound a 
policy for more liberal colonial management. In the legal sphere Hara Kei pro-
moted “Extending Home Rules” (naichi enchō shugi), promising colonial subjects 
the benefit of legal treatment equal to that of metropolitan subjects while trying to 
constrain the power of governor generals that lay outside the purview of the diet.5 
Legal assimilation had both practical and ideological goals. On the ideological 
side it would realize the colonial promise of isshi dōjin, granting equal benefits of 
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the rule of the law to all colonial subjects.6 On the practical side legal assimila-
tion would facilitate legal transactions between colonial territories and simplify 
colonial management by reducing customary exceptions. Facilitating better legal 
transactions between colonial territories also meant that it would be easier to form 
familial ties across the metropole-colony divide, another significant component 
of integrating the colony and the metropole, thereby achieving naisen yūwa, har-
mony between Japan and Korea.7
In this new political environment, the Government General launched a series of 
legal reforms. In 1918 the Japanese government had promulgated the Common Law 
(Kyōtsūhō) that laid out terms of correspondence between different legal spheres 
in the Japanese Empire. A few years later, in 1922, the Household-Registration 
Law (Kosekihō) was promulgated to reform the Korean family registry to con-
form more closely to its counterpart in Japan. The registry took on a new legal 
function: it now served to officiate family status, which meant that unregistered 
status changes were no longer legally recognized (todokede shugi). As a result, the 
colonial state reached deeper into the private space of families in the colony.8 In 
1922 and 1923 a major reform of the Civil Ordinances drastically reduced the appli-
cation of Korean customs and applied the Japanese Civil Code in its stead. As 
a result, the Japanese Civil Code was extended to family matters such as paren-
tal rights, divorce, and the legal age of marriage. These reforms in family matters 
stirred up great anxiety in colonial society. Although additional major reform of 
the Civil Ordinances did not happen until 1939, the two intervening decades were 
replete with discourses of reform.
Expanding women’s rights emerged in this period as the new rallying cry 
for many different parties dedicated to reforming Korean family customs. The 
Government General tried to tap this energy and steer it toward support of their 
project of assimilation. In 1924 the Government General proposed to import son-
in-law adoption as the next step in legal assimilation in civil matters, promoting 
the measure as a way to expand women’s inheritance rights. In the process some-
thing as quintessentially Japanese as son-in-law adoption took on the meaning of 
“progress,” while some Korean customs with potentially progressive impact, such 
as widow rights, were marked with the stigma of backwardness. Other avenues to 
expand women’s rights were closed as well.
Korean reform demands were not uniform, nor were they united against the 
colonial state. While some Koreans welcomed the expansion of women’s rights 
and even demanded more, other Koreans, the conservative elite in particular, 
strongly resisted such reforms, arguing that they would prompt chaos and resent-
ment among the colonized population. Thus, it was not only the Japanese but 
also conservative Koreans who sought to produce and maintain colonial differ-
ence in the name of Korean distinction. Japanese and Korean customs were not 
static entities clearly distinguished from each other; distinctions and common-
alities between Japanese and Korean customs were constantly constructed and 
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renegotiated throughout the colonial period as assimilatory reforms proceeded. In 
other words, the reform discourses of the 1920s and the 1930s developed through 
a three-way competition among the colonial state with its assimilatory objectives, 
reform-minded Koreans and their demand for change, and conservative Koreans 
trying to protect lineage prerogatives. In the convergence of interests of the reform-
minded Koreans and the Japanese colonial state, assimilation, for some, became 
congruent with progress. Yet Korean conservatives, or those Koreans who resisted 
such changes, exercised significant power to modify the reforms of the colonial 
state through the Korean Central Council (Chūsūin), the Korean advisory com-
mittee to the Government General; they were successful in delaying reforms in 
Civil Ordinances and deterring implementation of daughters’ inheritance rights in 
Korea. The colonial state also seems to have tried to appease the conservative elite, 
conceding to their demands when introducing reforms on family matters.
Considering the high tension over matters of family-law reform in the Japanese 
metropole at the time, it is understandable that the Japanese were willing to heed 
conservative demands in Korea. While assimilatory reforms were  unfolding 
in Korea, the Japanese metropole was being engulfed in its own set of reform 
demands. Japanese conservatives were unhappy that the customs of olden times 
were being lost in Japan’s rapid socioeconomic transformations. Progressives, on 
the other hand, were frustrated that the Civil Code, which was designed to preserve 
traditional family customs, was growing increasingly out of sync with the realities 
of Japanese peoples’ lives. Female activists’ demands for more equal family laws 
also were growing stronger. The Temporary Committee to Deliberate on the Legal 
System on Personnel Affairs (Rinji Hōsei Shin’gikai) was installed in 1919, and the 
final compromise was announced as a resolution in 1927.9 The resolution took many 
steps in the direction of constraining the rights of the household head and  making 
divorce laws less discriminatory against women, but these were too minor to 
 satisfy the growing demands of feminists of the time. This is understandable if one 
considers that the original reason the committee was convened was to strengthen 
the traditional family system rather than reform it toward progressive goals. 
Even with these limited endeavors, Civil-Code reforms failed to reach fruition, 
owing to the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in the Manchurian 
Incident of 1931 and the continuing war for fifteen years thereafter. Instead of Civil-
Code reforms, a Personnel Affairs Reconciliation Law was promulgated in 1939 
to facilitate resolution of family conflicts before they reached the point of formal 
trial in the courts. This law was devised to protect the traditional family struc-
ture and to deter further dissolution of families in a time of national exigencies. It 
also was devised to deal with the increasing number of family conflicts, as many 
families of those who died in the war became engaged in disputes over compen-
sation and pension benefits.10 On both the home front and the colonial frontier, 
then, the Japanese state was trying to deal with increasing demands that threatened 
the family-state ideology that it had established just a few decades before (or, in 
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the colonies, was about to establish). The legal reforms that eventually transpired 
should be understood in terms of the state’s attempt to control reform demands 
that were spreading rapidly in the empire at large.
In the end, the widespread reform discourse did not lead to much gain in terms 
of expanding women’s inheritance rights in Korea. The 1939 reform failed to achieve 
full assimilation of inheritance laws and left Korean women’s inheritance rights 
inferior to those enjoyed by women in the Japanese metropole. Only daughters’ 
inheritance rights emerged as a viable route to expanding women’s rights, although 
even those were compromised in the eventual Civil-Ordinances Reform of 1939.
The discourse on daughters’ rights that emerged did so in conjunction with 
discourses (both academic and public) about phasing out widow rights and 
ancestral rites inheritance. While reform-minded Koreans were co-opted by the 
colonial state, having bought into its assimilatory reform regime, conservative 
Koreans were successful in pushing the colonial state to compromise with lineage 
 principles that marginalized daughters in matters of inheritance. Widow rights 
eventually lost out entirely, abandoned by all three parties.
THE PROBLEM OF WID OWS
Even though the Kabo Reforms had lifted the ban on widow remarriage in 1894, 
the practice continued to be stigmatized under colonial rule. If anything, cultural 
restrictions against widow remarriage may have become even more widespread 
in the colonial period because what had been an elite yangban class ideal seems 
to have spread to commoners. In 1924 a Tonga Ilbo editorial titled “The Problem 
of Widow Remarriage” demanded that widows in Korea be allowed to remarry 
without stigma. The author lamented that among fifty thousand households in the 
capital of Keijō (Seoul), one thousand were widow households. The article asserted 
that “it is already very much behind the times to talk about widow remarriage.” 
The core of the problem, according to the author, was the discrepancy between 
the ideal of widow chastity and the reality: under the surface of stringent calls for 
morality, many illicit relationships were conducted, and efforts to hide them led to 
various ills. With the spread of new ideas about gender equality, the writer warned, 
women would no longer endure the unfair demands of chastity for women. There 
was only one country in the East that was worse in its treatment of widows and 
that was India, with its custom of sati: “Banning sati was the most benevolent 
policy of the British,” the writer noted. The same kind of progress, he seemed to 
suggest, could be achieved in Korea under the civilizing force of Japanese rule. 
Other writers argued that it was inhumane to force widows to remain chaste when 
widowers remarried with impunity.11
Such sympathetic pronouncements were advanced in the face of a public sus-
picion about widows’ chastity that had led to a shift, since the 1920s, away from 
earlier images of widows as victims of evil custom. Newspapers inundated readers 
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with reports of widows “crushing to death” (apsa) babies whom they had had with 
secret lovers.12 An article from 1935, for example, reported that about fifty cases of 
infanticide were committed by widows each year.13 Association between widows 
and infanticide was so prominent in the public image of widows that when a dead 
infant’s body was found, it was customary for the police to interrogate local wid-
ows.14 Indeed one author in 1935 argued for widow remarriage not in the interest of 
the women but on the grounds that it would be a solution to the increasing crimes 
of infanticide.15
Despite such deleterious trends in popular thought, there continued to be 
authors arguing for a change in public attitudes toward widow remarriage. In 1935, 
for example, an article appeared with the imperative title, “Konggyu e urbujinnŭn 
kwabu e salgil ul chura [Rescue widows crying in seclusion],” that argued, citing 
unverified statistics, that young widows under the age of forty who were keeping 
chaste numbered upwards of three hundred thousand in Korea. Many of these wid-
ows were still bound by the old custom that banned widow remarriage, the writer 
noted.16 In response to a petition from someone from the Kangwŏn Province to the 
governor general demanding the “liberation of widows,” the Government General 
issued a notice confirming that there was no ban on widow remarriage, and young 
widows should be encouraged to remarry. Some argued that the problem was with 
men who favored only unmarried young women. “Even young widows would 
have to settle for widowers in their fifties,” one writer pointed out, when “even old 
widowers looked only for young virgins.”17 There was no place for a young widow 
to go even if she did not wish to remain single.
Despite such efforts, it seems that many Koreans, even widows themselves, still 
appeared to be beholden to the ancient stigma of widow remarriage. One widow 
committed suicide in 1936 reportedly to avoid being married off to a new husband. 
This young widow of twenty-seven years of age, upon hearing her mother’s urge to 
remarry, left her young son with her mother-in-law and strangled herself to death 
at her husband’s grave site.18 In 1936 a man burned the house of his sister-in-law 
in protest against her arranging a remarriage for her daughter-in-law. The man 
claimed that such a deed was an insult to the whole family.19
The frequent reports on widows’ lawsuits over estates, though, suggest that 
there was a reason behind the growing concern over widows other than people’s 
backward adherence to chaste widowhood. The real source of anxiety was that 
widows’ inheritance rights had gained official backing in the colonial legal sys-
tem. Many articles reported on lawsuits between widows and family members, 
also known as “lawsuits between bone and flesh” (koryuksong). The articles were 
generally reprimanding in tone: one was not supposed to take a family member 
to court for personal profit. So Hyŏn-suk points to the many lawsuits that wid-
ows were involved in as evidence that they were subject to unstable and unequal 
legal standing under the colonial legal system.20 Indeed, informal pressures on 
widows from their marital kinsmen must have significantly undermined widow’s 
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rights and legal capacity in practice. Yet it is more plausible to think that it was 
the increasing legal standing of widows (rather than the opposite) that led to the 
increasing number of lawsuits over widows’ property.
Evidence of the increased anxiety over widows’ rights can be found in newspa-
pers’ legal advice columns, which featured many inquiries sent in by both widows 
and their family members regarding the prerogatives of widows. In 1929 a man 
submitted an inquiry about how to stop his widowed sister-in-law from selling 
the property she inherited from his brother.21 In 1930 a mother-in-law asked if she 
could retrieve her son’s property from her widowed daughter-in-law. The answer 
was no.22 In 1931 a young widow of twenty-two years of age asked if she would be 
able to keep the property she inherited from her husband, even if she remarried.23
Indeed, widows’ rights over property were now more secure under the colonial legal 
system, not equal to male counterparts but enough to alarm family members. Perhaps 
family politics and cultural taboos continued to push widows to the social margins, 
but legally they had gained much standing and protection. From these inquiries we 
learn that although widows were subject to jealous legal maneuvers, kin members 
now had to take formal steps to restrict a widow’s property rights. The mother-in-law 
mentioned earlier learned that there was no way that she could take away property 
that her widowed daughter-in-law had already inherited. The young widow learned 
that she would be able to keep her property even if she did not keep chaste.
THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR SON-IN-L AW 
AD OPTION
As widows emerged as a source of social problems in the public media, daughters 
emerged as the alternative to widows as potential heirs. When the Government 
General began to expand legal assimilation, it chose daughters’ inheritance rights 
as a useful channel through which to enlist Korean support for the project. There 
eventually emerged a growing consensus that widows’ rights were the evil custom 
of old, and daughters’ inheritance rights were the new trend of modern times.
In 1924 Matsudera Takeo, the chief of the Legal Division of the Government 
General, proposed, to the Korean Central Council, a plan to introduce the adopted 
son-in-law (muko yōshi) custom to Korea. Son-in-law adoption, where a son-in-
law was adopted into the family as a son to be heir to the household, was a well-
established custom in Japan. For Korea, however, this was not an easy proposal. 
The adoption of sons-in-law violated long-held adoption customs in Korea, which 
prescribed that only agnatic kin of the paternal lineage could be adopted as heirs. 
To make the reform measure palatable, Matsudera presented the adopted son-in-
law system as a way of granting daughters inheritance rights. Current Korean cus-
toms, which forced families to bypass their own daughters and adopt a stranger, 
“violated human feelings [ninjō],” he pointed out. If Koreans were allowed to 
adopt sons-in-law as heirs, such a problem would be resolved. Matsudera further 
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argued that allowing son-in-law adoption was “adapting to the trend of the times” 
and also promoting “the beautiful custom [biten] of the East” of “mutual love and 
respect between parents and child.” Since love and respect does not discriminate 
between a daughter and a son, he continued, a daughter also should be allowed to 
inherit the household from her parents. In Matsudera’s hands, son-in-law adop-
tion was remade into a progressive measure to expand women’s inheritance rights 
as well as promote happiness in the conjugal family.24
Matsudera’s strategy proved successful in eliciting support from certain strata 
of Koreans ready for equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters. An article in 
the Pu’in (Women) column in the Tonga Ilbo a few days later chimed in with its 
approval of the reform. Titled “Chosŏn esŏdo ddal ege sangsokkwŏn ŭl chunda 
[Daughters will be given inheritance rights in Korea too],” the article also depicted 
son-in-law adoption as inheritance rights for daughters and criticized the Korean 
custom that denied daughters such rights. The muko yōshi system, as such, was 
presented by the writer as a step of progress toward gender equality rather than 
a policy of assimilation to Japanese customs.25 Unfortunately for the Government 
General, the Korean response was not unanimously positive. While strong opposi-
tion to the reform measure from the Korean elite forced the Japanese to postpone 
the reform until 1939, demands for an extension of inheritance rights to daughters 
did not go away in the meantime.
Matsudera’s strategy was to cast the two inheritance customs in terms of a 
temporal trajectory of evolution.26 The argument had little factual basis: accu-
rately speaking, neither the Korean nor Japanese family system practiced equal 
inheritance between sons and daughters. Son-in-law adoption fell significantly 
short of granting daughters equal inheritance rights. Not only did a daughter have 
less priority than her brothers to inherit the household, but even if she became 
the household head she had to yield the status to her husband when she married 
(nyūfu kon’in). If a daughter was already married at the time of inheritance, the 
son-in-law would be adopted as heir, and the daughter had only indirect inheri-
tance rights through her husband. In both the Korean and the Japanese family 
systems, a female household head was merely a placeholder for a lacking male heir, 
to be replaced once the daughter married (in the case of Japan) or when the widow 
adopted an agnatic kin member (in the case of Korea).27
Rather than expanding women’s inheritance rights, a goal for the colonial 
government in son-in-law adoption was to strengthen the household system. By 
enabling son-in-law adoption, a son-in-law could replace an agnatic kin mem-
ber as a stand-in for a son, thus limiting potential heirs to household property 
to household members only. This meant a major redrawing of the boundary of 
inheritance from the boundary of the lineage to that of the household. An adopted 
 son-in-law would help maintain household property within the household, in 
contrast to traditional Korean adoption customs, which merely kept the property 
within the wider boundary of the lineage. Son-in-law adoption also would advance 
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the stability and integrity of the household, as daughters married to the adopted 
son-in-law could not marry out, while widow household heads could. The objec-
tive of the reform proposal to implement son-in-law adoption, therefore, was to 
promote not gender equality but rather the disintegration of the lineage system, 
thereby eliminating the need for agnatic adoption and widow household heads.
Under the colonial household system and the civil-law regime, widows’ 
 customary rights posed several problems. One problem with widow rights was 
the vagueness that provided a continuing source of legal conflict. As women, wid-
ows were not eligible to inherit ancestral rites, which meant that their inheritance 
was not complete; the heir to property, according to Korean customs as defined 
by the Japanese colonial state, had to be the heir to ancestral rites.28 As such, a 
household headed by a widow was in an inheritance limbo until a proper adoption 
was completed. Widow household headship, therefore, was a temporary role with 
not only an ill-defined length of tenure but also obscurely defined legal rights. In 
“posthumous adoption” (sahu yangja), when widows arranged an adoption for a 
deceased household head, there was no legal code that dictated precisely when 
this posthumous adoption had to occur. A widow naturally tried her best to make 
the most of her rights to arrange an adoption on her terms and secure heirs that 
she could trust, but when she could not find a suitable heir, she could and would 
indefinitely postpone the adoption, providing a source of tension with her in-laws. 
Dispute over heir selection was common between widows and agnatic kin who 
either disapproved of the widow’s selection of an adoptee or objected to the wid-
ow’s neglect in arranging an adoption.
On the other hand, widow household heads were a necessary provision for the 
seamless succession of the household head. Administratively, under the colonial 
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Figure 6. A diagram of son-in-law adoption.
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legal system the household-head position could not be left empty, and somebody 
had to fill the post immediately. For those families without a “presumed heir” (suitei 
katoku sōzokunin), that is, a son, and under Korean customary laws, where daugh-
ters lacked inheritance rights, widows were a necessary alternative. Yet widow 
inheritance had serious drawbacks; since the future heir eventually had to be cho-
sen from agnatic kin outside of the household, adoption by widows potentially vio-
lated the integrity of the household boundary. The intricate lineage rules of somok, 
which an adopting family had to follow in choosing an adoptee, also continually 
reenacted and confirmed lineage ties that the colonial administration only equivo-
cally acknowledged. The inherent ties that widow rights had with the traditional 
lineage system meant that they were incompatible in the long run with the colonial 
household system, which is why son-in-law adoption was an attractive alternative 
for the Government General. In contrast, a daughter’s inheritance right depended 
solely on her membership in the household. The debate over daughters’ inheritance 
rights, therefore, inevitably involved redefining the boundary of family and eventu-
ally involved breaking up the traditional lineage system into colonial households.
Korean newspapers in the 1930s show divergent attitudes among Koreans about 
the assimilation of civil laws in colonial Korea, but a sector of Korean society 
clearly supported legal assimilation as a way to expand women’s rights. Although 
implementation of the son-in-law adoption proposal was delayed, reports about 
the pending Civil-Ordinances Reform continually adorned Korean newspapers. 
Especially following the announcement of the “Outline of Reforms in the Family 
Chapter of the Civil Code” (1927) in Japan, numerous articles reported on the 
pending major revision of the Civil Ordinances in Korea, including son-in-law 
adoption, lifting of the ban on intralineage marriage (tongsŏng tongbon kyŏrhon), 
retirement of household heads, and so forth. On one end of the spectrum of opin-
ions was a clear voice of caution; articles expressing this opinion tried to warn 
readers of the catastrophic effects of drastic reforms that might shake the Korean 
family system to the core. In one such article in Tonga Ilbo, titled “Tongsŏng tong-
bon kyŏrhon do inhŏ! [Even intralineage marriage will be allowed!”], the reporter 
relayed the news of a meeting within the Government General over the issue of 
the Civil-Ordinances Reform. With a title phrased clearly to sensationalize the 
reform, the article highlighted what it thought were the most shocking parts of the 
reform: the lifting of the ban on intralineage marriage and son-in-law adoption.29
On the other side of the spectrum were articles that called for a further reform 
of family customs in the colony to achieve a definitive expansion of women’s rights. 
In contrast to the reservations and anxieties betrayed in the previously mentioned 
articles, one article in Tonga Ilbo a few months later called for an immediate exten-
sion of the reformed Japanese Civil Code to the Korean colony. The new Japanese 
Civil Code (actually the outlines for the Civil-Code reform), it claimed, gave prop-
erty rights to women and abolished the “bastard” marker from the household- 
registration system, both strikingly progressive achievements that were desper-
ately needed in Korea as well. Although the “revision of the Civil Code for Japan 
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is a bit late, even compared to the backward country of China,” Korea had it much 
worse in still being under the old Japanese Civil Code. It was critical, the author 
argued, for Japan to immediately extend the new Civil Code to Korea. “There is 
no reason why this [i.e., the issue of women’s rights] should be an exception,” the 
author added cynically, “when [Japan] is citing ‘extensionism’ [enchō-shugi] for 
everything else.”30
A few years later, on December 10, 1933, another article, titled “Yŏkwŏn ŭl sin-
jang hara [Expand women’s rights],” introduced a High Court decision that gave 
equal inheritance rights to a daughter as to a son, to a mother’s estate. The column 
writer used this decision as an opportunity to call for equal inheritance rights to 
all estates. Citing numerous discriminative measures in the Civil Ordinances— 
adultery law, which was repealed in the Japanese Civil Code in 1930; paren-
tal rights; lack of inheritance rights for daughters—the writer lamented, “How 
discriminatory is the legal treatment of women [in this country]! Expansion of 
 women’s rights! This is only a rational demand from women as humans.”31
Despite such demands and anticipations, Civil-Ordinances reforms continued 
to be out of reach for Koreans. In 1932 Tonga Ilbo reported that it was uncertain 
when Civil-Ordinances reforms would be enacted in Korea. The article laid out 
in detail seven specific reform measures in the works for family and inheritance 
laws. Son-in-law adoption was definitely part of the picture. “[These reforms] were 
meant to correct the contradictions of the Civil Ordinances [that is, Korean cus-
toms], such as [legal] disputes arising out of posthumous adoptions or marrying 
out one’s own [children, that is, daughters] and passing on the house headship to 
an adopted kin.” The article noted that although there was wide consensus among 
legalists in these matters, the Korean class of elders (chosŏnin koro-kyegŭp) and the 
majority of the Korean Central Council members were against it. Their opinion 
was that these reforms to the family laws were “destroying the beautiful customs” 
and that “to appear as if [Japan] was forcing Japanese customs on Koreans would 
disrupt the popular sentiment.” The Legal Division therefore was hesitant to act 
on the reforms, the article reported.32 And it was thus that the reform was to be 
delayed until 1939.
DAUGHTERS AS ALTERNATIVE HEIRS
The expectation that widows’ rights were a thing of the past and were giving way 
to daughters’ rights inspired lawsuits between daughters and widowed mothers. In 
one case that traveled as far as the High Court in 1931, a daughter was suing her 
mother for her father’s estate. The mother claimed that she had inherited the prop-
erty following Korean family custom that gave inheritance rights to widows. The 
daughter argued that the Korean custom that gave inheritance rights to widows 
over daughters was an old custom that had become defunct under Japanese colo-
nial rule. The daughter, moreover, accused her mother of having been involved 
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with several men since she was widowed and of now living with one of them, 
with whom she had had a child. Even if such a Korean custom of widow inheri-
tance rights was still valid in Korea, she argued, her mother should lose the rights 
because of her “immoral behavior.” The daughter demanded that her father’s estate 
be returned to her. The daughter lost the first suit, won the second suit, and lost 
this final suit. In the 1931 decision of the Chōsen High Court, the judges denied 
the daughter such rights and reaffirmed the widow’s inheritance based on rights 
that had been recognized since the early 1910s. “Immoral behavior” could not be a 
reason for disinheritance.33
The daughter in this case seems to have believed that as colonial law  progressed, 
daughters’ rights were expanding. In this framework of legal progress,  daughters’ 
rights represented progress and widows’ rights backwardness. Indeed, the 1922 
Civil-Ordinances Reform had abolished a significant portion of Korean  family 
customs and implemented the Japanese Civil Code in its stead. But, as the 
 daughter discovered, the Korean inheritance custom of excluding daughters 
from household headship had not changed with it.
The expectation that eventually the Civil-Ordinances Reform would expand 
women’s rights continued to spread and, to some, came to seem imminent. 
In 1934 a woman from the South Chŏlla Province sent an inquiry to a legal- 
consultation column about her chances for inheriting her father’s estate in place 
of her widowed mother. In his answer the lawyer–column writer noted that a 
recent High Court decision gave daughters equal inheritance rights as sons 
(probably the same case cited in the December 10, 1933, column—misquoted, in 
fact, because in the High Court decision the estate was held by a mother and not a 
father), yet he was not sure it applied to a daughter who had already married out. 
The lawyer explained that he could not say for sure “[because] these things [the 
precedent] are not codified but [depend on] whatever the High Court decides is 
Korean custom.”34
The anticipation that daughters’ inheritance rights would be expanded 
alarmed those Koreans who were protective of lineage interests. The following 
case aptly illustrates that the conservative Koreans who represented the interests 
of the Korean lineage system were concerned not just about widows’ rights but 
also about the inheritance rights of all women, including daughters. Yi In-gu 
was a widow who had the misfortune of losing both her husband and son in 
the same year just a month apart in 1931. Having lost her only son, she became 
the household head. The deceased husband’s older brother, Choe Tuk-ryong, 
became anxious to arrange a posthumous adoption for his brother and claimed 
(falsely, as it was revealed later) that his brother had arranged to adopt a nephew 
back in 1922. He sued the widow Yi for not acting on the adoption. After having 
lost all three rounds of his suit, Choe then put together a family council and (re)
arranged the adoption for Yi. The 1933 lawsuit was Yi’s, accusing the family coun-
cil of usurping her right as the widow to arrange the posthumous adoption. The 
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family council accused the widow of refusing to adopt, and the widow denied 
the accusation. The High Court’s decision was that the family council was pre-
sumptive in accusing the widow of not having an intention to adopt, and the 
widow won the case.35
What is notable about this case is in the details exposed in the arguments 
put forth by the family council in trying to defend their suspicions about the 
widow’s intentions regarding the family property. The family council argued that 
the real reason behind the widow’s neglect in arranging the adoption was her 
intention to pass the property on to her daughter, now her only remaining child. 
According to the family council’s claim, the widow had already registered some 
of the property under her daughter’s name, and her neglect to arrange an adop-
tion, they argued, was her scheme to hand over the entirety of the estate to her 
daughter. They were suspicious that it was the daughter’s fiancé who was per-
suading the widow not to adopt an heir; the fiancé had already moved in with 
the daughter and the widow.
The widow does not reveal much about her intentions, but it is possible that 
she indeed was making an effort to practice daughter inheritance on her own, 
while resisting adopting an agnatic nephew as heir. While the lineage suspected a 
plan for the family property to flow into the hands of the daughter and her fiancé, 
what they presented as their source of concern was something entirely different. 
After having entered these accusations of the widow handing over property to her 
daughter, the plaintiffs, in a revealing turn of argument, said that it was natural for 
them to worry about the widow’s intentions, because the widow could remarry 
any time and take the property with her: “The spirit of the laws of the family 
system of our country prizes most the continuation of the family. If a person of 
great wealth dies without a son and leaves behind a young wife, and she is given 
the rights to inheritance and the rights to arrange posthumous adoption, anyone 
would be suspicious about the wife’s future intentions. Human instincts are such that 
eight or nine out of ten such widows would just take the husband’s property and 
remarry. In such cases, the house would lose the entire family property and have 
its family line discontinued.” Because of the new freedom for widows to remarry, 
the plaintiffs argued, it was more dangerous for families to trust widows to arrange 
posthumous adoptions. The solution was to get rid of the widow as a “middle-
heir” (chūkan sōzokunin) and have the lineage (munhoe) or family council arrange 
a posthumous adoption.
Instead of attacking the widow’s choice to secretly squirrel away property for 
her daughter, which seems to have been at the heart of the conflict, the plaintiffs 
instead chose to attack what they alleged was the unstable commitment to the 
chastity of the widow and argued that this was what threatened the “continuation 
of the family” (ikkei iji) that was central to the spirit of the “family system of our 
country.”36 Their assumption was that the family council and the Japanese state 
shared an interest in the maintenance and continuation of the “family.” The ironic 
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fact here is that the family whose interest that the family council was defending 
was not at all the same as the family that the Japanese colonial state was trying 
to protect in colonial Korea. The solution that the plaintiffs presented, to replace 
widows with family councils to represent lineage interests, was laughable given the 
consistent effort of the colonial state in the opposite direction. It is likely that the 
family council knew that the colonial state’s reform policies threatened the integ-
rity of the lineage system and that they were trying their best to protect the lineage 
by appealing to what the Korean and Japanese family system shared in common: 
patrilineal succession.
It was not just widows’ rights but all women’s inheritance rights that Korean 
lineage interests resisted. As the Japanese colonial state continued with its reform 
measures to replace widows’ inheritance rights with daughters’ inheritance rights, 
the conservative sector of Korean society continued its resistance. Even after 1940, 
when the Japanese colonial state all but legally dismantled the lineage system 
through the Name-Change Policy (Sōshi Kaimei) and son-in-law adoption, it still 
had a difficult time implementing daughter household headship.
STATE DISC OURSES ON FAMILY-L AW REFORM  
IN THE 1930S
The family-law reform project was picked up again by the colonial government 
in 1932 with the establishment in the Chōsen High Court of the Committee for 
Surveying Family and Inheritance Laws and Regulations (Shinzoku Sōzoku ni 
Kansuru Hōki Chōsakai). The Outline of Reforms in the Family Chapter of the Civil 
Code (Minpō shinzokuhen chū kaisei no yōkō) in the Japanese metropole in 1927 
motivated the colonial government to again push forward with a codification pro-
cess through reform of the Civil Ordinances. The committee sent out questionnaires 
around Korea to heads of each local and appellate court asking for their opinions 
about the reform. The questions, forty-two in all, asked whether the direct applica-
tion of the Japanese Civil Code was possible in certain cases, or if separate provisions 
for Korean exceptions still were necessary. The format of the questionnaire showed 
that the policy of extending the Japanese Civil Code to Korea was now firm, and the 
colonial government was going to make little provision for those cases that needed 
exceptional treatment in Korea. Opinions from the heads of the courts varied, but 
many of them argued for the complete elimination of Korean customary laws and 
the adoption of the Japanese Civil Code. Some of them supported the use of Korean 
customary laws but stressed that these exceptional laws should be codified.37 They 
were unanimous in their discontent with the state of customary laws as it stood.
Although only indirectly mentioned, the questionnaire’s focus was on whether 
the recognition of ancestral rites inheritance, together with all the idiosyncratic 
rules of inheritance and succession in lineage laws, should be continued. With 
the new discourse of family-law reform in the 1930s, the main objective of the 
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initial efforts to import son-in-law adoption became clearer: to dissolve the  lineage 
system into households. Increased advocacy for reform regarding the legal status 
of ancestral rites was an indication of the intention to weaken (phase out) the 
 lineage system at large. As widow inheritance rights depended on ancestral rites, 
 undermining that practice would be detrimental to widow rights as well.
From early on many Japanese legalists had recognized the problem of acknowl-
edging customs of ancestral rites inheritance and utilizing them as a legal basis 
for inheritance between Koreans. Hozumi Nobushige argued that the origin of 
Japanese family law was in ancestor-veneration, and the basic unit of the Japanese 
society evolved from the clan to the house, and then to the individual. According 
to Hozumi’s framework, the fact that Koreans still practiced ancestral rites inheri-
tance was proof that Korea remained in the state of ancient society, where the 
religious power of the patriarch overruled individual rights over property.38 Asami 
Rintarō (1869–1943), a Japanese judge who worked in Korea between 1906 and 
1918, interpreted the customs of ancestral rites inheritance as an indication that 
Koreans lacked a modern concept of inheritance and, in fact, as proof that Korean 
society remained in the evolutionary phase of communal lineage society, which, 
according to Asami, was equivalent to the hunter-gatherer stage. Among all cus-
toms of inheritance, it was the ban on nonagnatic adoption that really troubled 
Asami. This was evidence that Korea remained in the stage of communal own-
ership; inheritance in Korea, therefore, was a “faux-inheritance” that functioned 
only to continue communal ownership by kin. Koreans merely “received” (keishō) 
property and “occupied” (senyū) it until handing it on to the next generation.39
Nomura Chōtarō (1881–?), a judge in colonial courts and the mastermind 
behind family-law reforms in Korea in the 1930s, critiqued the ban on nonag-
natic adoption as an indication of “familism” (shuzoku shugi) that evidenced the 
primitive religiosity of Korean ancestral rites, which believed “that the spirit of the 
ancestor will not smell [i.e., consume] the sacrifice offered by a nonblood relative.” 
Nomura therefore argued that ancestral rites should be eliminated entirely from 
the colonial civil laws as a basis for inheritance and that it was outside the realm of 
legal matters.40 The right to become the purveyor of ancestral rites was and should 
be beyond the realm of civil courts to adjudicate. The Korean concept of ancestral 
rites inheritance was, in this sense, incommensurable with the Japanese concept 
of inheritance, which was more focused on passing on the status and the property 
ownership of the household head.41
Yet Nomura also argued that such a difference in ancestor-veneration customs 
need not hinder the legal assimilation of colonial Korea to the metropole. Nomura’s 
argument was that the peculiarity of the Korean custom of ancestor-worship 
inheritance could be treated outside the legal realm. Conflict over the rightful heir 
to ancestral rites was, in fact, conflict over property inheritance or the status of 
the household head. Therefore, there was no need to treat ancestral rites inheri-
tance as a separate legal matter from other matters of inheritance.42 A number of 
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years later, in 1937, when the Government General collected opinions on revising 
the Ordinances on Civil Matters, Nomura more explicitly expressed his opinion: 
“The basic concept of inheritance in Korea should be divided into two  categories—
inheritance of household headship and inheritance of property—just as in the 
[Japanese] Civil Code.”43 By writing out ancestor-veneration customs as irrelevant, 
Nomura eliminated the single major exception in Korean inheritance customs 
that hindered the full assimilation of Korean family laws to the Japanese Civil 
Code.
Nomura’s strategy, the seemingly benign distillation of legal matters from 
sociocultural matters, was to ignore and therefore mute the peculiarities of Korean 
inheritance customs. In Nomura’s formulation Korean inheritance customs under-
went a major and significant modification that eliminated the role of the lineage 
and replaced it with that of the household. This was most apparent in Nomura’s 
treatment of the Korean custom on grave-site ownership, which also involved 
extremely obscure customary laws concerning concepts of traditional statuses and 
communal ownership. Nomura declared that grave-site ownership was with the 
household of the lineage heir (chong’ga), and the heir to the ancestral rites suc-
ceeded to its ownership as part of the privileges attached to the heirship.44 This was 
a direct transplantation of household-head inheritance from the Japanese Civil 
Code. In item 987 the Japanese Civil Code stated, “In inheriting the ownership of 
the lineage register, the tools of ancestral rites and grave site are included in the 
privileges of inheriting the household-head status.” This, in turn, meant that the 
grave site was now separated from the influence of the lineage and was subject to 
sole ownership of the lineage heir. The same applied for the ownership of the grave 
mountains (myosan) or wit’o, the ritual estates set aside to fund ancestral rites. 
Although cultural norms required that the heir consult the lineage representatives 
before selling such lineage property, it was not a legal requirement. In the legal 
sense the ownership of such property as lineage burial land resided solely with the 
individual heir. The fact that ownership of the grave site and ritual estate resided 
in the individual heir denied the influence of the lineage over that property; on 
the other hand, it gave the heir full power and greatly strengthened the freedom 
of action over that property. It specifically meant that the heir was free to sell or 
mortgage the property, thereby making the lineage property a liquid asset.
In 1934 the Government General promulgated Girei Junsoku (Guidelines for 
rituals), which aimed to reform family rituals, thus bringing the ancestral rites 
reforms into the realm of social reform. Girei Junsoku put forth regulations on 
Korean family rituals, including weddings, funerals, and ancestral rites. In an 
official note circulated to provincial governors around Korea (dō-chiji) on 
November 10, 1934, the minister of education (gakubu kyokuchō) laid out some 
rules for implementing the guidelines.45 The governors were to make examples of 
themselves by following the guidelines; they were to open roundtables and lectures 
(junkai kōgen, idō-zadankai) to explain the objectives of the guidelines to the local 
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people; and they should encourage communities to buy ritual tools as a group 
and share them. Although the guidelines did not have legal authority, those local 
variations of rituals that harmed the simplifying objectives of the guidelines were 
to be strictly forbidden.
The guidelines advised simplification of all rituals. Nomura stated that Korean 
rituals were too elaborate and wasteful and that they sustained the classic prob-
lem of Korean “familism.” In the guidelines Nomura proposed to simplify family 
Figure 7. An example of a properly moderate wedding ceremony following 
Girei Junsoku (Guidelines for rituals) and organized by a financial union 
in Sunchŏn. Abe Kaoru, ed., Chōsen kōrōsha meikan [Who’s who among 
(kōrōsha) in Korea] (Keijō [Seoul]: Minshū Jironsha, 1935), 175.
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rituals by scaling them down from lineage-wide celebrations to the parameters 
of the household. Ceremonial foods were to be simple. Lest anyone be nervous 
about slighting the ancestors with simple ceremonial food, the Korean  translator 
kindly quoted the “sage” (sŏnhyŏn), Confucius, who exhorted that sincerity 
(cheng) is the most important part of ancestral rites preparation. More  important 
was the shrinking of the boundary of kinsmen with whom these rituals should 
be celebrated. The ancestral rites ritual should be carried out for only two 
generations: one’s father and grandfather. Rituals for generations at further remove 
were discouraged. Ancestor-veneration for two generations had been advised for 
commoners in the Chosŏn dynasty. The higher one’s status, however, the more 
generations for which one was required and privileged to carry out rituals. Rituals 
for earlier generations meant that one was capable of gathering larger reaches 
of one’s relatives for the occasion.46 Curtailing the ritual regulations beyond two 
generations, therefore, meant that the guidelines effectively shrank the reaches 
of the lineage to the limits of the household.47 Scaling down elaborate ancestor-
veneration rituals was, in some sense, returning to the basics of the Confucian 
 guidelines for rituals proposed in the Zhu Xi jiali.48 The guidelines also tried to 
suppress communal bonds of the rural community that were buttressed by 
 communal rituals. It discouraged (or banned) the distribution of ceremonial 
foods and the invitation of nonfamily members to the ritual.
Members of the Korean Central Council supported the new regulations. In 
1938 the governor general asked opinions of the Chūsūin members on measures to 
improve rural society. The majority of the members proposed that family rituals 
should be simplified.49 Some even proposed that Korean rituals should be further 
assimilated to Japanese rituals and customs. The simplification of rituals proposed 
in the Girei Junsoku reinstated Confucian rationalism, which appealed to rural 
yangban elites who wanted to dominate social-reform efforts in rural society. In 
alliance with these rural elites, the state also found a space in the rural community 
to insert itself.50
Such modification of ancestral rites in colonial Korea was reflective of how 
ancestral rites had been modified by family-state ideology in the metropole. In 
the Meiji period Japanese ancestor worship went through a similar  reformulation. 
Hozumi Yatsuka (1860–1912), the prominent legal scholar and one of the 
writers of the Meiji Civil Code, also had emphasized the household level of  ancestral 
rites while deemphasizing communal and social rituals dedicated to ancestors and 
spirits. This meant a move away from emphasizing the universal world of “spirits” 
(seishin) in Confucianism to instead emphasizing the “spirit of the ancestors” (sorei) 
in ancestor-veneration, which in turn reinforced the family over the community in 
ancestor-veneration practice. In other words, the framework of Hozumi’s theory 
on ancestor worship was to theoretically thread three different kinds of veneration 
rites—ancestral rites of the family, communal veneration rites, and the national 
veneration rites—into a single system of ancestral rites in the household.51 With the 
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new guidelines, the ancestor-veneration custom condoned and preserved in the 
1920s was once more transformed to better fit the agenda of the colonial state: 
to shrink the boundary of worshippers from that of the lineage to the nuclear 
household.
The ties of lineage were weakened further in the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform, 
which lifted the ban on nonagnatic adoption, as well as by the implementation of 
the Name-Change Policy. This significance of the 1940 Civil Ordinances was not 
lost on contemporaries. The transition from a large-family to a small-family sys-
tem was the main implication that Kim Tu-hŏn, a Korean family-law specialist, 
distilled from the 1940 Civil Ordinances. In the essay “Chosŏn kajok chedo ŭi 
chaegŏmt’o t’ŭkhi hyŏndae ŭi saenghwal kwa kwanryŏn haesŏ [Re-examination 
of the Korean family system: Especially regarding modern life]” (January 29–
February 3, 1939), which he serialized in the Korean daily Tonga Ilbo, around the 
time when the new Civil Ordinances were promulgated, Kim asserted that the 
Civil Ordinances were a necessary adjustment to the inevitable trend of the times. 
In his framework existing Western family culture was the nemesis rather than 
the Japanese family system. Assimilation to Japanese family laws, Kim argued, 
facilitated Korea’s progress toward an improved version of the Western fam-
ily system. Kim emphasized that the Korean family system was part of the East 
Asian (tong’yang) tradition of communal family (chŏnch’e kajok), as opposed to 
the Western family tradition of individual nuclear family (kaebyŏl kajok); in the 
former the vertical relationship between father and son was much more important 
than the marital ties of the couple. Despite some serious shortcomings (p’yedan) 
in Korean family customs, namely the discrimination against sons of concubines 
and the ban on widow remarriage, Kim reminded readers that the Korean public 
should know better than to abandon the communal family system and blindly fol-
low Western family culture. Rather than emulate the Western system of a nuclear 
family, Kim warned, Koreans should be aware of the shortcomings of Western 
family culture and be mindful of the principle of the communal family system.
In a similarly titled essay published the following year in the Japanese-language 
journal Chōsa Geppō (Research monthly), Kim tried to weave his concern for 
the loss of communalism in Korean society into his analysis of the new Civil-
Ordinances Reform. He noted how the reform was the colonial government’s effort 
to adjust to the changing trend of the times: the emergence of the individual and 
small families over large families and lineages. Kim contended that “the national 
polity [kokutai] of Japan and the spirit of the civil code and the national morals 
[kokumin dōtoku] consider the large-family system [dai-kazoku-sei] essential and 
try to maintain the good and beautiful customs based on these ideals.” Yet, he 
continued, it was the declining communal consciousness among Koreans that 
led to the growing number of conflicts between families over property and thus 
necessitated the remedy of the Personnel Affairs Conciliation Law (Jinji Chōserei), 
which facilitated private reconciliation and compromises to cut down on the 
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number of civil lawsuits (especially during wartime, when the colonial govern-
ment was trying to cut down on administrative costs). The new policy on house-
hold names, that is, the Name-Change Policy, was another response to the trend of 
the times, in which “the spirit of communal ownership of families was diminish-
ing and the trend of individualistic [consciousness] that emphasizes individual 
ownership [was emerging.]”52
Kim Tu-hŏn had a negative opinion about the Name-Change Policy, but not 
because he wanted to defend the Korean lineage system, much less the Korean 
national identity that postcolonial Koreans associated with Korean surnames. It 
was, rather, that he was nostalgic about the disappearing communal family tradi-
tion, which he believed was the good and common ground of society that Japan 
and Korea shared. Even though he understood small families to be the origin of 
ethical and cultural problems, he nonetheless understood it to be part of an inevi-
table progress, and the Name-Change Policy was a necessary adjustment to deal 
with these changes. As such, the emergence of small families, in the form of the 
household, was a natural and inevitable trend in Kim’s analysis.
THE 1940 CIVIL-ORDINANCES REFORM
The 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform, which was promulgated in 1939 and imple-
mented in 1940, comprised two measures. The first measure was the Name-Change 
Policy, which compelled all Koreans to take Japanese-style surnames (shi). The 
second part of the revision, son-in-law adoption, was implemented through revis-
ing the ban on adopting from outside of the lineage, which had been acknowl-
edged as a Korean custom since the beginning of colonial rule.
Beyond increasing the ease of intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, 
the 1940 Civil Ordinances, it was expected, would expand women’s rights in 
Korea through the extension of daughters’ inheritance rights. Yet the eventual 
1940 Civil Ordinances failed to deliver in this regard. Owing to strong resistance 
from conservative Koreans, son-in-law adoption was implemented, but daugh-
ters were not given the right to become household heads on their own and thus 
gained only half of the daughters’ inheritance rights provided for in the Japanese 
Civil Code. Although these measures largely assimilated Korean inheritance laws 
into those of the Japanese, there was a critical difference in that daughters could 
not become heirs on their own. In Japan there were two routes through which a 
daughter could inherit the household; one was son-in-law adoption, and the other 
was as a daughter household head. In the latter case the daughter would become 
the household head and then, when she married, have her husband register as a 
married-in husband. In other words, Japanese inheritance law was not imported 
in its entirety in 1939. In the Korean adaptation daughters’ direct access to heir-
ship was bypassed. In this sense son-in-law adoptions in Korea and in Japan were 
significantly different, the Korean one allowing daughters many fewer rights. Why 
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this was so is evident in the following Chūsūin meeting minutes, which show that 
the Government General’s continued effort to further assimilate civil laws in Korea 
was thwarted in part by the strong resistance from some sectors of Korean society, 
in particular to daughter inheritance rights.
The 1941 inquiry from the Government General to the Chūsūin members ran 
as follows: “When there is no presumptive heir [hōtei suitei katoku sōzokunin] to 
the household headship, should a daughter [joshi] be allowed to inherit the house-
hold head [position]?” Opinions varied. Some Chūsūin members were in favor of 
female heirship, saying that Korea was advanced enough to embrace the idea. They 
argued that the Korean custom of banning daughters from becoming heirs was 
backward, growing out of the Confucian way of “revering the men and despising 
the women [danson johi; K: namjon yŏbi]” and the thought that women were not 
capable enough. But now, when women received education, they gained the capac-
ity to take care of a household.53
Kanemitsu Soeomi (Kim Kwan-hyŏn) agreed with this evolutionist framework, 
opining that since women’s status in Korea had advanced, it was now suitable for 
Korea to incorporate matrilineality.54 Kinoshita Toei (Pak Tu-yŏng) pointed out 
that Korean family conflicts originated from despising daughters and adopting 
from other families.55 Some answered that granting daughters the heirship would 
be beneficial to preserving the bloodline of the family, or more suitable in terms of 
“human sentiments [ninjō].”
Others disagreed on the grounds that suddenly importing such a custom 
would be too violent for Korean sentiments. While Japan had a tradition of hav-
ing daughters as heirs, Korea did not have such a tradition. One critic argued 
that this was even more drastic than the muko yōshi custom, for which Koreans 
had at least a comparable custom, teril sawi, whereby a son-in-law was brought 
into the daughter’s family but, unlike the Japanese counterpart, did not change 
his surname to his wife’s surname and could not inherit the wife’s household.56 
There were others even stronger in their opposition. Jokawa Sōkun (Sŏ Sang-kŭn), 
who apparently had not quite grasped the concept of son-in-law adoption, argued 
that giving daughters rights to household-head inheritances would be impossible, 
considering Korean customs. If daughters became heirs, the household would be 
“discontinued,” which would mean a “cruel conclusion” (chanhokhan kyŏlgwa) for 
the family.57 He meant that if a daughter married a man from another family, the 
descendants would be of the son-in-law’s descent, thereby discontinuing the fam-
ily line. Many years of effort to convince Koreans to think in terms of household 
names before patrilineal succession of the lineage does not seem to have succeeded 
with these Chūsūin members after all.
Yet other Chūsūin members were concerned that daughters’ rights could be 
conflated with widows’ rights and that the new measure would strengthen widows’ 
rights. They thought this would endanger the purity of patrilineal lines. Nanjō 
Chigyō (Hong Chi-ŏp) argued that heirship and son-in-law adoption marriage 
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(nyūfu kon’in) should be granted only to the daughter of the household and not the 
widowed household head, because this would totally change the family relations of 
the household. Nachiyama Heitoku (Min Pyŏng-dŏk) echoed the wariness about 
widow household heads. Even when daughters were not given the heirship, if the 
widow, who was also the mother, became the household head and first passed on 
part of the household property to her daughter before she arranged adoption of an 
heir, the adoptee’s property inheritance was in name only. Therefore, some mea-
sure to limit such treachery on the part of widows should first be implemented.58
Another argued that since a woman household head could hide the house-
hold property and then remarry, any important legal transaction by her regarding 
household property should be done with the approval of the court and the super-
vision of the family council.59 In short, the long tradition of patrilineal succession 
painted women as forever outsiders despite the continuing legal reforms that tried 
to convince Koreans otherwise. In this sense the 1939 reform was not entirely suc-
cessful in dismantling the lineage system in Korea. While the colonial state was 
able to legally dismantle the lineage system, it fell short of dismantling the lineage 
system in the minds of Koreans.
C ONCLUSION
As widow household heads once were useful in delineating the boundary between 
lineage and household, daughter inheritance was the last frontier in the transfer 
of property ownership from the lineage to the household. Yet this was a line that 
many Koreans were loath to cross. Even as Koreans were forced to let go of their 
traditional surnames, which were the markers of their lineage membership, they 
balked at the idea of letting their daughters inherit family property.
At the very end of colonial rule, daughters did gain a small victory over their 
mothers. In August 1944 the High Court delivered a decision based on new prior-
ity standings that gave daughters precedence over widows in inheriting a man’s 
estate.60 This decision directly contradicted the mother-versus-daughter case from 
1931 mentioned earlier. Even if it was not a granting of full equal inheritance rights 
to daughters, it did signal a new era of expanded daughter access to household 
property. Yet, as history would have it, exactly one year later Japanese colonial 
rule ended with Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, and the Korean legal system saw 
another round of tumultuous transformations under a newly independent Korean 
government.
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Conjugal Love and Conjugal  
Family on Trial
In 1938 the Chōsen High Court delivered a decision on a divorce case. The wife 
had sued her husband for a divorce, claiming that he had “gravely insulted” her 
by keeping a concubine. “Grave insult” (jūdaina bujoku) was one of the legitimate 
grounds for divorce, according to the Japanese Civil Code. The High Court granted 
the wife divorce and alimony. To the husband’s objection that concubinage was a 
legitimate custom among Koreans, the judge replied, “Just because some sectors of 
Korean society commonly practice the evil custom of concubinage does not mean 
that the above criminal activity of the husband should be condoned.”1 The decision 
overturned a decades-long precedent and was celebrated by the Korean newspaper 
Tonga Ilbo as a significant expansion of women’s rights.2 In another divorce case in 
1943, the High Court again granted a divorce on the grounds of concubinage and 
explained that the decision was a response to how “the way of marriage” (kon’in no 
dōgi) was slowly spreading among Koreans.3
These High Court statements reflect the vision of legal assimilation then being 
applied throughout the Japanese Empire during its wartime period. Although the 
Japanese maintained separate legal spheres in their colonial territories with differ-
ent degrees of integration with the Japanese home islands, marriage and divorce 
matters increasingly were subject to assimilation reforms. The status of concu-
bines changed accordingly. Concubines had been allowed to register as such in the 
household registers (minseki) established in 1909. But in 1915 concubines no longer 
were allowed to register. When a major reform in the Household-Registration Law 
(Kosekihō) in 1922 redefined the registry as having a legal effect on all aspects of 
personal status, including marriage, all unregistered marriages became concubi-
nage. A major reform in the Civil Ordinances in 1922 expanded the categories of 
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family matters to be adjudicated under the umbrella of the Japanese Civil Code 
rather than Korean customs, with marriage and divorce being critical components.4 
With the 1922 reform, divorce by lawsuit was made possible among Koreans.
Yet the reality of legal assimilation on the ground was further complicated by 
the fact that even with the expanded application of Japanese laws in Korea, the 
colonial territory remained a separate legal sphere and the High Court of Korea 
still had the power to choose when to apply Japanese precedents to Korean cases. 
If the new Civil Ordinances had been fully implemented in 1922, divorce on the 
grounds of concubinage would have been possible in Korea, according to the 
Japanese precedent established in 1918. Instead, citing the prevalence and wide 
acceptance of concubinage among Koreans, the High Court of Korea declined to 
grant Korean wives divorce on the grounds of concubinage until the 1938 decision. 
The shift came only after a transition occurred in the colonial policy in Korea 
for “forced assimilation” (kōminka) by the colonial state, that is, the Government 
General, following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The 
extension of Japanese laws on son-in-law adoption and the Name-Change Policy 
(Sōshi Kaimei) with the 1939 Civil-Ordinances Reform were further steps toward 
assimilating the family laws in the colony to those of the Japanese metropole.5
The selective application of Japanese divorce laws between 1922 and 1938 created 
a legal limbo that influenced the meaning of the conjugal relationship, whether 
as legal marriage or concubinage, in colonial Korea. Affection and companion-
ship emerged in this period as critical components of the conjugal relationship 
for Koreans.6 This process, which I call the “affectivization” of the female spouse, 
coincided with a penchant for romantic love in public media and popular novels. 
The continuing condonement of concubinage in Korea, ironically, accelerated the 
affectivization of the female spouse. It was through the debates over concubinage, 
expressed mainly in newspaper articles and in the civil courts, that ideas about 
monogamy and conjugal love were most intricately articulated. Also notable was 
the shifting role of male spouses in this period, with the new legal obligation of 
male household heads to support their dependents economically. This strengthen-
ing of household-head rights through exclusive economic obligations went hand 
in hand with the affectivization of the female spouse. Yet the new obligation of 
husbands did not clash with Korean customs in the way monogamy did, and thus 
discourses about male spouses were nowhere near as close to the center of public 
attention as were issues concerning concubinage and wives.
The new ideal of conjugal love worked in conjunction with—rather than being 
antithetical to—the family-state ideology of the Japanese Empire and the family 
system that the colonial state sought to implement in Korea. Evidence suggests 
that ideas about conjugal love were sometimes used by both the colonial courts 
and the Korean litigants to frame nominally illicit relationships as, in fact, monog-
amous relationships compatible with the colonial family system. The colonial 
court, over time, moved from the strict enforcement of marriage registration to a 
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looser acknowledgement of common-law marriage, which also assumed affective 
companionship as its critical component. The qualitative transformation of the 
conjugal relationship predated the 1938 full assimilation of Korean marriage and 
divorce law to that of the Japanese metropole, and in this sense “the way of mar-
riage” seems to have spread earlier, at least among some segments of the educated, 
urban population.
THE PROBLEM OF C ONCUBINAGE
There are ten cases of divorce in the Chōsen kōtō hōin hanketsuroku (Verdicts from 
the High Court of colonial Korea).7 Among the ten, three were direct appeals to 
have concubinage acknowledged as suitable grounds for divorce. These numbers 
reflect only those cases that reached the High Court; judging from newspaper 
reports, the number of cases in the local and appellate courts were much higher. 
High-profile cases concerning divorce and concubinage frequently appeared in 
Korean-language newspapers, some of which I analyze here, and are evidence 
of the great interest among the literate public in the issues of concubinage and 
monogamy.
Monogamy had become normative in the Japanese metropole only a few 
decades prior. Concubinage had been rare in Tokugawa Japan, but considered an 
acceptable way to obtain an heir necessary to continue the family line.8 After the 
Meiji Restoration, and after Western culture became the standard against which a 
culture’s level was judged, monogamy became the marker of civilization and con-
cubinage that of backwardness, as early as the 1870s.9 With the 1872 Penal Code, 
concubinage in Japan lost legal recognition, although legal recognition of children 
born out of wedlock (ninchi) provided legal protection for concubines and their 
children.10
Monogamy emerged as one of the key topics of discussion, along with equal 
rights and women’s education in the discussion of women’s rights in the People’s 
Rights Movement.11 The norm of companionate marriage, recently established 
in the West, quickly traveled to Japan in the uneven political terrain of the mid-
nineteenth to early twentieth centuries.12 Ellen Key’s Love and Marriage (English 
edition, 1911) was translated by the famous Japanese feminist, Hiratsuka Raichō, 
in 1913 and influenced many subsequent writings that promoted marriage based 
on love.13
That concubinage during the colonial period in Korea was not merely a stag-
nant remnant from the past has been pointed out by a number of recent studies. 
The Korean historian Chŏng Chi-yŏng (Jung Ji Young) has suggested that con-
cubinage practiced by New Women in colonial Korea conformed to the modern 
liberal ideal of conjugal marriage.14 In colonial Korea, according to Chŏng, concu-
binage was an appealing if not ideal option for educated young people as a way to 
realize the newly circulating ideal of companionate marriage, especially for men 
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who were already in arranged marriages.15 So Hyŏn-suk has argued that the preva-
lence of concubinage in the colonial period was in fact a product of social and 
legal changes during the colonial period that had diminished the stigma attached 
to concubines and their offspring.16 Both studies resist the simple characterization 
of concubinage as a backward custom suffocating the marriage system in Korea, 
instead analyzing it as an institution changing under Japanese colonial rule. I seek 
to highlight the particular changes to concubinage that ensued from a dynamic 
engagement between cultural discourse and the colonial legal system. Placing the 
debate over concubinage at the center of my discussion furthermore enables me 
to disrupt the dichotomy between the wife and the concubine, modern and tradi-
tional, and examine the legal transformation of the conjugal relationship at large, 
which was moving in the direction of the affective conjugal ideal.
The ways in which the affective conjugal ideal in colonial Korea was spread in 
part through the extension of the Japanese Civil Code challenges us to rethink 
the political, social, and cultural role of the Japanese family system in the Korean 
colony. In previous studies on Japan, the affective conjugal ideal was understood to 
be an antithesis to the Japanese family system (ie-seido), created by the Meiji state 
by drawing on the Tokugawa family customs of the elite samurai class and codify-
ing them in the form of the Meiji Civil Code (1898). The Japanese state utilized the 
system to enforce familial hierarchy and to cultivate loyalty and the subordina-
tion of individual desires to family and state prerogatives.17 Conjugal love, with its 
assumption of equality in relationships and free choice of partners, thus stood in 
opposition to this state-decreed concept of the family. In literature such tension 
often was expressed in the narrative of family drama, where the young protagonist 
is forced to choose between love (to his or her partner) and obligation (to his or 
her respective parents).18
What I show in this chapter, in contrast, is how the conjugal-family ideal itself 
was a critical component of the family system that the colonial state was imple-
menting in the Korean colony. The contention over legitimate conjugal relation-
ships that unfolded in the 1920s and the 1930s reveals that a significant part of 
the legal assimilation of Japanese colonial rule involved mobilizing the emotions 
and desires of the colonized Koreans. The consequence of Japanese family policy 
delineated here shows us that the “affective grid of colonial politics” applied not 
only to the colonizers but also to the recipients of the colonial policy.19 The colo-
nial power, in other words, not only shaped the colonized people’s sentiments but 
also informed their attitudes toward colonial policy. This is not to claim that the 
impact of colonial legal policy on Koreans was uniform across all sectors of soci-
ety. Some scholars have pointed out that, for example, the influence of Japanese 
colonial legal policy on Korean family practices was minimal, especially in rural 
areas.20 Even so, I argue that previous scholarship has been too limited in consid-
ering the culture of love and romantic relationships that emerged in the 1920s as 
something confined to literary and cultural phenomena alienated from the actual 
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experience of colonized Koreans.21 New ideas about conjugal love in the urban, 
literate circles of Korea had an inherent relationship with colonial policy at large, 
and their impact on Korean society was not confined to literary discourses alone. 
In the legal debates—and novels—of the time we can see that love and the conju-
gal ideal were critical to the Japanese colonial project of assimilation as mediums 
through which the Japanese family system was implemented in colonial Korea. 
In other words, such emotions and desires were often produced and expressed 
through particular power relations dictated by the colonial state. Neither was the 
hegemonic language of love and affection limited to use by the New Women and 
Men—as evidence shows, such ideals were disseminated through the colonial legal 
system to a wider sector of Korean society, to the extent that common concubines 
previously considered passive victims of tradition were among the first to actively 
embrace the ideal of conjugal love.
C ONCUBINAGE IN THE CHOSŎN PERIOD
The distinction between wife and concubine in Korea involved multiple layers 
of cultural meaning that originated as far back as the Koryŏ-Chosŏn transition 
period at the turn of the fifteenth century. As part of adopting neo-Confucian-
ism as the official political ideology, the Chosŏn court reformed the polygamous 
practices of the Koryŏ dynasty along the lines of Confucian family prescriptions 
and allowed men of its ruling elite yangban class only one wife and one concu-
bine.22 Other legislation followed that discriminated between a husband’s wife 
and his concubine and, further, between their respective offspring. Only wives 
could obtain official honorary titles and have a place in the lineage shrine of the 
husband’s family, and only a wife’s children could sit for civil-service examina-
tions. Heightened competition between yangban elite families in the late Chosŏn 
dynasty led to the consolidation of the patrilineal kin group, which involved fur-
ther stratification between the offspring of wives and concubines within lineage 
practices. Children of concubines could not be appointed as jural heirs, that is, 
heirs to ancestral rites, even when the family did not have other sons. Resentment 
by the children of concubines against such legal discrimination became a mount-
ing social problem by the late Chosŏn dynasty (the late seventeenth to late nine-
teenth century) and functioned to continually put the problem of concubinage at 
the center of public demands for social reform.23
The definition of concubines in the Chosŏn dynasty depended more on the sta-
tus of the women’s birth families and the process of relationship formation than on 
the marital status of the male partner. Concubines of men from the elite yangban 
class were chosen from the commoner or the slave classes, and the relationships 
lacked the proper rituals required of formal marriages.24 Because the definition 
and status of a concubine depended on her lower social origins, a concubine could 
never become her partner’s wife even if his wife died. Records from the Chosŏn 
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dynasty suggest that a relationship with a concubine could be managed in a variety 
of ways, from a fleeting affair lasting only for a few years to a lifelong connec-
tion.25 A concubine could share dwellings with the main wife or live in a separate 
dwelling; in the latter case she might reside near the main home or in a remote 
region where the husband regularly visited, such as his government post or his 
hometown. Single men might acquire a concubine without also having a wife. A 
widower had the choice to keep a concubine or marry a new wife.
After the onset of Japanese colonial rule, the definition and status of concu-
binage shifted from a ritual to a legal basis. Instead of a definition based on fam-
ily status and rituals, the colonial definition of concubinage was based on a lack 
of registration in the household registers. Therefore, even a common-law wife 
acquired through proper rituals could legally be considered a concubine if unreg-
istered.26 On the other hand, a concubine could always be made a wife by reg-
istering her as such, a path that had been denied to concubines in the Chosŏn 
dynasty.27 Furthermore, since the Kabo Reforms in 1894 abolished the custom-
ary ban on making the offspring of a concubine a jural heir, a concubine in the 
colonial period possessed increased power in the relationship, as her son had the 
potential to become the future head of her partner’s household.28
However, older definitions of concubinage, together with the lower-class stigma 
attached to the nomenclature, lingered on into the colonial period. Traces of the 
old ideas about concubinage can be seen in the legal records. Families would call 
a wife of a widower who remarried a “concubine,” even if she was the legally regis-
tered wife, if she fit the typical mold of the traditional kind of concubine: a woman 
much younger than the husband or from a humble background.29 The social shock 
about New Women becoming concubines comes as much from the stigma of low 
class attached to the nomenclature as the adulterous nature of the relationship.
C ONCUBINAGE AS MARITAL OFFENSE
The normative form of the conjugal relationship is difficult to ascertain in the con-
text of colonial Korea, because there was a discrepancy between legal codes and 
social practices. First of all, there was the chronic problem of unregistered mar-
riages. After the first implementation of household registers in 1909, the gover-
nor general repeatedly declared the principle that registration was the only means 
through which personal status was officially recognized (todokede shugi), yet many 
Koreans put off registering a personal change of status, such as birth and marriage. 
Therefore, many conjugal relationships that Koreans considered legitimate were 
illegitimate in the eyes of the law. A government inquiry from the 1920s shows the 
discrepancy between the official vision and the local understanding of legitimate 
marriage: the local official referred to an unregistered spouse as a “wife,” while the 
bureaucrat from the Office of the Governor General consistently referred to her as 
a “concubine,” emphasizing her unregistered status.30 One Tonga Ilbo article as late 
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as 1934 surmised that all Korean couples delayed registering their marriages and, 
therefore, experienced a common-law stage at some point.31
Another problem was the ambivalent stance of the governor general on the 
issue of concubinage. While the colonial state officially backed the principle of 
monogamy, the colonial courts protected concubinage in legal decisions. Although 
excluded from household registration since 1915, concubines received de facto 
protection of their status in the civil courts. Until 1922 a concubine, rather than her 
partner’s legal wife, had parental rights over her own children. Often concubines 
were treated just like wives, especially if there were no living wife with the part-
ner.32 If she was registered as a concubine before the 1915 ban, she was burdened 
with the same legal constraints as a wife, such as spousal cohabitation.33 Even after 
the 1922 revision of the Civil Ordinances subjected marriage and divorce matters 
in Korea to the Japanese Civil Code, concubinage still was protected as a legitimate 
Korean custom in the colonial civil courts.34 Citing the prevalence of concubi-
nage among Koreans, the colonial court denied Korean wives the right to divorce 
on the grounds of concubinage. Such decisions blatantly ignored legal precedents 
established in the Japanese metropole. Japan had made concubinage a legitimate 
ground for divorce in 1918, with the Japanese Supreme Court (Daishin’in) ruling 
that concubinage amounted to a “grave insult” to the wife.35 In other words, even 
after the official assimilation of divorce laws in 1922, Korean wives were not fully 
granted the same divorce rights as their Japanese counterparts. Such decisions 
illustrated for the Korean wives the legal consequences of living in the colony, 
where the country’s supposed cultural backwardness was in fact arbitrated by the 
colonial state.36
Indeed, concubinage in the 1920s seemed to be far from declining. One writer 
claimed that “more than half of middle-class Korean families keep concubines” 
and that “some even keep three or four [concubines],” arguing for a national 
movement to abolish the custom.37 Reports of concubinage gone awry frequently 
appeared in the newspapers: women committed suicide to escape the fate of 
becoming concubines; men killed themselves from the economic pressures of 
keeping many concubines. In an opinion piece, one writer suggested that Koreans 
could solve the school-shortage issue by persuading the rich to spend money on 
building schools instead of on luxury items and concubines.38 Reports on possible 
taxation for keeping concubines also adorned the papers.39 Scandalous accounts 
that emerged in the mid-1920s about the New Women, those paragons of glo-
balized modernity who had chosen the status of concubines, seemed to further 
darken the prospect for Koreans overcoming this backward custom.
Despite being condemned as backward, concubinage seems to have been bol-
stered by the growing importance of love emerging in discourses at that time.40 In 
opposition to the criticism that concubinage was an old, backward custom, others 
began to redefine it as a new and modern relationship based on love. Even in the 
writings that condemned concubinage as a serious social problem, the authenticity 
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and inherent goodness of the romantic relationship undergirding such relation-
ships were seldom questioned. Many of the newspaper articles that were critical 
of romantic relationships nonetheless implied that they were based not only on 
sexual attraction but also emotional and intellectual compatibility by mentioning 
the comparable levels of education of the two parties. While “moral depravity” 
in relationships with concubines was still condemned, so were the old customs 
that confined young people in loveless marriages. While men surely should be 
condemned for deserting their wives, they also were to be pitied for being trapped 
in marriages that had been arranged by parents when they were barely teenag-
ers.41 And while New Women were criticized for luring married men, blame also 
was assigned to the wives who failed to educate themselves to become suitable 
companions to their husbands.42 Both concubines and their partners portrayed 
themselves not as perpetrators but as victims of old evil customs. Some intellec-
tuals even asserted that concubines should be identified with a new name, the 
“second wife” (chei pu’in), rather than the stigmatized word “concubine” (ch’ŏp).43 
Regardless of the morality of their status, they were victims, these intellectuals 
claimed, of the backward custom of early marriage, which tied men to unwanted 
marriages before they had a chance to meet companionate mates.
In other words, in a family culture where arranged marriages still prevailed, 
concubinage was embraced as an alternative institution that enabled young people 
to realize the new conjugal ideal in a romantic relationship.44 Chŏng Chi-yŏng 
posits that perhaps the reason why some New Women became concubines was 
because concubinage offered them the unique (and rare) path to the affective 
conjugal-family ideal of the “simple home” (tanch’ol’han kajŏng).45 Far from being 
ill-informed victims, they entered the extramarital relationship with their eyes 
wide open; it might have been a better option than what awaited them in a regu-
lar marriage: domineering in-laws, absent husbands, burdens of housework and 
child rearing. Chŏng suggests that, given the common Korean family structure 
of the stem family, where the married couple cohabited with the parents-in-law, 
concubinage perhaps provided a respite from the conventional arrangement of 
marriage.46 For these women, then, a companionate relationship trumped the legal 
securities of marriage as the guiding principle in charting their lives.
Yet the hegemonic language of love also increasingly was used to support the 
monogamous relationship in legal marriages. In the 1920s women in the colonial 
civil courts began using the language of conjugal love to argue that Korean wives 
should be allowed to divorce when the marriage lacked an exclusive loving rela-
tionship, namely, when their husbands kept concubines. Records of civil litigations 
show us how colonized Koreans maneuvered within the colonial legal system to 
articulate or legitimize competing visions of conjugal relationships.
Contemporary newspaper reports about wives who alleged concubinage 
as grounds for divorce would have served as sources of information for literate 
women considering their legal options. Divorce cases were the stock of sensational 
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journalism at the time and newspaper readers were treated to all kinds of details 
of the failed marriages. All too often, the failed marriage involved concubines. 
Divorce cases mentioning concubinage as the major source of marital discord 
appear as early as 1921, although the newspapers did not always report the ver-
dicts.47 In 1928 alone the newspaper Tonga Ilbo reported two cases of wives suing 
over their husbands’ concubinage. In the first case, the wife sued for a divorce 
because, even after she married her husband, he continued to live with his con-
cubine and refused to cohabit with or support her. The article reporting the com-
plaint was titled “Ch’ukch’ŏp namp’yŏn silso: Sinyŏja ŭi ihon sosong [Doesn’t want 
husband who keeps a concubine: A New Woman’s divorce suit].” In the second 
article the wife implemented the unique strategy of suing her millionaire husband, 
Kim Yŏn-yŏng, for cohabitation and the expulsion of two concubines instead 
of divorce. She won the case. The judges in the Keijō Local Court affirmed that 
“concubinage is not only humanely unreasonable but also the main cause destroy-
ing the peace of homes, which should be the foundation of the state.” While the 
title of the article—“Pŏmnyul sang ŭrodo ch’ukch’ŏp ŭn pulga [Concubinage is 
even legally impossible]”—clearly overstated the decision rendered by the court, a 
legal advice column in 1932 nonetheless recommended that a wife should sue for 
divorce on account of a husband’s relationship with a concubine.48
In 1928, the same year in which Tonga Ilbo reported on two lawsuits over con-
cubinage in the lower courts, Yi Myŏng-rye appealed the lower-court ruling in her 
divorce suit on the grounds of her husband’s concubinage. Although she eventu-
ally failed, the case shows how the affective relationship as a primary foundation 
of legitimate conjugal ties began to emerge as a strong rhetorical tool in legal dis-
putes. This case had all the common trappings of a 1920s divorce case: mother and 
daughter-in-law conflict; husband’s battery of the wife; wife’s escape to her natal 
home; and, in addition, the keeping of a concubine by the husband. The details of 
the case probably took cues from what was stipulated as grounds for divorce in 
the Japanese Civil Code, article 813, which had been partially extended to Korea in 
1922.49 Yi argued that the fact that her husband, Pak, kept a concubine and forbade 
Yi to return to the house amounted to “malicious abandonment” and a “grave 
insult,” both stipulated as legitimate grounds for divorce in article 813. Pak claimed 
that it was his wife who provided reasons for the marital discord, and, when Yi 
ran away from the house, he had no other recourse than to take in a concubine to 
care for his mother and look after household tasks, such as cooking and cleaning. 
The local and appellate courts (fukushin hōin) sided with the husband and denied 
Yi the divorce. “If this is why the defendant is cohabiting with the concubine,” the 
appellate court’s statement concluded, “this does not amount to malicious aban-
donment or grave insult.”50
The appellate court did not break any new ground here; it was merely following 
the precedents in the colonial Korean courts. At that point no Korean woman had 
had any success in obtaining divorce on grounds of concubinage. Nonetheless, 
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Yi ventured to appeal to the High Court probably because she, or her lawyer, 
thought that, with the 1922 reform in Civil Ordinances, the 1918 Japanese Supreme 
Court decision that declared concubinage a marital offense in Japan should also be 
extended to Korea.51 She indeed cited the 1918 Japanese decision that had ruled that 
malicious abandonment and grievous insult are not affected by whether or not the 
other party provided a cause or if concubinage resulted from necessity.52
To demonstrate that she was due the protection of monogamy, Yi Myŏng-rye 
seems to have believed that she needed to demonstrate her faith in exclusive emo-
tional ties as the legitimizing grounds for a marital relationship. In her appeal 
to the High Court, to emphasize that the principle of monogamy also applied to 
marriages in Korea, Yi declared, “Marriage can be sustained only with love [ai] 
between opposite sexes.” She continued, “The love that is necessary for the suste-
nance of marriage is a holy one and must be singular and exclusive.” She went on 
to criticize the appellate court decision for being discriminatory to women in the 
colony. To the court’s reasoning that the husband’s battery and concubinage did 
not amount to grievous insult because she, the wife, had provided the basis for the 
marital discord, Yi responded, “[Such a decision] would lead to producing a mali-
cious custom even worse than the current malicious custom of concubinage. . . . 
Neither the [Japanese] Civil Code nor Korean custom today discriminate between 
men and women to such a degree. Rather, they condemn concubinage regardless 
of the reason.”53
Despite all her efforts, Yi was unsuccessful and the High Court again turned 
down her appeal for divorce. The judge’s reasoning, in short, was that Korea was 
different from Japan: concubinage was still too common in Korea; therefore, 
Korean wives should not feel so insulted as to impede the normal continuation of 
the marriage in such circumstances. The exact wording of the High Court decision 
decreed the following:
The evil custom [heifū] of concubinage is still prevalent in certain strata of Korean 
society, and the general public has an accepting attitude toward the practice and does 
not consider it a grave wrongdoing. If such is the circumstance among Koreans, it is 
difficult to say that just concubinage alone constitutes a grave enough insult to im-
pede cohabitation with the wife, in other words, grounds for divorce from the wife.54
To assert concubinage as grounds for divorce, Korean wives first would have to 
refute what the colonial court perceived as a prevalent Korean custom and then 
appeal to the established precedent in the Japanese metropole. How to wage such a 
struggle successfully was a tricky question, as the High Court’s perception was not 
necessarily based on a quantifiable observation.55 Legitimizing a separation of legal 
spheres between Korea and Japan on the basis of different customs seems barely 
supportable when we realize how closely and quickly some Koreans, such as Yi, 
were embracing the legal developments in the Japanese metropole. It also shows 
how the maintenance of such separate legal spheres may have motivated women 
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from the colony, like Yi, to support expedient assimilation of civil laws in Korea. Yi 
Myŏng-rye expressed her belief not only in her rights as a wife to a monogamous 
relationship with her spouse but also in her rights to legal treatment equal to her 
metropolitan counterparts.
What is notable in this case is Yi Myŏng-rye’s choice to foreground the language 
of love and affection in her argument despite the absence of any legal precedent 
for the effectiveness of such a strategy. The most common and successful reason 
for divorce was battery, either of the wife or the wife’s parents.56 Another frequent 
reason was “malicious abandonment” of one spouse of the other.57 Yi’s strategy 
may well have been based on her perception of the larger trends occurring in the 
legal arena at the time, but her argument was possibly inspired also by the popular 
discourse about conjugal love, which often called for exclusive love in marriage.58 
In August 14, 1928, Tonga Ilbo printed an opinion piece, “Ihon su ŭi kyŏkchŭng, 
sinjunghi koryŏ hal munje [Explosion of divorce rate, a problem of careful con-
sideration].” The article noted that divorce itself was not new in Korea, but “what 
is notable is the divorce that derives from the transformation of thoughts [sasang 
pyŏnch’ŏn], that is, the man abandoning a wife after he gained [modern] knowl-
edge, and the wife abandoning a husband after she became progressive.” The arti-
cle also noted that many divorces resulted from a “free love-relationship” (chayu 
yŏne). The writer then went on to argue that “the true meaning of married life is 
for the husband and wife to love each other and to pursue the happiness of home,” 
and therefore people should distinguish this true domestic happiness from the 
“simplistic hedonism” (tansunhan k’waerak ju’ŭi) and “fleeting feelings” that are 
the source of a “temporary love-relationship.”
In 1933 Tonga Ilbo ran a serialized article, “Segye kakkuk ŭi rihon pŏpche wa 
chosŏn rihonpŏp ŭi kwagŏ hyŏnjae kŭp changrae [Divorce laws in the world and 
the past, present, and future of the divorce law in Korea],” that argued for reforms 
to make it easier for Koreans to divorce. The writer argued that the difficulty of 
securing a divorce accounted for the increased instances of familial disputes and 
also the particular problem of female crimes in Korea that involved high rates 
of husband homicide and infanticide. In the eighteenth installment, the writer 
cried, “Why should a wife have the obligation to endure when her husband seeks 
the pleasure of concubinage! Those women who become concubines while fully 
knowing that the man has a legal wife! Know that you lead the men to concubi-
nage and that you worsen the social system!” The last installment noted that “mar-
riage without love is a constant rape.”59 In 1935 the author of another opinion piece 
questioned whether “a marriage should be maintained if the couple lacks affection 
[aejŏng]. ”60
These newspaper articles show how the growing discourse about conjugal love 
was not only transforming the understanding of marriage but also aggressively 
undermining the legitimacy of concubinage. Even articles that excused particu-
lar extramarital relations when the marriage was loveless still believed that the 
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goal was to move toward companionate marriages that would make concubinage 
unnecessary. Such statements directly challenged the notion, expressed by the 
High Court judges in Yi’s divorce lawsuit in 1928, that Koreans widely accepted 
concubinage as a legitimate custom. With the emerging popularity of love and the 
love relationship throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, the dominant discourse at 
least among the literate urban population seems to have privileged the alignment 
of love and marriage. Ironically, the demand for expanded divorce rights was one 
of the consequences of increased expectations of love and affection in marriage. 
By 1938, the year in which the High Court first granted a divorce to a Korean 
wife on the grounds of her husband’s concubinage, very detailed legal knowledge 
about divorce and the unique challenges Korean women faced was made available 
through a popular novel serialized in a Korean newspaper. In this novel, Millim 
(The jungle), by Kim Mal-bong, the wife, Cha-kyŏng, decides to sue her husband 
for a divorce after she finds out about his concubine and their son. Her lawyer 
recommends, however, that she pursue divorce through agreement rather than a 
lawsuit, saying, “Since concubinage is acknowledged to a certain extent in Korea, 
victory would not easily come to the plaintiff.” To this reasoning, Cha-kyŏng 
retorts, “When the husband gravely insults the wife, isn’t this the biggest ground 
for a divorce?”61 Cha-kyŏng’s statement is very telling, revealing as it does what the 
contemporary author imagined was possible for an educated woman to know at 
that time about divorce lawsuits, particularly about the charge of concubinage as 
a marital offense.
C OMPANIONSHIP AND C OMMON-L AW MARRIAGE
Newspaper reports and popular fiction reveal that the emerging discourse of love 
increasingly came to define legitimate conjugal relationships among the urban 
middle class in the 1920s and the 1930s in Korea. Moreover, some Korean women 
marshaled the discourse of conjugal love in their attempts to expand divorce rights 
during the legal limbo of colonial rule regarding concubinage between 1922 and 
1938. In this section I analyze a case where the discourse of conjugal companion-
ship was mobilized conversely to legitimize a relationship that was itself on the 
margin of legality. This case highlights how the emotional component of a conju-
gal relationship emerged as a central and defining element in this period, to the 
extent that it overshadowed other elements that had thus far defined legitimate 
marital relations. In this particular case in 1933, a concubine claimed the status of a 
wife, and the High Court concurred, stating that her kind of concubinage could be 
acknowledged as a common-law marriage. The judgment rested on her provision 
of emotional companionship.
In the case the concubine Yi Sun-gyŏng went to court to claim a piece of prop-
erty promised to her by her late partner. In a letter (written in 1932) appended to 
the land title, the man had promised to give her full rights to the land and building 
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“if she continued living with him until 1937.” As fortune would have it, he died 
soon after he wrote that letter and well before the agreed time of cohabitation was 
up. His son and heir refused to relinquish the property to Yi, claiming that she was 
not eligible to receive the land because she did not fulfill her contract. In addition, 
the son argued, the contract involved maintaining a concubinage relationship, 
which was against “public order and good customs.”
The outcome of the litigation hinged on the definition of the concubine’s rela-
tionship to her partner. Was it an illicit and fleeting relationship or was it a lasting 
relationship, more akin to that of marriage? The success of the concubine’s case 
hinged on her ability to prove that the relationship was a familial one. Her argu-
ment reveals the subtle but important shift that had occurred in the definition of 
familial relationship, from legal and ritualistic to affective. The concubine Yi pro-
ceeded to argue that the land was promised to her not as a wage but as a provision 
for her livelihood and for the child she was carrying in her womb. To regard such 
a stable and exclusive relationship as a simple liaison, she argued, would actu-
ally contradict “our moral convictions” (ware no dōtokuteki na shinnen). She also 
pointed out that her late companion did not have a (living) proper wife, and thus 
her relationship was more like an “engagement” (kon’in yoyaku), eligible for legal 
protection.
Engagement was protected as a kind of common-law marriage under the 
Japanese Civil Code, extended with great publicity to the Korean colony in 1923.62 
The measure was meant to protect unregistered marriages to ameliorate public 
reaction to the 1922 Civil-Ordinances Reform, in which the governor general 
had recognized only registered marriages as legal (hōritsukon shugi). The provi-
sion also could be used by wives of unregistered marriages when their husbands 
tried to “divorce” them without due support. In such cases the wives could sue for 
compensation on the basis of the husband not completing the promise of mar-
riage. Notably, “engagement” referred not to all instances of unregistered cohabi-
tation but only to those in the process of becoming registered marriages.63 Such 
engagements could be considered full-fledged marriages if they featured a public 
wedding ceremony, cohabitation, and public representation of the marriage: all 
that was lacking was the formality of a legal registration. According to a 1935 local 
court decision, for a cohabitation to be acknowledged as a “common-law mar-
riage,” one had to have undergone at least part of the traditional wedding rites of 
nap’ye (exchange of wedding gifts) and chŏn’an (wedding ceremony).64
Yi Sun-gyŏng seems to have lacked the wedding ritual prerequisite; in its place 
she listed myriad facets of her relationship to depict that she and her partner had 
had a lasting relationship, like a marriage. Yi pointed out several things that she 
thought proved that her relationship with the deceased had been an enduring one: 
she was formally introduced to him by a go-between, and, after entering his house, 
she prepared his clothing and food. But the central feature of this “marital rela-
tionship” that she emphasized was her affective companionship to her partner. 
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Considering the age of the late husband when he entered the relationship (sixty), 
she claimed, he did not enter into it simply to satiate his sex drive but to have a 
good “companion” (hanryo) in his lonely old age. Yi noted more than once that she 
was chosen to “provide companionship to [the husband] in old age” and also to 
“console [him] in old age.” She also cited an old Korean saying that “one evil wife 
is better than ten filial sons.”
Yi’s choice to present herself as the pseudowife was successful. The decision of 
the judges to approve her claim stipulated the following:
A husband-concubine relationship [like the one cited] is just like the husband-wife 
relationship in that they are tied for life. It is not the same as pursuing transient plea-
sure in invariably seeking concubines or courtesans. One cannot generally dismiss it 
as being harmful to public order and good customs.65
The High Court was in fact making a new distinction in Korean concubinage 
between a transient and fleeting relationship versus a more lasting one, where “one 
man and one woman openly live together, having promised to live together for all 
their lives [shūsei no kyōdō seikatsu wo yaku shite kōzen dōkyo suru]. In light of 
the status of concubinage during the Chosŏn dynasty, this distinction is clearly 
artificial. The judges went on to make sure that their decision did not amount 
to a categorical sanction of concubinage. They noted that, while the relationship 
was definitely not marriage (fūfu kankei), it was still a legitimate one, akin to a 
common-law marriage (jijitsujō no fūfu).
The High Court acknowledged Yi Sun-gyŏng’s familial status not by acknowl-
edging her claim that her relationship was an “engagement” but by introducing 
a new concept of “common-law marriage” into case history. Nevertheless, the 
ground on which both Yi Sun-gyŏng claimed legitimacy and the High Court 
judges rescued the relationship from the category of concubinage is similar. The 
High Court seems to have been preparing the way for applying the common-law 
marriage recognition then prevailing in the Japanese Civil Code into Korea, which 
did occur the following year. The categorical treatment of all forms of unregistered 
cohabitation as concubinage was being modified, and, critically, the factor that 
most influenced this redefinition was emotional companionship.
The emergence of emotional companionship as the defining element of a legiti-
mate conjugal relationship was a new phenomenon in the legal scene of this period. 
The conjugal love that previously had been argued by wives and concubines in their 
cases did not have the same quality of feeling as the companionship claimed in this 
case, which definitely lacked a tone of romantic love. Nonetheless, all invoked an 
emotional element in representing their relationships, which was unprecedented 
in the prior legal discourse defining legitimate conjugal relationships. What was 
manifest, especially in the 1933 case, was how an emotional element emerged as the 
defining factor to tip the scale for a relationship on the margin toward legitimacy. 
The outcome shows that the ideal of companionate marriage that had emerged in 
90    chapter 4
the cultural sphere had made its way into the legal discourse to redefine the conju-
gal relationship. Such cases show that culture and law were not separate but porous 
spheres that shaped and bled into each other. 
Although companionate conjugal love vied with legality in legitimizing con-
jugality, it did not subvert the marriage system in any way. If anything, the ideal 
of conjugal love strengthened the husband’s exclusive economic rights within the 
family (especially with regard to property). To gain ownership of the land prom-
ised to her, Yi emphatically redefined the promise of the land not as a wage but 
as a form of economic support. The concept presumed the wife a dependent of 
the husband, the sole economic provider of a family. Such a redefinition of famil-
ial relationships, according to the sociologist Viviana Rotman Zelizer, was also 
central to the Victorian ideal of the domestic sphere, which had been built on 
the assumption that economic transactions were antithetical to the definition of 
family.66 Zelizer thus reveals how the belief in separate spheres itself, which claims 
contradictions and separation between the economic and the affective, hides and 
nullifies the economic value of service and labor conducted within domestic rela-
tionships. What we see in Yi Sun-gyŏng’s case is how the equation can work in the 
opposite direction; by denying the economic value of her domestic and intimate 
work, the concubine earned recognition of her familial status.
This 1933 case over the familial (or spousal) status of the concubine is in strik-
ing contrast to a case from the 1910s, where the concubine claimed independent 
economic rights as customary and as a marker of concubine status.67 As the concu-
bine of the late Han Che-uk, Yi Pogwanghwa ran a successful bar-restaurant (chu-
mak) and accumulated great wealth. The problem arose when, after forty years of 
cohabitation, her partner died. Upon his death, Han’s son, Han Kyu-yong, claimed 
all of the couple’s property. When Han sold off 400 majigi of the land, Yi sued to 
reclaim it. Yi argued that the land was her separate property. “Separate property” 
was a Japanese Civil Code term for property owned by a wife or an adopted son-
in-law (muko yōshi). The term was used to protect a designated property from the 
household head. While the household head retained management rights over the 
property, the wife of the adoptee could reclaim the property in case of a divorce or 
the severance of adoption ties (p’ayang). Thus, the assumption was that a house-
hold head held exclusive ownership of a household’s property unless it was spe-
cially designated as “separate.”
Yi argued that, since it was her business, the money she earned from it was hers 
and so was the land that she had bought with that money. To support her case, she 
provided two witnesses who testified that they had indeed sold the land to her. The 
defendants did not deny that it was Yi who had bought the land, but they argued 
that she merely had been acting on behalf of her husband, who had been sick for 
many years. They had many witnesses testify that Han Che-uk had, indeed, been 
ill for many years and thus incapable of handling the legal transactions of business. 
From the local to the High Court, all the courts acknowledged the defendants’ 
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argument. The High Court stated that “it was rare for Korean women to have a 
separate property [tokuyū zaisan] between 1898 and 1902.” Since it was assumed 
that “separate property” was a rare designation in Korea, the burden fell on Yi to 
prove otherwise. Ultimately, the fact that Han was sick and probably needed a 
proxy to carry out his legal transactions tipped the scale against her. Ironically, 
for the reason that her husband was too weak to carry out his own business, Yi 
Pogwanghwa was denied all ownership of the property.
A few years later Yi came back before the courts with another case. In the sec-
ond set of lawsuits, which came to the High Court on February 16, 1917, Yi was 
once again entangled in a dispute over the ownership of a piece of land. The defen-
dants, headed by Han Kyu-yong, had won a case at the appellate court by arguing 
that all of the couple’s wealth was generated from the initial capital provided by 
Han Che-uk to Yi’s business. Therefore, the land belonged solely to Han Che-uk, 
which, in turn, made Han Kyu-yong the sole legitimate heir. In an effort to tarnish 
Yi’s reputation, Han Kyu-yong and the other defendants provided seedy details of 
Yi’s life. Before meeting Han Che-uk, she had been married to three other men, 
and before coming to live with Han, she had been poor and working as a laborer 
in an oil factory.
In response, Yi argued that it was Korean custom for a concubine to keep the 
profits from her business as separate property. After examining the evidence, the 
High Court concluded that Yi’s contribution to the business alone made her eli-
gible to become the owner of the land.
The judge stated,
In Korea, when a wife or a concubine cohabits with the husband, any nondesignated 
[i.e., separate] property should be presumed to be the husband’s. But this is only a 
presumption, [reserved] only [for cases] when the ownership is unclear. When a wife 
or concubine, while cohabiting with the husband, purchases a property with the profit 
earned from her own business, she should be given ownership of this property. The 
previous decision [of the High Court, referring to the case discussed earlier] states 
only that it is rare for women in Korea between 1898 and 1902 to have separate proper-
ty; it does not deny [the possibility] for a wife or concubine to have separate property.68
The fact that Han Che-uk was sick and unable to contribute to the business now 
became the basis for legitimizing Yi’s ownership of the property and wealth. The 
High Court also dismissed the appeals court’s argument that cohabiting with her 
husband automatically gave the husband ownership of Yi’s profits and wealth. That 
is, cohabitation did not automatically rule out the possibility of separate property.
In these two cases, Yi Pogwanghwa challenged the definition of concubine that 
the colonial state and the plaintiffs were trying to impose on her and proactively 
redefined her own status as a concubine. She resisted the plaintiffs’ strategy of 
using her status as a concubine to slight her moral character. And even though the 
colonial court tried to suppress her identity as a concubine and treat her as a wife, 
92    chapter 4
Yi reclaimed the meaning of concubinage and embraced her ambiguous position 
in the family. Although her claim over the property was not granted through vali-
dation of her claims to the special customary rights of a concubine, the High Court 
judges clearly seem to have acknowledged Yi’s contribution to the accumulation of 
property. By ignoring, or bypassing, Yi’s claim to the special customary rights of a 
concubine and treating her rather as a wife with separate property rights, the High 
Court ended up serving two objectives at once: it delivered justice (by acknowl-
edging rights to what it saw as a rightful owner of the property), and it successfully 
ignored a backward custom that the colonial government was trying to phase out. 
Yet what eventually happened was a strengthening of household-head rights, since 
the concept of separate property could exist only in the context of the monopoly 
rights of the household head over household property.
In light of the 1933 case, the proactive voice for independent economic rights 
in the 1917 case is striking. The love and companionship cited in the former pre-
sumed economic dependence on the male partner (or husband), thus aligning 
with the colonial household system more than challenging it. A household system 
where economic rights were ideally concentrated in the hands of the household 
head required that other members of the household lack economic rights. One 
perverse consequence was that a wife’s gainful employment (against the husband’s 
will) could be used against her in divorce lawsuits. In a 1931 divorce case, the hus-
band cited the wife’s gainful employment outside of the home as evidence of her 
intention to abandon him. The wife, on the other hand, forcefully defended her 
employment as a necessary last resort, since her husband had evicted her from 
their home.69 The wife eventually won the case and succeeded in obtaining alimony.
Exclusive economic rights did not always work in favor of the husband, how-
ever, as they also meant that the husband household head had the obligation to 
financially support family members. Wives could, and did, utilize this legal tenet 
to their advantage, citing their economic incompetence to sue their estranged or 
ex-husbands for economic support.70 Behind the growing attraction of compan-
ionate marriage were the harsh socioeconomic conditions of colonial Korea. It was 
not only cultural expectations that kept women from employment; the Korean 
economy provided little opportunities for women to achieve economic indepen-
dence through employment. Although there exists only limited data about the 
rate and conditions of Korean employment in this era, we can still deduce some 
conclusions about the prospects for economic independence for women in colo-
nial Korea.
According to a Tonga Ilbo report describing how well the Keijō Job Agency 
(Kyŏngsŏng Chigŏp Sogaeso) did in the month of March 1929, the largest mar-
ket for Korean female workers in Kyŏngsŏng (Japanese: Keijō, i.e., Seoul) was as 
domestic labor for Japanese households: omani, who worked as nannies or house-
keepers.71 Of successful female employment seekers, 119 out of 121 were employed 
in such a capacity. These were the fortunate few who found employment, as 
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opposed to the 343 women who were not successful. The situation for male 
employment seekers was even more bleak: only 74 out of 298 were successful in 
finding work.72 Some people criticized unemployed women as “lazy free-riders” 
(nolgo mŏngnŭn saram) and blamed the “family system” (kajŏng chedo) for this 
phenomenon.73 Articles from the journal Sin Yŏsŏng also affirm that educated 
women as well had limited career options. A statistical chart from the journal 
shows that while some became teachers, the majority failed to move onto gain-
ful employment.74 Until 1925 Korea lacked tertiary-level schooling for women, 
and any woman who wanted to continue education after secondary school had to 
travel abroad to Japan or other foreign countries. An accompanying article in the 
journal lists letters from students who lamented their postgraduation prospects; 
many wanted to continue education but lacked adequate funds. Most students 
complained about the pressure to marry they were receiving from their par-
ents. Another article listed messages of encouragement from school principals; 
however, their exhortations to young women to continue learning and lead an 
enlightened life rang hollow in light of the desperation expressed by some of the 
female students.75
With limited prospects for economic independence, the choices for most 
women were restricted to finding a suitable spouse. Yet even these limited aspira-
tions hit an impasse in the socioeconomic conditions of colonial Korean society. 
Its underlying economic structure, in addition to the post–World War I eco-
nomic downturn, allowed for few male white-collar workers who could function 
as breadwinners for the idealized home. Also, the old custom of early marriage 
meant that there were only minuscule numbers of eligible bachelors by the time 
educated women were looking for partners. In such predicaments concubinage 
may have emerged as a viable option for educated women to acquire a compatible 
male partner. Behind the prominent and tenacious practice of concubinage existed 
the intricate workings of the colonial legal system, where women were disciplined 
into the household system as emotional companions and economic dependents.
The trend toward emphasizing emotional companionship in a conjugal rela-
tionship easily transitioned into an expedient wartime emphasis on conjugal ties 
throughout the Japanese Empire. As war continued after 1931, the ideal of “good 
wife, wise mother” (ryōsai kenbo) took on added importance as the state tried to 
strengthen women’s ideological role on the home front.76 In addition, conjugal ties 
as expressed through closer sexual relationships also were emphasized to buttress 
the state’s pronatalist policy.77 One could argue that the affective conjugal ideal 
that captured the minds of the educated, urban Koreans during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s provided a convenient tool for mobilizing these Koreans to support the 
wartime family ideal of the 1940s.78 The conjugal-family ideal functioned as a con-
venient mode of familial relationship that encompassed both Korean desires for 
family-customs reform and the colonial state’s desire for family-law assimilation. 
The “age of love” was in fact a palatable facade of the age of assimilation.
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C ONCLUSION
Through the lens of the legal discourse surrounding concubinage and monogamy, 
I have examined how the language of companionate love influenced a redefinition 
of legitimate conjugal relationships in the 1920s and 1930s. The hegemonic power 
of affective discourse in legal and cultural definitions of conjugal relationships, 
I argue, was a crucial component in the implementation of the colonial house-
hold system and played an important role in mobilizing the colonized population 
toward the successful implementation of legal assimilation and social reform. The 
ways in which the ideal of conjugal love facilitated legal assimilation in colonial 
Korea thus challenges the existing understanding of the conjugal-family ideal in 
colonial Korea, as well as in the Japanese Empire as a whole. While many have 
understood the conjugal family, or home (katei), to be antithetical to the Japanese 
family system, I argue, rather, that in the context of colonial Korea, the desire to 
realize the conjugal-family ideal was readily mobilized to support the transplanta-
tion of the family system then current in the Japanese metropole to the Korean 
colony through assimilation of its family laws. Some Koreans, particularly those 
in urban areas, accepted the expansion of the Japanese Civil Code to Korea as a 
useful means to reform family customs that they themselves had come to believe 
were backward and undesirable, such as early marriage and concubinage. Legal 
assimilation in family matters was one of the few means possible for Koreans to 
break out of the discriminatory separate legal spheres during colonial rule. The 
increasing aspiration among some Koreans to enjoy the conjugal ideal appears 
to have generated colonial consent for assimilationist measures promoted by the 
Japanese authorities.
In the process of the assimilation of family laws in colonial Korea, another 
significant process was taking place, namely, the “affectivization” of the female 
spouse. The more the ideal of the conjugal family gained ground in the cultural 
discourse, the more emphasized was the role of the affective companionship of the 
female spouse in the legal discourse. This had a somewhat perverse effect, as we 
have seen, for as concubines became more like wives and thus part of this affectiv-
ization process, they lost independent economic rights.
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Consolidating the Household across the 
1945 Divide
In 1952 a draft of the Family and Inheritance Law section of the new Civil Code 
of the Republic of Korea was unveiled. The new Civil Code was to replace the 
Borrowed Civil Code (Ŭiyong Minpŏp), the colonial civil laws from the Japanese 
colonial era, the use of which had been prolonged because of the Korean War 
(1950–53), which had broken out before a new Civil Code was fully prepared. The 
1952 draft prompted an acute debate between those who wanted to reclaim what 
they considered Korean traditions from alleged “Japanese distortion” and those 
who saw an opportunity to push Koreans toward progress and gender equality. 
Chang Hwa-sun was one of those who were disappointed with the lack of a pro-
vision for daughter’s inheritance in the draft Civil Code. She argued, “When a 
household head dies, leaving behind inheritance, no matter how smart and fine a 
daughter he has, just because she is a daughter . . . the widow has forced on her a 
distant nephew [as adopted heir] just because he is of the same lineage [tongsŏng 
tongbon], and he inherits the family’s household headship and property; this leads 
to contradictions in the love between parent and child, and strife and competition 
between kin.”1
The resonance of Chang’s statement with colonial-period rhetoric is striking: in 
fact, it repeats the colonial-era logic that criticized the Korean custom of agnatic 
adoption, which we examined in chapter 3, almost to the letter. This is not surprising, 
considering that Chang was a public intellectual active during wartime. Having been 
educated in Japan in the early 1930s, she frequently appeared in newspapers and on 
the radio, lecturing on various family matters such as how to best manage a simple 
and frugal household during wartime.2 Repeating the colonial-period rhetoric about 
a daughter’s inheritance, feminists like Chang argued that the new Civil Code of 
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South Korea should install son-in-law adoption (sŏyangja ibyang) as a way to give 
daughters inheritance rights. Many other commentators, however, considered son-
in-law adoption one of the most egregious examples of the “Japanese distortion” of 
Korean family customs. After much debate, and albeit with significant compromises, 
son-in-law adoption was installed in the final draft of the Korean Civil Code.
As this example illustrates, there was a striking continuity between wartime and 
postcolonial reform discourses. Even though there was a strong public renunciation 
of “Japanese color” (woesaek) in the immediate postcolonial years in South Korea, 
the influence of colonial rhetoric nonetheless cast a long shadow in the Korean 
reform discourses of the postcolonial era. The legacy was strongest in the particu-
lar reform direction toward creating small families and replacing agnatic kin with 
daughters as backup heirs, both steps pretty much in line with the family system 
that the Japanese had been trying to institute in Korea. In other words, postcolonial 
reforms, while assuming the facade of “anticolonial cleanup,” very much continued 
to be framed in the colonial rhetoric of reform; it can also be said that the family-
reform program that began in the colonial period continued its course in the post-
colonial period. What is different in the postcolonial years is that the proponents of 
lineage interests found a stronger voice as the representatives of “tradition” and thus 
were able to modify key features of the colonial household system. The result was a 
hybrid of the two family systems, in which Korean families had to comply with the 
doubly constrictive demands of small families and lineage interests. To understand 
this trajectory of reform discourses, we need to reexamine the 1940s, which in most 
previous scholarship has simply been set aside as a “period of darkness [amhŭkki],” 
a time of forced assimilation and national annihilation. How did the reform dis-
courses of the 1920s and 1930s develop through the 1940s and reemerge in 1950s 
South Korea? And how did this continuity influence Korea’s postcolonial reforms?
THE 1940 CIVIL ORDINANCES
The 1940s opened with new Civil Ordinances for Korea, which took effect on 
February 11, 1940. The date was Foundation Day (Kigensetsu), celebrated to 
honor the enthronement of the first mythical emperor of Japan and thus chosen 
to symbolize a new beginning for Koreans as Japanese imperial subjects.3 Gov. 
Gen. Minami Jiro, in the pamphlet Shi seido no kaisetsu: Shi towa nanika, ikani 
shite sadameruka [Explanation on the (Japanese-style) surname system: What is 
a surname; how does one choose it?], explained the significance of that particular 
new policy as the last step in realizing Japan-Korea unity (naisen ittai).4 As I have 
noted before, the assimilation of family laws, and thus the facilitation of marriage 
and adoption among Koreans and Japanese, was considered a critical component 
in achieving empire-wide unity.5
The 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform implemented two key measures: the Name-
Change Policy and the lifting of the ban on nonagnatic adoption in Korea, which 
enabled son-in-law adoption (muko yōshi). Of these two measures, the Name-Change 
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Policy has received more popular attention and been understood as the quintes-
sential emblem of the forced assimilation policies designed to recreate Koreans as 
“(Japanese) imperial subjects” (kōminka seisaku). Under the policy Koreans had six 
months to report their new household names. The response rate was very low at first, 
but by the end of the six months, about three million households, approximately 80 
percent of the total number of households, had reported new names. Even if one did 
not report a new Japanese-style (i.e., two-character) surname, all Korean surnames 
became household names after the designated six-month term.6
Scholarly understanding of the 1940 reform has focused on cultural assimilation 
aimed at obliterating Korean national identity (minjok malsal). Understanding the 
1940 Civil Ordinances as an essential part of the forced assimilation policy that 
sought to make Koreans into imperial subjects, Miyata Setsuko interprets the 
Name-Change Policy as a policy to erase distinctions between the Koreans and 
the Japanese to facilitate their blending in with Japanese soldiers in the military.7 
With an increasing number of casualties since the war with China began in 1937, 
the Japanese faced an imminent need to conscript Koreans into the Japanese 
 military. There were several roadblocks to such plans because of the status of colo-
nial Korean subjects within the empire: one was that Koreans lacked representa-
tion in the Japanese diet, and another was that they were considered not integrated 
enough with the Japanese to function seamlessly in a single military unit. Suspect 
loyalty among colonial subjects was another glaring problem. The late 1930s, 
therefore, saw a series of legal reforms to incorporate Koreans into the fabric of 
the Japanese Empire that culminated in the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform.
Yet while the Name-Change Policy was part of the wartime assimilation policy 
to facilitate the mobilization of colonized Koreans, both literally and ideologi-
cally, the policy was not necessarily designed to achieve the erasure of distinctions 
between Koreans and Japanese, but rather to impose integration of the former to the 
latter. Historian Yang T’ae-ho has pointed out that surname politics had a tradition 
reaching into the ancient history of Japan, when surnames were important tools 
for incorporating new subjects into the imperial political structure. Conferring 
Japanese-style surnames on foreign immigrants was a practice from the era of the 
Yamato court to the Meiji period, when the emperor conferred new surnames on 
the Ainu and Okinawan peoples.8 Many Koreans, therefore, perceived the new 
Civil Ordinances as a measure of drastic assimilation, but also one with the poten-
tial to promote inclusion of Koreans in the Japanese Empire and equality between 
Koreans and Japanese. Takashi Fujitani has emphasized the potentially powerful 
equalizing effects of a forceful assimilation policy, which only a desperate war situ-
ation could propel. Fujitani argues that the various wartime policies that Japanese 
deployed to assimilate Koreans into the Japanese nation were not aimed at making 
them indistinguishable from Japanese but rather at including them, albeit with 
distinctions along racial lines, into an “enlarged concept of the Japanese nation.”9
The 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform, therefore, was aimed at facilitating the 
integration of Koreans into the Japanese Empire, all the while maintaining the 
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distinctions between Koreans and Japanese. Given a policy that, in effect, served to 
maintain Korean differences, family laws continued to function as the arena in which 
differences were articulated. Korean families were again placed in the forever “wait-
ing room,” where they were always on the path to progress, which was always equated 
with the family customs of Japan. The particular traits that were Japanese and pro-
moted as universally progressive were the small family as realized in the household 
system structured by the household registry (koseki).10 This was increasingly so in 
wartime, when Japan was trying to break away from the Western norm and push its 
own path to “modernity.” As a result of maintaining the difference between Korean 
and Japanese family customs, the 1940s was also the time when certain unique (or 
allegedly unique) traits of Korean family customs became fossilized and naturalized 
into “tradition.” The postcolonial trajectory of family-law reform was shaped by these 
two discursive forces that emerged in the 1940s that naturalized the following aspects 
of the Korean family: nuclearization and the particular Korean custom of inheritance.
In the following section, I examine the reform discourses on the Korean family 
and family laws in the 1940s, which continued to produce Korea-specific reform 
plans that hovered around expanding daughters’ inheritance rights and weak-
ening widow rights. This direction of reforms was promoted not as particularly 
Japanese but as a natural trend toward universal progress, made better thanks 
to the Japanese modifications designed to protect the family community and to 
impede the harms of Western individualism. These reform discourses in colonial 
Korea, which shared great commonality with wartime Japanese discourses, ended 
up shaping postcolonial legal reforms in South Korea to a surprising degree. The 
conflation of specific reforms in the 1940 Civil Ordinances with the inevitable 
transition toward the small, modern family continued to shape postcolonial legal 
reforms. The result was that the reforms for expanding women’s rights centered 
around the issue of son-in-law adoption even after 1945.
RESPONSE FROM THE MARGINS
The impact of the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform did not reach all Koreans in the 
same way, nor to the same degree. In other words, the experience of the 1940 reform 
cannot be neatly contained in one national or nationalist narrative. One case aptly 
illustrates how surname customs were not uniformly practiced by all Koreans and 
how the Name-Change Policy thus affected Koreans differently. The case, from 1942, 
concerned a eunuch family that tried to adopt an heir to continue the  ancestral rites.11 
As eunuchs could not procreate, the long-standing practice was to adopt young boys 
from poor families to pass down their occupation as well as the responsibility of 
ancestral rites.12 Since the Office of Eunuchs (Naesibu) was abolished during the 
Kabo Reforms, no new eunuchs were appointed to palatial positions, but existing 
eunuchs stayed in the palace and continued to serve the royal family.13 But when this 
particular family decided to adopt an heir in 1923, the family learned to their surprise 
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that the adoption would not be acknowledged. The reason was that, according to the 
Japanese-instituted Civil Ordinances, the eunuch family had to follow the Korean 
custom of adoption, which banned nonagnatic adoption. The colonial government 
allowed no provisions for exceptional cases such as eunuchs. Same-surname adop-
tion, it was decided, was the only recognized norm for Koreans. The eunuch family 
could not register their adoption. Nonetheless, they took in the intended adoptee, 
Sun-bong, who was three years old at the time, and brought him up in the family.
When the Name-Change Policy lifted the ban on different-surname adoption, 
the eunuch family jumped at the opportunity. But just as the adoption arrange-
ment was underway, Sun-bong’s adoptive father to be, Hong Pong-gŭn, died 
unexpectedly, on March 29, 1940. Even with the 1940 reform, different-surname 
adoption was not allowed for posthumous adoption (sahu yangja). Regardless, 
Oh Kŭng-hwa, Hong Pong-gŭn’s adoptive great-grandfather and the household 
head, proceeded to register the adoption with the local office on October 30, 1940. 
Kŭng-hwa’s daughter-in-law, Pok-dong, was not happy with this arrangement. If 
it were not for Sun-bong, now with the Japanese given name of Nagayoshi, she 
would have been next in line for household-head succession as the ch’ongbu, 
eldest daughter-in-law of the family. When Kŭng-hwa passed away soon after, 
and Nagayoshi succeeded to the household headship, Pok-dong sued Nagayoshi 
and his adoptive mother and daughter-in-law for arranging an illegitimate adop-
tion. In her statement she argued, “the plaintiff has the obligation to protect the 
Harashiro family and continue the household name.” Oddly, for a daughter-in-law 
of a eunuch family, Pok-dong seems to have fully embraced the custom of same-
surname adoption. Nagayoshi and other defendants protested that it was nonsense 
to annul the adoption on the grounds of different surnames, when, in fact, all heirs 
of the family had been adoptees of different surnames for generations.
In the end, the Chōsen High Court ruled in favor of the adoptee, Nagayoshi. 
The court produced a convoluted explanation that since the Harashiros were 
an exception to the custom of adoption in Korea, legitimate adoption for them 
could be achieved by adopting from families that shared surnames with any of the 
adopted ancestors. Nagayoshi, by the original name of Yi Sun-bong, coincidentally 
shared the same surname and lineage seat (Chŏnju Yi-ssi) with his adoptive great-
great-grandfather. One suspects that the judges at the courts worked out this far-
fetched explanation to protect the adoptee from what they considered an arbitrary 
accusation on the part of the adoptive grandmother, Pok-dong.
The Name-Change Policy, it can be said, involved a redefinition and reeduca-
tion of what surnames meant in Korea. The policy was not simply about taking a 
Japanese-style surname with two Chinese characters instead of the more common 
Korean-style surname with one character. Numerous explanatory essays were 
published in Japanese and Korean at the time to explain the difference between 
Korean surnames (K: sŏng; J: sei) and Japanese household names (shi). The writ-
ers explained that Korean surnames signified the name of a lineage, while the 
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Japanese shi signified the name of a household. This was a distinction fabricated 
in 1940 because sei and shi had been used interchangeably until that point.14 With 
the existing understanding that the lineage system was of the past, and the house-
hold system was of the future, the Name-Change Policy thus could be depicted as 
a policy of progress in the family system. In his pamphlet Gov. Gen. Minami Jirō, 
indeed, explained that, as times advanced, it was more fit for members of Korean 
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(b. 1920)
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Figure 8. A diagram of the Yi Sun-bong case.
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households to have names to designate their household.15 Both the Japanese and 
Korean authorities explained the new policy as “adding a household name [shi] to 
the lineage name [sei].” In fact, Korean surnames were kept in the household regis-
ters, and the new household names (Japanese sounding or otherwise) were added 
to the existing surnames.16 In a legal sense, then, it meant choosing a name for the 
household in addition to (not in place of) the Korean surname.
The Japanese household name also was meant to be shared by all members of 
the household, which had not been the custom for Koreans. Since all Koreans had 
to have a household name, regardless of whether or not they reported a “Japanese 
style surname,” all household members ended up bearing the same household 
name after the Name-Change Policy. This had its most visible impact on mar-
ried women who hitherto had customarily kept their maiden names. Regardless of 
whether or not the household chose a new surname, maiden names of married-in 
women were erased. Helen Kim (aka Kim Hwa-lan), the famous New Woman of 
Korea and the principal of the Ewha Womans School at the time, pointed to this 
Figure 9. An example of 
name-change documenta-
tion. After a name change the 
original Korean surname would 
be crossed out but remain 
visible in the registry. Chōsen 
Sōtokufu Hōmukyoku, Genkō 
chōsen koseki hōreishū [Col-
lection of current household 
registration laws in Korea] 
(Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Koseki 
Kyōkai, 1942), 195.
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change as a positive one that elevated the married woman’s status from that of a 
child following her father’s surname to an equal partner sharing her husband’s sur-
name: “One should appreciate this from the perspective of harmony of the home.”17
Helen Kim herself took the Name-Change Policy as an opportunity to define her 
own identity through her choice of a new Japanese surname, “Amagi,” instead of 
the name that members of her lineage decided to all take, “Kane’umi” (K: Kimhae), 
after the name of their lineage seat. Such collective selection of new household 
names by lineage groups was discouraged by the colonial state and regarded by 
Koreans as a way of resistance.18 The name she chose, Amagi, was more appealing 
to her because the Chinese characters of the name meant “heaven,” a meaning-
ful representation of her Christian identity.19 The 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform 
allowing—even encouraging—each household head to choose a separate house-
hold name independent of the larger lineage enabled Helen Kim and her mother, 
who was a widowed household head, to choose a different name from the relatives 
of her father’s lineage. Such a move was not one of the intended outcomes of the 
1940 reform and, arguably, despite Kim’s contention, a woman more commonly 
lost a piece of her identity when she was forced to replace her maiden name with 
her husband’s name. The case of Helen Kim, nonetheless, shows that some women 
were able to use the Name-Change Policy to express their independence from the 
patriarchal family order. Kim’s case also can be seen as an outgrowth or continu-
ation of discursive trends from decades prior. Kim’s feminist appropriation of the 
new Civil Ordinances was not merely a single anomaly but a product and reflec-
tion of the long strand of thoughts developing since the 1920s that framed changes 
in inheritance rights in the colonial household system as an expansion of women’s 
rights.
Helen Kim’s ability to turn the Name-Change Policy to her purposes, however, 
evidences the fact that, despite the apparently benign explanations of officials, the 
main objective of the Name-Change Policy was to starkly render the distinction 
of the household from the lineage rather than simply making Korean surnames 
similar to those of Japanese. In fact, Government General pamphlets recom-
mended that Koreans not take existing Japanese names but instead invent their 
own based on the names of their hometown or lineage seat.20 While the Japanese 
had to keep their main family’s household name when they divided the house 
(bunke), that is, established a separate household, each household in Korea was 
encouraged to choose its own name, possibly and preferably different from that of 
the main branch of the family. It was emphasized that the new surname in Korea 
was a signifier for the household and not the lineage. Historian Yang T’ae-ho has 
pointed out that, although the fears of genealogy extinction felt by some Koreans 
about the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform—such as that a family’s genealogy record 
would be abolished—were inaccurate about the policy itself, they were insightful 
about the potential harm the Name-Change Policy would have on the lineage.21 
The Name-Change Policy was therefore much larger than an issue of names; it was 
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in fact an attempt at structural transformation of the Korean family system itself, a 
“Japanification of the family system [kazoku seido no nihonka].”22
REFORM DISC OURSES IN THE 1940S
Exceptional responses to the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform illustrate that the 
impact of the reform cannot be simplified to one result or another. Likewise, the 
variations among intentions, expectations, and consequences cannot be reduced 
to simple formulae. The potential for positive benefits of inclusion by way of 
assimilation was not lost on Koreans and led many cultural nationalists to turn 
to vociferous support for assimilation measures. Yi Kwang-su, one of the most 
famous of these cultural nationalists, explained his choice to take a Japanese name 
with the logic that Koreans would someday achieve equality of status within the 
Japanese Empire.23 Yet efforts to maintain the distinction and differences between 
Koreans and Japanese continued after 1940. As noted, anxiety about diminishing 
differences between Koreans and Japanese led the Japanese colonial government 
to discourage Koreans from choosing existing Japanese names.24 When Koreans, 
as encouraged, created new names from the names of their hometowns or their 
professions, the resulting names were easily distinguishable from Japanese names. 
Even without such easily distinguishable names, Koreans were kept separate legally 
from the Japanese through the separation of household registers. Continued 
demands (both from Koreans and from Japanese residing in colonial territories) to 
allow people to move their “original place of registry” (honseki) to different territo-
ries of the Japanese Empire were denied, thereby effectively making the distinction 
between the Japanese and the colonial populations permanent.25
Moreover, information about legal, cultural, and customary differences 
between Japanese and Koreans was continuously disseminated even after the Civil-
Ordinances Reform supposedly boosted Korean assimilation. In the early 1940s 
legal journals in colonial Korea were inundated with articles offering an overview 
of the history of Korean legal reforms and the differences between the Korean 
and Japanese legal systems. These articles did more than merely address practi-
cal issues about how to treat specific legal matters. As a group, the articles also 
established narratives about the transformation of family laws in colonial Korea, 
the nature of the unique customs that remained, what these remaining unique 
customs said about the nature of Korean society, and how the Japanese colonial 
rulers—or the writers themselves, as legal authorities in the colony—were to man-
age this colonial difference. In other words, rather than erasing the differences 
between Korea and Japan, the so-called forced assimilation of 1940 perpetuated 
the differences that still remained and their legal significance. In these articles two 
major differences emerge in striking relief: the lack of daughters’ inheritance rights 
and the continuing inheritance rights of widows in Korea. The bias against daugh-
ter’s inheritance rights was written into the lineage laws, and partial reforms in the 
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inheritance custom were not enough to change that. But, more significant, we see 
in the 1940s that legal specialists in colonial Korea clearly were approaching this 
problem of difference (failure of assimilation) less as a temporal problem, that is, a 
problem owing to Korea’s place in the singular trajectory of progress, but more as a 
matter of local variances that the colonial legal authorities must manage. Through 
these discourses that highlighted Korean differences, in other words, the Korean 
customs based on the lineage system became further fossilized as unique Korean 
traits, and their longevity ironically was strengthened.
Utilizing his extended expertise in family matters, Nomura Chōtarō continued 
to publish on the characteristics of the Korean lineage system and explained for 
his readers the continuing differences in Korean family customs that needed to be 
attended to in adjudicating family cases in Korea. In several articles published after 
1940, Nomura expounded on the differences between Korean family law and the 
Japanese Civil Code, focusing on matters of family laws such as adoption, lineage 
property, and inheritance. In a 1941 article Nomura focused on Korean inheri-
tance customs, explaining how the Korean concept of inheritance required lineage 
membership and followed the laws of ancestral rites inheritance (K: chesa sangsok; 
J: saishi sōzoku). Emphasizing to readers that these differences remained after the 
1940 reform, Nomura slightly shifted his previous position from the 1920s and 
the 1930s on reforming ancestor-veneration inheritance. He maintained the posi-
tion that there should be only two kinds of inheritance in Korea—household-head 
and property inheritance, just as in the Japanese Civil Code—but now argued that 
Korea should use the laws of ancestral rites inheritance from the traditional Korean 
laws of lineage (chongpŏp) as the substantial laws for household-head inheritance 
among Koreans. At the end of the article, Nomura explained his reasoning: he 
noted that the division between household-head inheritance and ancestral rites 
inheritance, which was utilized only when widows became household heads, had 
created much confusion over the rights of the widowed household heads and had 
led to much conflict among kin. Nomura noted that even though after the 1940 
reform the women of the family (i.e., married-in women) came to also use the 
same family name, lineage laws that excluded widows from full inheritance still 
stood. To diminish the confusion and conflicts, Nomura suggested that widow 
inheritance be given a different term than “inheritance.”26 In this new age after 
1940, Nomura seems to have approached the enterprise of family-law reform as a 
reform not toward progress but as a practical adjustment to diminish conflict and 
simplify adjudication processes.27 In his view established customs such as lineage 
laws were to be respected and maintained, and customs less central, such as widow 
rights, were to be disposed.28
Not everyone thought that Korean widow rights were necessarily a backward 
custom. In “Chōsen ni okeru kafu no sōzokuken [Widows’ inheritance rights in 
Korea],” Judge Yama’uchi Toshihiko compared the difference between widows’ 
rights in Korea and Japan and tried to explain them in terms of the different 
106    chapter 5
degrees of belief in communal property rights in the two countries.29 Unlike many 
other writers, such as Asami Rintarō, discussed in chapter 3, Yama’uchi argued 
that strong widow rights and the power of testimony in deciding the heir or heir-
adoptee in Korean customs proved that Korea had a more individualistic take on 
property ownership. In contrast, weak widow rights in the Japanese Civil Code 
showed that Japanese property ownership had a stronger foundation in commu-
nal ownership. Of course, by the height of wartime in 1940, individualism was no 
longer a prized marker of progress but a marker of Western modernity that was to 
be overcome by the traditional virtue of Japanese communalism.
The son-in-law adoptions that became possible in Korea in 1940 also were the 
focus of detailed analyses of Korean and Japanese differences. In a serialized essay 
titled “Chōsen minjirei ni okeru muko-yōshi ni tsuite [On son-in-law adoption 
according to Korean Civil Ordinances],” the head of the Civil Affairs Section in 
the Legal Division, Iwajima Hajime, gave an overview of son-in-law adoption in 
colonial Korea and laid out the differences between son-in-law adoption in Korea 
and Japan.30 He noted that, unlike in Japan, an adopted son-in-law in Korea was 
the presumed heir of the house. In Japan the adopted son-in-law’s access to inheri-
tance was determined by his wife’s inheritance status. Therefore, if a natural son 
is born to the parents after the adoption, in Japan the adopted son-in-law lost 
his heir status, whereas in Korea the adopted son-in-law still had top priority to 
become the heir. This, the author explained, was owing to the difference in adop-
tion customs between Korea and Japan: adoption in Korea was limited only to 
adopting an heir, and therefore the adopted son-in-law was “adopted as heir.” In 
contradiction to all the talk at the time about son-in-law adoption expanding a 
daughter’s inheritance rights, he added that the Japanese custom of equating the 
adopted son-in-law’s status to heirship with the daughter’s did not make sense in 
Korea, where daughters did not have the right to inherit the household headship. 
The author’s purpose in citing the difference was less about casting Korean cus-
toms in a negative light than about emphasizing the benefits of such customs. The 
author, for example, noted that Korean son-in-law adoption solved the Japanese 
problem of the insecure status of adopted sons-in-law. But the author made clear 
that the lack of daughters’ inheritance rights in Korea was a problem that needed 
to be reformed. Other differences as well, such as the ban on intralineage marriage, 
he presented in a negative light and in immediate need of reform.
Other unique customs that persisted in Korea also were topics of scholarly 
attention. In “Dōsei dōhon fukon [The ban on intralineage marriage],” Korean 
ethnologist Chang Sŭng-du examined the history of the Korean ban on marry-
ing within the same lineage seat and same lineage. After recounting a long list 
of examples of such a ban from historical texts dating back to the History of the 
Wei Dynasty (Weizhi) and the Three Kingdoms period (first century BCE to sixth 
century CE), Chang concluded with the observation that, despite the long ban, 
there were cases where Koreans had married within the lineage. Citing one survey, 
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Chang compared numbers from urban and rural areas, showing that the number 
of marriages within the lineage was higher in urban areas. This, Chang argued, 
showed that rural areas were more beholden to the old customs. The underlying 
assumption, of course, was that the old custom of banning marriage within the 
lineage was backward and irrational and that more enlightened urban residents 
had managed to free themselves of it.31
The works published in the short period between the 1940 Civil-Ordinances 
Reform and the end of colonial rule in 1945 continued to produce knowledge 
about Japanese and Korean differences. These pieces of knowledge, as they were 
not necessarily marked as “Japanese” per se, continued to be disseminated without 
much alarm in the postcolonial years. The fact that the same Korean scholars, as 
the few experts on family law in the postwar years, continued to produce similar 
works did not help to create a clean slate for debates on family customs. Indeed, 
the long legacy of their works directly influenced the writing of the 1960 Civil 
Code in South Korea.
THE WRITING OF THE NEW CIVIL C ODE
When Japan, after its surrender, relinquished all of its former colonies, the United 
States and the Soviet Union separated the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-
eighth parallel and began the demilitarization process. On the northern side the 
Soviet Union immediately annulled all Japanese colonial laws. On the south-
ern side, in contrast, the United States annulled only a portion of the Japanese 
laws. On October 23, 1946, the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform was repealed by 
U.S. military government’s Ordinance 122. Japanese-style names that came into 
effect through the Name-Change Policy were nullified, and all Korean names were 
changed back to their original forms.32 Those who wanted to retain their Japanese 
names needed to make a special request to the authorities within sixteen days. As 
one of the first reform measures undertaken by the U.S. military government, the 
repeal of the Japanese-surname policy was supposed to signify a symbolic ending 
of the Japanese colonial distortion of Korean family customs and the beginning of 
decolonization in Korea.
Not all Koreans agreed that repealing the colonial Civil Ordinances in Korea 
was a good idea. Kim Tu-hŏn, in his Han’guk kajok chedo yŏngu (Research in 
the Korean family system), criticized the U.S. policy of repealing the 1940 Civil 
Ordinances. Kim argued that the repeal, while it abolished the colonial legacy, 
also did away with the positive features of the law: “The Name-Change Policy 
was not just implementing Japanese-style names; it also had an aspect of mod-
ernizing the Korean family system itself. But the [U.S. policy to repeal the law] 
did not consider this aspect at all.”33 In an earlier edition of the book, Kim noted 
that even though the Name-Change Policy was inspired by the political goal of 
assimilation, the Korean surname would eventually change from being a marker 
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of kinsmen (hyŏljok ch’ingho) to a marker of family (kajok ch’ingho), following 
the inevitable trend of lineage reduction.34 Repeating verbatim his wartime argu-
ment (see chapter 3), Kim asserted throughout the book that Korean families had 
modernized during the colonial period through a process of lineage divisions into 
smaller nuclear families. A spike in divorce rates and the expansion of women’s 
rights (which also propelled the divorce rate upward) were major and important 
factors that sped up the process. The 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform and its policy 
of household names, Kim pointed out, was another factor that divided the lineage 
into small families and strengthened the nuclear household.
Apart from the reversal of Japanese surnames, however, all of the colonial civil 
laws initially were kept intact by the U.S. military government. Ordinance 21, 
issued November 2, 1945, ordered all Japanese laws to be retained for the practical 
purpose of sustaining stability for a temporary period, but their use was unexpect-
edly prolonged because of the Korean War (1950–53). The compilation of the new 
Civil Code was delayed until 1958 and then came into effect only in 1960. Since 
Japan replaced its own prewar Civil Code with a new Civil Code in 1948, the pre-
war Japanese Civil Code had a longer life in Korea. Until the new Civil Code was 
promulgated, the Borrowed Civil Code (ŭiyong minpŏp), that is, the colonial law 
of Civil Ordinances, was used, which meant that family matters still were decided 
according to Korean customs as defined by the Japanese colonial courts. Thus, the 
end of Japanese colonial rule brought about little change in the civil-law regime in 
the immediate postwar period.35
With the delayed preparation of the new Civil Code, the effects of the Borrowed 
Civil Code continued to run long and deep. Thus, civil lawsuits over widows’ rights, 
for example, manifested striking continuity across the 1945 divide. In a case from 
1959, a widow’s right to designate an adoptee was challenged.36 The narrative of the 
litigation is now familiar to us: a male relative of the widow, backed by the family 
council (ch’injokhoe), forced an adoption agreement, arguing that the widow had 
refused to choose an heir for her deceased husband and thereby neglected her 
obligation. In this case the widow had registered some of the household prop-
erty under the name of her son from a previous marriage. The widow refused the 
adoption agreement and argued that only she had the customary right to choose 
an heir. The Supreme Court confirmed that the widow indeed had the right to 
choose an heir and just because she did not exercise her right was not sufficient 
proof that she did not have the intention to choose an heir indefinitely. The family 
council, therefore, could not designate an adoptee and force the choice on her. This 
case, even to the very details of the litigants’ arguments, was strikingly similar to 
cases from the colonial period described in chapter 3. What is also notable is the 
similarity of the format and argument of the decision made by the postliberation 
Supreme Court to that of the colonial High Court. The Borrowed Civil Code in 
fact continued to influence civil cases even after the promulgation of the new Civil 
Code, leading one legal scholar to argue for its abolition as late as 2008.37
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During the time of the new Civil Code’s preparation, public anticipation (and 
anxiety) for a major reform ran high. The so-called Japanese color was to be abol-
ished, it was said, and the tool was to be the newly codified civil law. The family 
laws in particular were considered a crucial area of decolonization. The problem 
was that despite the popular perception that postliberation South Korean society 
had a uniformly negative position against the wartime colonial civil laws, Korea in 
the immediate postliberation period was quite diversely divided over the direction 
of the new Civil Code. There was not a consensus over what elements had been 
Japanese impositions to begin with nor what to do with such a colonial legacy.
Preparation for the new Civil Code began immediately after the new constitu-
tion was promulgated in July 1948. The new constitution was based on democratic 
principles—declaring equal rights for all, including equality of the sexes—with 
which the civil laws from Japanese colonial rule were deemed incompatible. On 
September 15, 1948, the Codification Committee (Pŏpchŏn P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe) 
was formed to prepare civil, penal, and commercial laws. Legal specialists from all 
areas were sought to staff the committee.
The process of writing the laws was not smooth. Family law turned out to be 
especially divisive. Chang Kyŏng-gŭn, one of the committee members, highlighted 
the special challenges when he published the basic principles of family- and inher-
itance-law preparation in 1948: “Preparing family and inheritance laws is the most 
difficult enterprise of all law preparation, as we cannot rely on foreign laws, and 
there is no consensus among scholars and the public on whether to focus on custom 
and tradition or progress and reform.  .  .  . I have drafted the following principles 
focusing on maintaining the good and beautiful customs but effecting gradual prog-
ress by discarding those feudal evil customs that are uncivilized, illegal, and unfit for 
present times and that impede our nation from developing in step with the world.”38
The “gradual progress” that seemed to be a calm and rational approach to what 
could be a caustic and divisive matter in a still-volatile postwar environment was 
in fact a veneer over a conservative position to keep most of the laws from the 
colonial period. This was not surprising, as Chang himself was a legal specialist 
from the colonial era, a former judge at the Keijō (K: Kyŏngsŏng, i.e., Seoul) local 
and appellate courts. His understanding of the effects of the laws and their refor-
mative effects on customs was quite similar to the positions of judges’ during the 
colonial period that we have seen in previous chapters. The following statements 
sound almost the same as those by colonial-era judges and show how many of the 
ways of thinking from colonial times continued into the postliberation era.
Chang writes in the same essay,
Our current family and inheritance law . . . has its basis in the unique East Asian fam-
ily system, which is centered on not the actual communal unit of living but the larger 
family [kwangbŏmwi ŭi ka] under the strong authority of the household head [and 
maintained by] the desire to contain the community that shares common ancestral 
rites among the male agnatic kin (eldest son or grandson) and therewith continue 
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the family [ka, that is, ie in Japanese] without break. This is true to the Confucian 
rituals and teachings [yugyo ŭi yegyo sasang] and is a beautiful custom from the old 
[kore ŭi sunp’ung misok] but also is behind the times when the familial communal 
unit is transitioning from a large organization that is a production and management 
unit to the small organization of a consumption unit; from submission of the indi-
vidual to enlightenment of the individual: the strong control and management of the 
family system therefore has turned into an evil custom that impedes the growth of 
the individual [kae’in sinjang].39
Chang’s observation that the transition from large to smaller families is natural and 
inevitable was exactly the same as that made by scholars in the colonial period, in 
particular Kim Tu-hŏn and Chŏng Kwang-hyŏn. The perception led those two to 
interpret the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform, especially the Name-Change Policy, 
as an impetus toward a modern family system and a corrective to Korea’s lineage-
oriented family system. Common perceptions and characterizations of the Korean 
family system on the eve of the liberation carried on into the post-1945 moment 
and deeply influenced the direction of the postcolonial reforms of the family laws.
Multiple attempts at a consensus on a new Civil Code all went for naught with 
the outbreak of the Korean War, which led to the death or abduction of many of 
the committee members as well as the loss of the Chang draft. In the aftermath 
of the Korean War, the chair of the Codification Committee, Kim Pyŏng-ro, took 
on the task of writing new family and inheritance laws. Kim had quite a differ-
ent position from Chang’s view of “gradual progress,” which essentially meant the 
maintenance of colonial laws and sharply conflicted with Kim’s focus on entirely 
restoring the good and beautiful customs, that is, returning to the old and tra-
ditional ways. Kim himself was a traditionalist and nationalist. Even though he 
was a Japan-educated former judge and lawyer during the colonial period, he was 
famous for his work defending Korean nationalists indicted for their activities in 
pursuit of Korean independence. Many of Kim’s statements expose his strong anti-
Japanese and nationalist sentiments. His adherence to nationalism meant that he 
considered restoration of what he saw as Korean tradition more important than 
realizing the constitutional principles of gender equality. In the revised Civil Code, 
Kim’s position translated into restoring strong patriarchal rights of the household 
head, maintaining the principle of primogeniture in household-head succession, 
and abolishing son-in-law adoption.
The draft completed in 1952 drew much criticism from legal scholars as well 
as the public. Chŏng Kwang-hyŏn criticized the new draft for disregarding the 
original principles laid out in 1948. Yi T’ae-yŏng, the first female lawyer in Korea, 
criticized the draft for blatantly violating gender equality, and she began a social 
movement to repeal the proposed draft. Yi and women’s groups presented a formal 
proposal demanding various reforms, including the abolition of the household-
head system itself. They also demanded the repeal of the ban on intralineage mar-
riage. Against such demands from women’s groups, the Association of Confucian 
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Scholars (Yurim) also organized a strong movement. They fiercely defended the 
household-head system as the foundation of social order and morality. They also 
considered intralineage marriages as “barbaric acts, unthinkable for humans.”40 
Yi recounted that when she and the leaders of nine women’s organizations met 
with Kim Pyŏng-ro, he severely reprimanded them and declared that he would not 
change one dot in the draft before he was dead.
Legal experts from the colonial era who had been educated in Japan and worked 
within the legal system, such as Chang Kyŏng-gŭn and Kim Tu-hŏn, pushed for 
reforms—or to maintain the direction of reforms underway during the colonial 
period—that would ensure more equality between the sexes. Those who came of 
age after liberation, students of Chŏng Kwang-hyŏn, were more open to abolish-
ing the colonial family system altogether for more radically progressive laws. But 
it was the ardent nationalists like Kim Pyŏng-ro who were so strongly against the 
colonial legal system that they, quite ironically, left the more feminist reforms to be 
driven by the lingering rhetoric of colonial reform discourses.
When a public hearing was held for the draft Civil Code, an acute debate 
broke out between those who wanted to continue the modernizing efforts that 
the Korean legal system had been undergoing during Japanese colonial rule and 
those who sought to seize the postcolonial moment to rescind the changes that 
they  considered damaging to Korean cultural identity and to return Korea to a 
precolonial (and pure) past. Some of the hotly debated issues were “lifting the 
ban on intralineage marriage,” “lifting the ban on nonagnatic adoption,” “giving 
daughters rights to household-head inheritance,” and “allowing girls to be adopted 
(as heirs).”41 The Confucian Association castigated such moves and accused those 
who advocated them of “trying to damage the beautiful customs of our country.”42
Chŏng Kwang-hyŏn argued that the whole purpose of writing the new Civil 
Code was to have a set of civil laws that followed the principles of the new consti-
tution. Therefore, any part of the Civil-Code draft that violated the constitution 
should be abolished. He noted, “We have already implemented land reform in 
1949 to liberate tenant farmers. I cannot find any rational reason why we are not 
yet implementing laws to liberate women to ensure equality between the sexes 
and men and wives.” Lawyer Yi T’ae-yŏng argued that Koreans needed to abolish 
any family customs that violated the spirit of the constitution. During the public 
hearing she declared, “[some family customs] might appear to men as good and 
beautiful customs but from women’s perspective these customs and system could 
be [a source of] resentment bitter to the bones” [ppyŏ’e samuch’inŭn wŏnhan]; then 
this good and beautiful custom is not objectively good or beautiful.”43 The audi-
ence applauded her statement.
A record of National Assembly Committee hearings relays the high-tension 
debate over the new Civil Code. On April 8, 1957, the first public hearing for the 
official draft of the new Civil Code was held. The head of the preparation com-
mittee was traditionalist Kim Pyŏng-ro, head of the Supreme Court of Korea 
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(Tae’pŏpwon’jang), continuing his push for a restoration of Korean family tra-
ditions. In the introductory speech that he gave to the committee, Kim empha-
sized the need for the new Civil Code to restore Korean traditions, the essence of 
which was patrilineal descent groups and patriarchal hierarchy. Kim believed the 
tradition of the patrilineal descent group to be the marker of Korean superior-
ity compared to the Japanese. He denounced the demand for gender equality in 
family laws, arguing that gender equality should be sought in the society, not in 
the family.44 Kim further denounced the influence of Japanese laws during the 
colonial period that tainted the great Korean family tradition. With strong words 
he denounced the “barbaric family culture of the Japanese” that had no regard for 
patrilineal descent groups. Kim argued that patrilineal descent was not only moral 
but scientific. He also stated, “if you sought equality between parents and children, 
and husband and wife, within the family, nothing could be done. Its ill effects 
would lead to corrosion of morals and ethics and chaos in society.”45 Not all agreed. 
The strongest and most vociferous opponent to Kim was Representative Pak Yong-
jong, a Japan-educated former newspaper reporter, who pointed out that the Civil-
Code draft violated the gender-equality clause of the Korean Constitution and, in 
that regard, was inferior even to the new postwar Japanese Civil Code. He even 
claimed that gender inequality was one of the reasons why Korea was colonized by 
the Japanese in the first place.46
The new Civil Code was promulgated in 1959 and implemented in 1960. It 
ended, ostensibly, the use of the colonial civil laws that had continued after Korea’s 
liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. While the 1960 Civil Code declared 
that it implemented the principle of equality of the sexes, many of its codes fell 
short of this promise. The new Civil Code, according to some evaluations, was 
“a conciliatory law modeled on the basic principles of the old-fashioned lineage 
law system [i.e., household-head system] but with an effort to eliminate as much 
as possible those undemocratic aspects of family life that hampered individual 
 freedoms and the development of individuality.”47 The 1960 Civil Code did advance 
women’s rights on some fronts. Wives now had separate and independent prop-
erty rights from their husbands, they could sue for divorce on grounds of infidel-
ity (just as their husbands could), and they had full legal capacity in household 
affairs.48 Inheritance rights for widows were strengthened: widows now had full 
inheritance rights if there was no one else eligible for inheritance (thus, the tem-
porary provision was eliminated), and their share of inheritance was increased 
from half to equal to the amount of inheritance direct descendants were due. Yet 
other stipulations preserved the conservative slant that customary laws had in 
the colonial period. Wives could be divorced for disharmony with parents-in-law 
(article 840). Although wives had separate-property rights, any property for which 
ownership was unclear was assumed to be the husband’s (article 830, no. 2). Wives 
were required to live in the husband’s household after marriage (article 826, no. 2), 
and husbands still had the right of guardianship over wives and children (article 
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934). A husband did not need to obtain his wife’s permission to register a child 
born out of wedlock in their household register (article 782), while the wife did 
need such permission. Wives were further disadvantaged in divorce under the 
1960 Civil Code. Upon divorce, husbands had precedence over wives for parental 
rights over children (article 909). Wives did not have the right to ask for a division 
of household property, nor were they guaranteed alimony.49 These stipulations 
were codifications of the patriarchal aspects of the previous customary laws that 
strengthened household-head rights and fell well short of the principles of equality 
between individuals and sexes.
A number of these new codes in Korea were even more conservative than the 
new Japanese Civil Code. For example, while the Japanese Civil Code assumed 
common ownership by a married couple of any property that had unclear owner-
ship, the 1960 Korean Civil Code attributed such property to the husband’s owner-
ship. Also, while the Japanese Civil Code stipulated that the husband and the wife 
had shared responsibility to provide for the marital economy, the new Korean Civil 
Code assumed that the husband provided living expenses for the married couple.
Other parts of the law stipulated even fewer rights for women than during the 
colonial period. The 1960 Civil Code did not merely inherit the household system 
of the colonial period but modified it by incorporating the stronger male centricity 
of the Korean lineage laws, where all male members of the lineage were considered 
equally valuable in continuing the family line. Under the Japanese laws the main 
branch of the household and its heir, the eldest son, was privileged in inheritance. 
Therefore, the separate property of the non–household head was not protected 
as kazan, the family property, and was equally distributed among all children, 
daughters as well as sons. But in the Korean Civil Code, all property held by male 
members of the household was considered family property, and sons were privi-
leged over daughters in all property inheritance. While during the colonial period 
daughters had equal share with their brothers, in the case with the non–household 
head’s inheritance, under the 1960 Civil Code daughters were due at most half 
the share of the inheritance received by their brothers. A daughter’s share would 
be one-third that of her eldest brother, the heir to the household headship. If she 
already had married out of the household, her share shrank to one-fourth of her 
brothers’ shares. In some sense the 1960 Civil Code in Korea expanded the family-
property concept, while the colonial court had contained it by privileging the main 
line of a household over branch families. As a result, the inequality between the 
sexes was strengthened in the postcolonial household-head system in Korea com-
pared to the colonial household system.
SON-IN-L AW AD OPTION REINSTATED
Among the very few laws that did change in the immediate aftermath of 
Japan’s defeat, the most dramatic shift occurred in son-in-law adoption. Unlike 
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Japanese-style family names that were unmistakably recognizable as Japanese 
and were immediately abolished, the custom of son-in-law adoption was less eas-
ily defined as such and had a motley career in the postcolonial Korean civil-law 
regime. It was first categorically repealed as a Japanese-imposed custom, then 
reinstated in the new Civil Code of 1960.
Initially, son-in-law adoption was considered one of the quintessential exam-
ples of the Japanese distortion and violation of Korean customs, on par with 
“Japanese-style surnames.” A newspaper article in 1949 reported on a Supreme 
Court (Taebŏbwŏn) decision that nullified son-in-law adoption in South Korea. 
The article, titled “Sŏyangja nŭn sangsokkwŏn ŏpta, chŏnt’ong sallin taebŏpwŏn 
sinp’an’gyŏllye [Sons-in-law have no inheritance rights, new decision by the 
Supreme Court that revived tradition],” described a civil case in which a wife had 
sued her husband for a divorce and nullification of his son-in-law adoption. In the 
local court, she had won the divorce case but failed to nullify the son-in-law adop-
tion. The Supreme Court overturned this decision and nullified the adoption. The 
press interpreted this decision as a denial of son-in-law adoption: “The Japanese 
colonial state, when it was invading [our land], had imported Japanese law in its 
entirety, ignoring our customs, but the Supreme Court decided to invalidate the 
law, since it goes against our custom and the beautiful ways of life [mi’p’ung].”50
The Supreme Court reduced the rights of sons-in-law by establishing that (1) 
sons-in-law cannot become the head of the wife’s household, (2) sons-in-law can-
not become the adopted sons of the parents-in-law, and (3) sons-in-law do not 
have inheritance rights to a parent-in-law’s property. The decision came long 
before the details of the new Civil Code were hammered out, but it illustrates how 
son-in-law adoption could be perceived as a cultural affront in the anticolonial 
ambience of the early liberation period. With this decision the Supreme Court 
redefined and overturned what during the 1930s was lauded and advertised as the 
harbinger of women’s inheritance rights.
Son-in-law adoption did not go down in an easy death, as its proponents began 
pushing for its reinstatement in the new Civil Code. It again appeared as a promi-
nent focus of debate in newspaper reports about the process of drafting a new Civil 
Code. In 1953, in one of the earliest articles about the new Civil Code, a newspaper 
reported that “son-in-law adoption at the least would be abolished,” betraying some 
level of anxiety on the part of those who feared that it would not be abolished.51 Yet 
another article a few years later reported that allowing son-in-law adoption was in 
line with the spirit of abolishing “feudal vestiges” (pong’gŏn chan’jae), by advanc-
ing equality between sons and daughters in inheritance.52 Adoption laws were one 
among the few concessions that women’s groups achieved, and son-in-law adop-
tion was reinstated.53
In newspaper articles introducing and explaining the new Civil Code, married-
in-husband and son-in-law adoption were considered “representative examples 
of how the new Civil Code confers equal legal rights to women as men.”54 In a 
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newspaper column titled, “14-nyŏn kwa yŏsŏng haebang [Fourteen years (after 
liberation) and (finally) the liberation of women],” Yi T’ae-yŏng lauded the 
achievements of the new Civil Code just promulgated in Korea. In an overview Yi 
laid out the details of the revolutionary changes in family law and concluded that 
with these changes “women were finally freed from being merely child-bearers 
[for the husband’s family].”55 Everything was in fact propagated with the language 
of gender equality and the trend of the times (sidae ŭi pyŏnhwa), and the new 
adoption law was evaluated in those terms. What is striking here is the similarity 
between this rhetoric that associated the expansion of women’s rights with son-
in-law adoption and the rhetoric of the colonial government in the 1930s that was 
utilized to garner support for the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform.
Despite the high anticipation about its progressive effects, the hodgepodge 
nature of the various compromises made in the 1960 new Civil Code meant that 
son-in-law adoption was more of an idea than an actual new measure that could 
benefit daughters. A serious catch in the new adoption system was that if the 
adopted child was not from the agnatic kin group, he could not inherit the house-
hold. Therefore, son-in-law adoption was allowed, but with an awkward restraint: 
an adopted son-in-law could never become the heir to the household headship, 
and a son-in-law thus also could not become the heir to ancestral rites. This 
compromise to uphold the lineal laws by restricting inheritance of the house-
hold headship and ancestral rites to agnatic kin was probably to appease the 
 traditionalists in Korea. In addition, the 1960 Civil Code also banned adopted 
sons-in-law from changing their surnames to the wife’s surname. The  compromise 
basically disabled the use of son-in-law adoption and daughter household  headship 
and significantly restricted the inheritance rights of daughters.
Most important, the new laws could not resolve the need and desire of Korean 
families to designate heirs to ancestral rites and the household headship. Even 
though the newspapers emphasized that “times have changed,” customs and 
beliefs did not change that much; many Koreans still believed in ancestral rites 
inheritance and saw adoption as usually a resort only for families that needed an 
heir to ancestral rites.56 While the immediate imperative to abolish  colonial influ-
ences meant that the most apparently Japanese-looking reforms were repudiated, 
reforms that seemed more neutral and were cloaked in the language of moder-
nity remained intact and had a continuing influence on the direction of reforms 
into the new Civil Code of 1960. Still, although the discourse of progress toward 
daughters’ inheritance rights that began during the colonial period had a lasting 
impact on the direction of the reform of family laws after liberation, the new Civil 
Code failed in many ways to fulfill the promise of modernity for Korean women 
because the forces of tradition remained strong in practice.
A newspaper legal inquiry section, “Wŏryo ŭngjŏpsil” (Monday salon), in 1958 
published a letter from a man in his sixties who was wondering if there were a way 
he could adopt his son-in-law as his heir. He himself was an only son, as were his 
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father and grandfather, and although he had tried with all his might to produce a 
natural son for an heir, he had failed. The lawyer explained to him that when the 
new Civil Code was promulgated, he could very well adopt his son-in-law but that 
this adopted son-in-law, as nonagnatic kin, would be ineligible to become the heir 
to the ancestral rites.57
Son-in-law adoption remained an unattractive option for Korean men for both 
cultural and practical reasons. The traditional form of adopted son-in-law, teril 
sawi, was looked down on because it was considered a sign of the man’s incom-
petence and need to depend on his wife’s family. An old Korean saying was that 
if one has only three bushels of coarse barley, one does not become a teril sawi. 
Although a grandchild from an adopted son-in-law could become the heir, for the 
grandson to become eligible as heir, the marriage had to have been registered as 
“married-in husband.”
A newspaper article from November 19, 1965, titled, “Ddak’han munam 
dong’nyŏ” (Pathetic only daughter) relays a story about a mother of three who 
sent an appeal letter to the family court in Seoul about her predicament as an only 
child. Since her natal family was in danger of being “discontinued” (chŏlga), and 
her husband was unwilling to leave his house for her house, she was considering 
getting a divorce to marry another man willing to marry into her family (ippu 
honin). To this the judge who answered her query agreed that son-in-law adoption 
was practically unrealizable in Korea “because of a [culture that emphasizes] men’s 
face,” meaning it would be too demeaning for the husband to become an adopted 
son-in-law. He sympathized with the woman’s situation and agreed that family law 
should be revised to implement “same surnames for married couples.” Another 
article a few days later reintroduced this letter but emphasized the judge’s advice 
that the woman’s decision to get a divorce to continue her natal family was an 
“extremely dangerous thought” (wihŏm ch’ŏnmanhan saeng’gak).58 If the husband 
was unwilling to become an adopted son-in-law—and such a decision indeed was 
understandable, it was implied, as son-in-law adoption would scar the husband’s 
pride—the judge advised that the woman had the option to arrange a posthumous 
adoption for her father. The article then provided information about the  procedure 
in detail, probably to educate the readers challenged with the same issue. 
C ONCLUSION
Contrary to state propaganda, the 1940 Civil-Ordinances Reform neither abol-
ished discrimination nor granted equal rights to colonized Koreans. Instead, it 
attempted to strengthen the household system by naturalizing it with the new 
name system and continuing the reform discourses to expand daughters’ inheri-
tance rights. From the perspective of women’s and family issues, what is remark-
able about the reform was not its conspicuous break from the past as a drastic 
assimilatory measure but its continued policy toward reform in the inheritance 
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regime. Reform discourses that continued into the 1940s left a long and strong 
legacy in postcolonial Korea. Examination of civil cases after the 1945 indepen-
dence and the 1960 new Civil Code shows that the legacy of the colonial custom-
ary laws lived on in Korea. Even though the postcolonial period brought a broad 
abolishment of Japanese legacies, the household system, with its strong patriarchal 
rights, was slow to be identified as one of those legacies. Although the purpose 
of strengthening the rights of the household head supposedly was to dismantle 
the Korean lineage system, rather ironically, household-head rights came to be 
accepted as a Korean tradition rather than a Japanese import.
118
Conclusion
It was not until the twenty-first century that the long legacy of the household 
system finally began its demise. Despite the consistent efforts of women’s rights 
activists, the laws that upheld the small patriarchal family persisted throughout 
the postcolonial decades.1 Incremental reforms since the 1970s expanded women’s 
rights in a piecemeal manner, but the system itself was preserved.2 The movement 
to abolish the household-head system took a decisive turn in the 2000s, when, in 
the recession after the International Monetary Fund takeover of Korean financial 
reform and with the wind of newly kindled anticolonial sentiment at their backs, 
the reform activists reframed the issue of household-head abolition as an anticolo-
nial project rather than as a movement for gender equality.3 The new anticolonial 
strategy proved to be very effective in rekindling public debate over the household-
head system. Also helpful was the demographic transformation of Korean society 
that was underway. The continuing decrease in the birthrate and the shrink-
ing family size meant that society could no longer sustain the demands of the 
household-head system, where sons were required to continue the family lineage.4 
Beginning in 2003 public hearing sessions over the legality of the household-head 
system were held at the National Assembly. In 2005 the National Assembly passed 
a new family law that did away with the household-registration system that had 
formed the basis of civil administration since the end of the colonial period. With 
it, the basis of the small patriarchal family too was drastically weakened.
In this book I have shown how it was that the small patriarchal family came 
to be the dominant unit of family organization in Korea in the colonial period. 
The process, essentially, was a contest between the strong agnatic principles of 
the existing lineage system in Korea and the household-based family system from 
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Japan. Women on the margin of the family emerged as critical agents in articulat-
ing the new family boundary established by Japanese colonial policy and abetted 
by a new legal framework, as it chipped away at the agnatic principles and the 
strong lineage ties that, in the Japanese view, were a barrier to the integration of 
Koreans into the larger empire.
The trajectory of household consolidation that I trace shows how this process 
affected different kinds of women in succession—first widows, then daughters, 
wives, and concubines. Women often were on the forefront of change, as they had 
been particularly affected in the course of lineage formation and the strengthen-
ing of agnatic principles in inheritance that marginalized their position in fam-
ily-property relations. A widow’s right to inherit the ancestral rites and family 
property was in an increasingly ambivalent position by the end of the nineteenth 
century, with some widows driven to the extreme margins of the family. As the 
various court cases examined here illustrate, widows found new support in pro-
tecting their rights in the colonial legal system. As the new colonial policy aimed to 
strengthen the boundary around the household against the reaches of the lineages, 
widowed household heads were protected against the claims of lineage elders.
The emergence of new reform discourses in the 1920s and the 1930s that tar-
geted certain Korean customs gave the Government General further pretext for 
strengthening the household system. This is evident in the debate over a proposal 
to extend inheritance rights to daughters through allowing son-in-law adoption 
in Korea, presented as an opportunity for women to gain greater equality. The 
debate over concubinage, also framed as a modernizing reform, became, as we 
have seen, an avenue for introducing ideals of conjugal love. The language of con-
jugal love, used by Korean litigants at this time in lawsuits over divorce and inheri-
tance, worked in the direction of consolidating the household. It proved, as well, 
to be one of the many instances where change did not necessarily mean equality, 
as it emphasized a woman’s dependence on the household head, the male spouse. 
In a final effort to legally consolidate the household, in 1940 the Japanese colo-
nial state launched the assimilatory Civil-Ordinances Reform, implementing the 
Name-Change Policy and son-in-law adoption. The latter, as shown, was compro-
mised by the remnants of Korean agnatic principles. As a result, daughters were 
not allowed to become heirs to households in Korea. Thus, while the Japanese 
household system had gained legal predominance in many respects, compromises 
made along the way led to a severely constrained inheritance regime in the post-
1945 era, where adoptees from outside of a lineage (adopted sons-in-law or non-
kin) were denied full inheritance rights.
An important aspect of the process of implementing the household system, 
highlighted by the court cases examined here, is that it was not carried out uni-
laterally by the colonial state but involved the participation of many Koreans with 
competing desires. Those who took to heart the promise of equality and the poten-
tial of progress excitedly supported assimilatory measures such as son-in-law 
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adoption to bring Korea closer to the goal of equal inheritance. Others criticized 
such assimilatory measures to defend the agnatic principles of the Korean lin-
eage system. As we have seen, much of the conflict unfolded in the colonial court 
system, as women litigated against their own families, who were keen to protect 
the agnatic principles of the lineage system. In other words, the colonial house-
hold system was shaped through competing and at times conflicting desires of 
the Koreans as well as the colonial objectives of the Japanese state. In the end, the 
desire to maintain the agnatic principle won out, especially after Koreans regained 
independence in 1945.
How colonized Koreans’ desire for a modern conjugal family was implicated in 
the colonial policy of assimilation sheds new light on the workings of the family 
system in the Japanese Empire at large. Colonized Koreans’ desire for legal assimi-
lation to realize what they perceived as a more progressive and modern conjugal 
family challenges us to rethink the nature of the Japanese wartime family system 
and its place in the Japanese Empire as a whole. So far, the dominant understand-
ing has been that the Meiji family system of Japan was antithetical to the modern 
ideals of family, such as love marriage and conjugal love.5 In the same vein the 
cultural ideal of “home” (katei) was conceptualized as a resistance point to the 
“lineal family” (ie).6 What my analysis of the Korean cases show, in contrast, is that 
in colonial Korea the modern ideals of family seem to have very much worked 
through the incremental entrenchment of the family system into everyday lives 
of the colonial subjects rather than in resistance to it. In other words, although 
the legal arrangement of the Japanese family system was not entirely progressive 
and modern, it was perceived as such, partly because it was different enough from 
existing family structures in Korea to propel change toward the direction of mod-
ernization. Also, the progressive and “civilizing” language in which it was couched 
led the colonial subjects to demand more reforms toward the ideals it purport-
edly espoused.7 Colonial subjects in Korea, therefore, perceived the Japanese fam-
ily ideology as potentially conducive to realizing modern family ideals and thus 
creatively engaged with the Japanese colonial state to further demand progressive 
measures that would push the colonial customary laws in that direction.8 The col-
laborative relationship that emerged in the process challenges the previously dom-
inant view in colonial history that emphasized the dichotomy of domination and 
resistance. Yet taking the perspective of women in the civil courts has enabled us 
to see the conflation of modern family ideals and the Japanese family system, with 
its long legacy in the postcolonial period in Korea, as the small patriarchal family 
continued to provide the framework of family organization for decades to come.
My goal has been to shift the previous focus of women’s history in Korea in sev-
eral ways. In emphasizing the continuity across the 1945 divide, I move the focus 
of the history of women’s rights in South Korea away from the concerns of postco-
lonial feminism and place it in the larger historical context. I have also emphasized 
women litigants from various walks of life entering the colonial civil courts to 
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wage private struggles for personal gains instead of educated women pushing for 
a more universal expansion of women’s rights in the postcolonial period. Many of 
these women existed outside the small coterie of New Women, who have received 
the lion’s share of attention in the history of women in colonial Korea. The female 
litigants who appear in this book were not feminists per se, but in their personal 
legal pursuits they expose for us the legal conundrums of the colonial legal system, 
where the contradictions and the gaps between the colonial household system and 
the Korean lineage system posed particular problems as well as new  opportunities. 
Female litigants continue to expose for us the legal conundrum that remains in 
today’s family law even after the 2005 abolition of the household-head system. 
A series of recent lawsuits over lineage property show that the 2005 abolition 
began a process larger than just the abolition of the household-head system. In the 
first decade of the 2000s, two groups of daughters sued their lineage  organizations 
for an equal distribution of profits from the disposal of lineage property. These 
 daughters accused the lineage system of perpetuating sex discrimination, which 
violated the Korean Constitution. Some lineages excluded daughters who had 
married; other lineages distributed more money to male members of the  lineage.9 
As the title of a newspaper article (“Dasi pulpunnŭn ‘ddaldŭl ŭi chŏnjaeng 
[Daughters’ war reignited]”) aptly captured, these cases signaled the fact that there 
was a new kind of attack on the lineage system. By asking for equal inheritance as 
their brothers, these women were challenging the very basis of lineage organiza-
tion, namely, the principle of agnatic inheritance. Although both groups of women 
lost their cases, the mere fact that these cases went as far as they did in the legal 
system signals that the Korean lineage system may be finally nearing its end.10
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Chronolo gy
Era Names and Events Legal Changes
Koryŏ, 918–1392
Chosŏn, 1392–1910
Monogamy enforced, 1413
Chastity land (susinjŏn) rescinded, 1466
Widow remarriage banned, 1485
Imjin War, 1592–98
Kanghwa Treaty, 1876
Kapsin Coup, 1884
Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95
Kabo Reforms, 1894–96: Ban on widow 
 remarriage lifted; discrimination against 
sons of concubines (sŏja) abolished
Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5
Korea becomes Japan’s protectorate, 1905
Japanese assume control of legal matters 1909
Modern court system first established, 1909
Civil-Registration Law (Minsekihō, 民籍法), 1909
Annexation of Korea, 1910
Civil Ordinances (Minjirei, 民事令), 1912
Concubines denied registration, 1915
Divorce by consent acknowledged, 1915
Common Law (共通法), 1918
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March First Movement, 1919
Beginning of Cultural Rule, 1920
Civil-Ordinances Reform, 1921
(implemented 1922): Japanese Civil 
Code extended to parental rights, legal 
 sponsorship, assistantship, and family 
 council for persons of legal incapacity
Civil-Ordinances Reform, 1922
(implemented 1923): Japanese Civil Code 
extended to age of marriage, judicial divorce, 
recognition of child, parental rights, legal 
sponsorship, assistantship, family council, 
acknowledgement of inheritance, and divi-
sion of property.
Regulations on Korean household 
 registration (朝鮮戸籍令), 1922 
( implemented 1923)
Manchurian Incident, 1931
Second Sino-Japanese War begins, 1937
Beginning of Korean volunteer corps, 1938
Civil-Ordinances Reform, 1939 (imple-
mented 1940)
Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation, 1945
U.S. military government in (South) Korea 
(USAMGIK, 1945–48)
Separate governments established in North 
and South Koreas, 1948
(South Korea)
Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1948
Korean War, 1950–53
New Civil Code (Sin-minpŏp), 1960
Pak Chung-hee presidency, 1960–79
Chun Du-hwan presidency, 1980–87
June Uprising, 1987
Roh T’ae-woo presidency, 1987–93
Kim Dae-jung presidency, 1997–2002
Roh Muhyun presidency, 2002–7
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Household-head system (hojuje) declared 
unconstitutional, 2003
Abolition of the household-head system, 
2005
Family-relations registry
(kajok kwan’gye tŭngnokpu), 2008
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Glossary
ai 愛
apsa 壓死
besseki yizai 別籍異財
biten 美点
Bunka Seiji 文化政治
bunke 分家
bunseki 分籍
chakushi 嫡子
chei pu’in 第二婦人
ch’injokhoe (J: shinzokukai) 親族会
ch’inyŏng 親迎
chŏn’an 奠雁
chŏn’ga 傳家
ch’ongbu 冢婦
chong’ga 宗家
chongpŏp 宗法
ch’ŏngri 聽理
ch’ŏp 妾
Chōsen kōtō hōin 朝鮮高等法院
Chōsen kōtō hōin hanketsuroku 朝鮮高等法院 判決録
chumin tŭngnok 住民登録
Chūsūin 中枢院
Daishin’in 大審院
dōka 同化
enchō-shugi 延長主義
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fukushin hōin 副審法院
Girei Junsoku 儀礼準則
hanryo 伴侶
heifū 弊風
hojŏk (J: koseki) 戸籍
hojuje 戸主制
honseki (K: pon’jŏk) 本籍
hōritsukon shugi 法律婚主義
ie (K: ka) 家
ie-seido 家制度
ikkei iji 一系維持
inkyo 隠居
isshi dōjin 一視同仁
jo’i (sosa) 召史
kaitō (K: hoedap) 回答
kajang 家長
kajok kwan’gye tŭngnokpu 家族關係登錄簿
kanshū 慣習
kasan (J: kazan) 家産
katei 家庭
katoku sōzoku 家督相続
keishō 継承
ketsu’i 決意
kokumin dōtoku 国民道徳
kokutai 国体
kōminka (K: hwangminhwa) 皇民化
koryuksong 骨肉訟
Kosekihō 戸籍法
koshu (K: hoju) 戸主
Kyōtsūhō 共通法
mindo 民度
Minjirei 民事令
minjok malsal chŏng’ch’aek 民族抹殺政策
minseki 民籍
mi’p’ung (J: bifū) 美風
muko yōshi 婿養子
munhoe 門會
munjung (J: monchū) 門中
munki 文記
munkwŏn 文券
musong 無訟
naichika 内地化
naisen ittai 内鮮一体
namjon yŏbi (J: danson johi) 男尊女卑
nap’ye 納幣
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ninchi 認知
ninjō 人情
nyūfu kon’in (K: ippu honin) 入夫婚姻
pan-ch’inyŏng 半親迎
pon’gwan 本貫
Pŏppu 法部
pun’ga pyŏl’jae 分家別財
ryōsai kenbo 良妻賢母
sahu yangja 死後養子
saishi sōzoku (K: chesa sangsok) 祭祀相続
sedaeju 世帯主
senyū 占有
shi (K: ssi) 氏
shōkei 承継
shuzoku shugi 種族主義
sŏja 庶子
sojong 小宗
somok 昭穆
sŏng (J: sei) 姓
Sōshi Kaimei 創氏改名
sŏyangja ibyang 婿養子入養
susinjŏn 守信田
Taebŏbwŏn 大法院
taejong 大宗
todokede shugi 届出主義
tokuyū zaisan 特有財産
tong’gŏ’in 同居人
tongsŏng tongbon kyŏrhon 同姓同本結婚
tsūchō 通牒
tsureko 連子
Ŭiyong Minpŏp 依用民法
ŭmsaji 淫祀地
wit’o 位土
woesaek 倭色
yangban 兩班
Yurim 儒林
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version of Kyǒngkuk taejǒn also is said to have carried provisions against sons of thrice- 
married women. Debates about banning widows from remarrying began as early as 1389, 
when heated debate erupted in 1468 over Kim Kae (1405–84), whose mother married three 
times and yet achieved a high-ranking status through royal favor. Deuchler, Confucian 
Transformation of Korea, 277–79.
42. Deuchler, Confucian Transformation of Korea, 161.
43. Widows in the Koryŏ dynasty also remarried without social taboo. Deuchler, Con-
fucian Transformation of Korea, 72.
44. Deuchler, Confucian Transformation of Korea, 221, 265.
45. Anne Griffiths, “Doing Ethnography, Living Law: Life Histories and Narratives in 
Botswana,” Practicing Ethnography in Law: New Dialogues, Enduring Methods, ed. June 
Starr and Mark Goodale (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 160–81.
46. There is a debate over whether China possessed a civil-law tradition before the im-
pact of Western legal tradition. Philip Huang has argued that China did have a civil-law 
tradition, although it was not codified or compiled as such. Civil Justice in China: Representa-
tion and Practice in the Qing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). Jérôme Bourgon de-
nies that these were civil laws; instead, he states, they were merely examples of abnormalities 
or local eccentricities, without a noticeable trend toward norm building such as happened in 
Europe. Korea, having been under Chinese civilizational influence, thus had a similar lack of 
civil-law tradition. See “Rights, Freedoms, and Customs in the Making of Chinese Civil Law, 
1900–1936,” in Realms of Freedom in Modern China, ed. William C. Kirby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002); and Bourgon, “Uncivil Dialogue: Law and Custom Did Not Merge 
into Civil Law under the Qing,” Late Imperial China 23, no. 1 (2002): 50–90.
47. For more information on the late Chosŏn legal system, see Sun Joo Kim and 
Jungwon Kim, Wrongful Deaths: Selected Inquest Records from Nineteenth-Century Korea 
 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014).
138    Notes
48. Chŏng Chi-yŏng [Jung Ji Young], “Chosŏn sidae hon’in changryŏch’aek kwa tok-
sin yŏsŏng [Single women and the policy of promoting marriage in the Chosŏn dynasty],” 
Han’guk Yŏsŏnghak 20, no. 3 (2004): 9.
49. Kim Pyŏng-hwa, Han’guk sabŏpsa, 2:212–16.
50. Cho Yun-sŏn, Chosŏn hugi sosong yŏngu, 18, 159, 202.
51. Cho Yun-sŏn, Chosŏn hugi sosong yŏngu, 160–61.
52. Later in the colonial period this concept of “separate family, separate property” be-
came besseki yizai (separate register, separate property), a translation modified to fit the 
household-registration system.
53. Cho Ŭn, “Kabujangjŏk chilsŏhwa wa pu’in gwŏn ŭi yakhwa,” in Choe, Chosŏn 
chŏn’gi kabujangje wa yŏsŏng, 238.
54. Asami Rintarō’s idea of linear progress from collective to individual property, there-
fore, was erroneous. Chōsen hōseishi kō [A study of Korean legal history] (Tokyo: Ganshodo 
Shoten, 1922).
55. Deuchler, Confucian Transformation of Korea, 157–58.
56. Susinjŏn was abolished in 1466 as a result of reform in office land. See Deuchler, 
Confucian Transformation of Korea, 278. For a detailed list of court debates over widows’ in-
heritance rights, see Cho Ŭn, “Kabujangjŏk chilsŏhwa wa pu’in gwŏn ŭi yakhwa,” in Choe, 
Chosŏn chŏn’gi kabujangje wa yŏsŏng, 233–37.
57. Deuchler, Confucian Transformation of Korea, 161.
58. Son Kwang-hyŏn vs. Choe Tŭk-ch’ung, in Mun Suk-cha, Chosŏn sidae chaesan sang-
sok kwa kajok, 159–68.
59. Yi Ham vs. Kim Sa-won, in Mun Suk-cha, Chosŏn sidae chaesan sangsok kwa kajok, 
169–74.
60. Mun Suk-cha, Chosŏn sidae chaesan sangsok kwa kajok, 175–76, 178.
61. Cho Yun-sŏn, Chosŏn hugi sosong yŏngu, 200.
62. Mun Suk-cha, Chosŏn sidae chaesan sangsok kwa kajok, 104–5, 168–70.
2 .  WID OWED HOUSEHOLD HEADS AND THE NEW B OUNDARY  
OF THE FAMILY
1. Yi Sŭng-il, “Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu ŭi pŏpche chŏngch’aek e tehan yŏngu.”
2. It is difficult to consider civil cases in the East Asian legal tradition since Civil Codes 
did not exist separate from penal codes, which dominated the judicial system. There is a 
debate over whether China possessed a civil-law tradition before the impact of Western 
legal tradition. In Civil Justice in China, Philip Huang has argued that China did have a 
civil-law tradition, although it was not codified or compiled as such. Jérôme Bourgon 
denies that these were civil laws; instead, he states, they were merely examples of abnor-
malities or local eccentricities, without a noticeable trend toward norm building such as 
happened in Europe. Korea, having been under Chinese civilizational influence, thus had 
a similar lack of civil-law tradition. See “Rights, Freedoms, and Customs,” in Kirby, Realms 
of Freedom; and Bourgon, “Uncivil Dialogue.” Recently, Marie Seong-hak Kim has added a 
Korean perspective to this debate, largely siding with Bourgon. Kim notes that both Japan 
and Korea follow the Chinese legal tradition centered on state law and argues that Korea 
also lacked a tradition of civil law. Law and Custom, 41, 73–78.
Notes    139
3. Marie Kim, Law and Custom, 41. See also Kim Pyŏng-hwa, Han’guk Sabŏpsa, 1:212. 
On this issue, Asami Rintarō (1869–1943) also notes that there was no process of customary 
law production in Korea, although he used this statement to emphasize Korea’s backward-
ness and deny the validity of Korean customs in matters of property rights. Asami also 
overlooked the fact that Japan shared this lack with Korea. Chōsen hōseishi kō [A study of 
Korean legal history] (Tokyo: Ganshodo Shoten, 1922), 381.
4. According to Takushokukyoku, Ōshū rekkoku shokuminchi hōsei gaiyō [Outline of 
colonial legal systems of European empires] (1911), Japan modeled its colonial legal system 
mostly after Germany’s, but also took notes from British policies in acknowledging local 
customs. Chŏng Kŭng-sik, Han’guk kŭndaepŏpsa go [A study of the Korean legal system] 
(Seoul: Pakyŏngsa, 2001), 350. For examples of legal policies in European colonies, see Cha-
nock, Social Order; Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire 
in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Rich-
ard Roberts and Kristin Mann, eds., Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1991).
5. Yi Yŏng-mi, “Chōsen tōkanfu ni okeru hōmu hosakan seido to kanshū chōsa jigyō: 
Ume Kenjirō to Oda Mikijirō wo chūshin ni (4) [Judicial advisory system of the Resident-
General Office and the customs-survey project: Focusing on Ume Kenjirō and Oda Mikijirō, 
no. 4],” Hōgaku Shirin 99, no. 3 (2002): 184.
6. Kim Pyŏng-hwa, Han’guk sabŏpsa, 1:20–25; Yumi Moon, Populist Collaborators: The 
Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896–1910 (Cornell University Press, 2013), 
33–35.
7. More biographical information about Ume Kenjirō can be found in Yi Yŏng-mi, 
Han’guk sabŏp, 296.
8. Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 235–41.
9. Yi Yŏng-mi, “Chōsen tōkanfu ni okeru hōmu hosakan seido to kanshū chōsa jigyō: 
Ume Kenjirō to Oda Mikijirō wo chūshin ni (3) [Judicial advisory system of the Resident-
General Office and the customs-survey project: Focusing on Ume Kenjirō and Oda Mikijirō, 
no. 3],” Hōgaku Shirin 99, no. 2 (2001): 223, 239.
10. Yūhō Kyōkai, ed., Chōsen ni okeru shihō seido kindaika no sokuseki, 97–99.
11. There were more Korean lawyers than Japanese lawyers. Against 835 Korean lawyers 
(55 percent), there were 666 Japanese lawyers throughout the colonial period. Chŏng Kŭng-
sik, Han’guk pŏpchesa go, 274.
12. So Hyŏn-suk [So Hyun Soog], “Singminji sigi kŭndaejŏk ihon chedo wa yŏsŏng ŭi 
tae’ŭng [A study on the modern divorce and women as historical actors during the Japanese 
colonial period in Korea]” (PhD diss., Hanyang University, Seoul, 2013), 83–84. An older 
figure from the Meiji period (“Minji soshō hiyōhō, Meiji 23-nen [1890]”) is listed in Chōsen 
Sōtokufu Saibansho Kōtō Hōin, Chōsen shihō teiyō [Summary explanation of laws in Korea] 
(Keijō [Seoul]: Ganshōdō Keijōten, 1923), 547. One can see the variety of fees, according 
to this record, involved in bringing a case to the courts: scribes, drawings (land related), a 
translator (if needed), wages for witnesses, fiscal stamps (inshi), and mailing fees, among 
other expenses, on top of lawyers, if applicable.
13. Kim Tong-in, “Yakan jaŭi sŭlp’ŭm,” in Yakan jaŭi sŭlp’ŭm oe [Sadness of the weak 
and other works], ed. Kim Yun-sik (Seoul: Pŏm’u, 2004), 54–60. The novel was originally 
140    Notes
published in Kaebyŏk’s inaugural issue in 1919. I thank Jun Yoo for informing me about this 
novel.
14. Chŏng Kwang-hyŏn, Han’guk kajokpŏp yŏngu [Research on the Korean family law] 
(Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1967). A more detailed overview of the position of “dis-
tortion” in earlier studies on the colonial civil laws can be found in Hong Yang-hŭi [Hong 
Yang-hee], “Singminji sigi ch’injok kwansŭp ŭi ch’angch’ul kwa ilbon minpŏp [Invention of 
family customs during the colonial period and the Japanese Civil Code],” Chŏngsin Mun-
hwa Yŏngu 28, no. 3 (2005): 123–24. See also Yi Sŭng-il [Lee Seung-il], “1910, 20 nyŏndae 
Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu ŭi pŏpche chŏngch’aek: Chosŏn minsaryŏng che 11 -cho ‘kwansŭp’ ŭi 
sŏngmunhwa rŭl chungsim ŭro [Legal policy of the Korean Government General in the 
1910s to 1920s: Centering on the codification of custom [shown in] Civil Ordinances in 
Korea article 11],” Tongbang Hakpo 126 (June 2004).
15. Marie Kim, Law and Custom, 175.
16. In “Singminji sigi ch’injok kwansŭp ŭi ch’angch’ul kwa ilbon minpŏp,” Hong Yang-
hŭi also states that the postcolonial scholars in Korea also assumed that a uniformed set of 
Korean customs existed in Korea before the onset of the colonial rule.
17. Hong and Yang, “Singminji sabŏp kwanryo ŭi kajok ‘kwansŭp’ insik kwa gendŏ 
chilsŏ,” 176. For the process of customs surveys and how it combined field surveys and 
textual studies, please see Chōsen Sōtokufu Chūsūin, Chōsen kyūkan seido chōsa jigyō gaiyō 
[Outline of the customs-survey project in Korea] (Keijō [Seoul], 1938); Chŏng Kwang-
hyŏn, Han’guk kajokpŏp yŏngu; Chŏng Kŭng-sik, Kugyŏk kwansŭp chosa pogosŏ; Yi Sŭng-il, 
Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu pŏpche chŏngch’aek, 117–37; and Yang Hyun-ah, Han’guk kajokpŏp ilki 
(Seoul: Ch’angbi, 2011), 114–15.
18. Concubinage was nonetheless acknowledged as part of the custom in divorce cases. 
Please see chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.
19. With the Official Notice 240 (August 7, 1915), concubines could no longer be regis-
tered in household registers. Yi Chŏng-sŏn, “Han’guk kŭndae hojŏk chedo ŭi pyŏnch’ŏn: 
Minjŏkpŏp ŭi pŏpchejŏk t’ŭkching ŭl chungsim ŭro [Transformation of the modern Ko-
rean household registration system: Focusing on the legal characteristics of the Civil Reg-
istration Law],” Han’guksaron 55 (2009): 275–328; So, “Singminji sigi kŭndaejŏk ihon chedo 
wa yŏsŏng ŭi tae’ŭng,” 220.
20. Terazawa Tokusaburo, “Kanshū chōsa: Kōkaido chihō [Customs survey: Hwang-
haedo region],” manuscript, 1924; and Ariga Keitarō, “Kosekini kansuru jikō: Chūwa-gun 
[Cases concerning household registers: Chunghwa county],” manuscript, 1913, both in East 
Asian Rare Collection, C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
Terazawa’s report lists the occupation of the interviewees, while Ariga’s report has the age 
of those interviewed. Terazawa’s report was part of a series of investigations on customs 
commissioned by the Central Council in 1921. For more information, please see E. Taylor 
Atkins, Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945 (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2010), 69–70.
21. Cho Pyŏng-jo, “Gogun no kyūkan chōsa hōkokusho [Report of old customs in five 
counties],” manuscript, 1919, East Asian Rare Collection, C. V. Starr East Asian Library. 
Chŏng Chi-yŏng notes that kajang in the Chosŏn dynasty was quite distinct from hoju: 
while hoju was the first name listed in the household register, kajang had the authority 
over family members. “Chosŏn sidae ‘kajang’ ŭi chiwi wa ch’aegim: Pŏpchŏn ŭi kyujŏng ŭl 
Notes    141
chungsim ŭro [Family head in Chosŏn dynasty: Focusing on the rules in the law codes],” 
Kajok Kwa Munhwa 25, no. 1 (2013): 121–49.
22. Yi Yŏng-mi, “Kankoku kindai koseki kanren hōkyu no seitei oyobi kaisei katei,” 13–14.
23. In principle the legal system in colonial Korea was not based on a common-law 
system bound by legal precedents, but in practice precedents had a strong influence on how 
later cases were decided. Marie S. Kim explains this as the following: “The Chosŏn High 
Court effectively engaged in creating law based on precedents. The colonial customary law 
regime amounted to a common-law system in Korea. The lower courts were strongly urged 
to follow the highest court’s decisions, although there was no recognition of the principle of 
stare decisis.” Kim, Law and Custom, 207.
24. Chōsen Sōtokufu Hōmukyoku Hōmuka, Chōsen no shihō seido [Judicial system of 
Korea] (Keijō [Seoul], 1936), 33–34.
25. Similar dynamics have been examined in other colonial situations. See Roberts and 
Mann, Law in Colonial Africa, 22. Women in Egypt used the colonial courts as forums for 
affirming their legal rights. See May Ann Fay, “From Warrior-Grandees to Domesticated 
Bourgeoisie: The Transformation of the Elite Egyptian Household into a Western-Style 
Nuclear Family,” in Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender, ed. 
Beshara Doumani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 77–78.
26. Chōsen Kōtō Hōin Shokika, Hanketsuroku, 4:1–4, 5–10.
27. Pŏppu sojang, 7:593, 603, 609. There were three separate appeal letters on behalf of 
this widow.
28. Cho Yun-sŏn, Chosŏn hugi sosong yŏngu, 62–67.
29. This, of course, is only one case and does not represent the overall condition of 
women’s legal status in the Chosŏn period. Jisoo Kim tells us that women’s power for legal 
representation was quite strong during the Chosŏn dynasty. Emotions of Justice.
30. Chōsen Sōtokufu, Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho [Customs-survey report] (Keijō [Seoul], 
1912), 16, 310.
31. Chōsen Sōtokufu, Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho, 352, 356; emphasis added.
32. Chōsen Sōtokufu, Kanshū chōsa hōkokusho, 297.
33. Official Notice 240; Yi Sŭng-il, “1910, 20 nyŏndae Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu ŭi pŏpche 
chŏngch’aek: Chosŏn minsaryŏng che 11 -cho ‘kwansŭp’ ŭi sŏngmunhwa rŭl chungsim ŭro; Yi 
Sŭng-il [Lee Seung-il], “Chosŏn hojŏngnyŏng chejŏng e kwanhan yŏngu [A study about the 
Household-Registration Law (of colonial Korea)],” Pŏpsahak Yŏngu 32 (October 2005): 37–68.
34. Son Pyŏng-gyu, Hojŏk, 1606–1923: Hogu kirok ŭro pon Chosŏn ŭi munhwasa 
[Household registry: Cultural history of the Chosŏn dynasty seen through census records, 
1606–1923]” (Seoul: Hyumŏnisŭtŭ, 2007), 27–28, 34–35, 39–53.
35. Son Pyŏng-gyu argues that because the household registry was used to collect 
household tax, registries from the Chosǒn dynasty were manipulated to shrink the number 
of households. Hojŏk, 310–29. Chuho was a more common term for household heads during 
the Chosŏn dynasty, but hoju or hosu were also used (168–69).
36. Chŏng Chi-yŏng, Chilsŏ ŭi kuch’uk kwa kyunyŏl, 264–65.
37. Terazawa, “Kanshū chōsa: Kōkaido chihō.”
38. Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 201–2. Kyung Moon Hwang argues that from the per-
spective of the rationalization efforts of the state, there is a continuity between the Kwang-
mu Registry of 1896 and the Japanese-installed household registry. Yet this rationalization 
142    Notes
attempt in the Kwangmu Registry was far from perfect, as there was not much time to 
realize its goals. Despite the goal of more accurately depicting existing households, the 
Kwangmu Registry captured only one third of the number of households recorded by the 
first household registers (minseki) under the Japanese. Son Pyŏng-gyu speculates that some 
of the features of the Kwangmu Registry might have originated in the 1871 Meiji household 
registry of Japan. For an overview of the Kwangmu Registry as well as a case study of par-
ticular examples from Tansǒng County, South Kyŏngsang Province, see Son, Hojŏk, 330–55.
39. Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 202.
40. Son Pyŏng-gyu, Hojŏk, 366–70.
41. Yi Yŏng-mi. “Kankoku kindai koseki kanren hōkyu no seitei oyobi kaisei katei.”
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Rules of the House offers a dynamic revisionist account of the Japanese colonial 
rule of Korea (1910–1945) by examining the roles of women in the civil courts. Chal-
lenging the dominant view that women were victimized by the Japanese family laws 
and its patriarchal biases, Sungyun Lim argues that Korean women had to struggle 
equally against Korean patriarchal interests. Moreover, women were not passive vic-
tims; instead, they proactively struggled to expand their rights by participating in the 
Japanese colonial legal system. In turn, the Japanese doctrine of promoting progres-
sive legal rights would prove advantageous to them. Following female plaintiffs and 
their civil disputes from the precolonial Choson dynasty through the colonial period 
and into the postcolonial era, this book presents a new and groundbreaking story 
about Korean women’s legal struggles, revealing their surprising collaborative rela-
tionship with the colonial state.
“A timely and fascinating study, demonstrating the complex interplay between gender 
politics and empire building through the examination of the legal construction of the 
ideal modern family that was deeply implicated with the invention or appropriation of 
tradition. A major contribution to gender history, empire studies, and legal studies.” 
HYAEWEOL CHOI, author of Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, 
Old Ways
“Challenges the conventional nationalist narrative of colonial Korea and restores 
agency to female plaintiffs and defendants. It should be read not only by those inter-
ested in colonial Korea and the Japanese empire, but also by historians of comparative 
and colonial law, the family, and gender.” SUSAN L. BURNS, Professor of History, 
University of Chicago
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